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ABSTRACT
This study examines the behaviour of announcement period returns of bidders and 
targets involved in takeovers and mergers in the U.K. during the period 1985 to July 
1988. In particular it examined the following aspects:
(1) The validity of the ’information hypothesis’ as suggested by Myers and Majluf 
(1984) on bidder returns in cash and share offers.
(2) Comparison of announcement period returns to target shareholders in cash offers 
and those in share offers, in view of the presence of capital gains tax liability for 
shareholders in cash offers and the possibility that the bidders compensate them for 
this liability.
(3) The effect of the takeover announcement on the returns to bidders and targets 
respectively.
(4) The effect of takeover announcements on the wealth of shareholders in the 
combined firm.
(5) The possibility that shareholders in high leveraged bidding firms earn higher 
returns than those in the low leveraged bidding firms.
(6) The effect of merger announcement on the returns to bidders and targets 
respectively.
(7) The effect of merger announcement on the wealth of shareholders in the 
combined firm.
A sample of 90 bidders and targets in hostile bids and 21 bidders and targets in 
mergers which satisfied the sampling requirements were collected for the period 
January 1985 to July 1988. The market model was used to generate expected returns. 
The daily abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for the two-day 
announcement period were used to measure the wealth effect of takeover and merger 
announcement.
For takeovers, the findings of this study show that shareholders of share bidders 
earned significant negative abnormal returns for the two-day announcement period, 
whereas shareholders of cash bidders did not suffer losses, in support of the 
’information hypothesis’ suggested by Myers and Majluf (1984).
The two-day announcement cumulative abnormal returns of all bidders in the 
takeover sample are significantly negative, in support of the notion that takeovers are 
negative net present value investments for bidder shareholders.
However, the combined gains of bidders and targets are significantly positive 
implying that takeovers do create wealth for the shareholders of the combined firm.
Shareholders of target firms in takeovers earned significant positive abnormal 
returns for the two-day announcement period irrespective of the form of payment 
(cash, shares, and combination) offered. However, there was no significant 
difference in the two-day announcement period returns of cash and share targets, in 
support of the notion that target shareholders in cash offers are not compensated for 
their capital gains tax liability.
There is no evidence of shareholders in high leveraged bidding firms earning higher 
returns than those in the low leveraged bidding firms.
For the sample of mergers, the two-day announcement period returns were positive 
for the targets, consistent with the findings of the earlier studies on merger targets in 
the U.K. and the US. The returns to bidders for the same period were not 
significantly different from zero. The combined gains at the two-day announcement 
period were significantly positive implying that the announcement of mergers does 
have a positive wealth effect on the share price of the combined firm. This contrasts 
with the findings of earlier studies which suggest that the combined gains in U.K. 
mergers are not significantly different from zero (Firth (1979)).
This research was based on the assumption that the capital market is at least semi­
strong efficient. Since the analysis covered only eleven days surrounding the official 
announcement, it is not possible to infer that the findings of this study support this 
assumption. However, the significant positive combined gains of bidders and targets 
in both takeovers and mergers at the two-day announcement period imply that the 
securities market is strong form inefficient.
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Chapter 1
An Introduction to Takeovers in the UK
1.1: Introduction
Acquisitions of listed firms in the United Kingdom (U.K.) dates back to at least 
1835 when the National Provincial Bank (now merged with National Westminster) 
acquired the North Devon Bank (Tabb (1981)) but it was not until the late 1950’s that 
takeovers of quoted firms in the U.K. increased dramatically. This increase is 
perhaps directly associated with the passing of the Companies Act 1948, which 
removed the main obstacle faced by bidders until then. It allowed the bidders to 
remove unwilling target Board of Directors through ordinary resolution of simple 
majority once it acquired the target, and also allowed them to approach the target 
shareholders directly, by- passing the target’s management. This laid the foundation 
of hostile takeovers in the U.K. Before 1948, the usual methods of acquisition were 
proxy contests and mergers, carried out through pressure exerted by a third party 
(usually creditors) on the target to accept the bid.
1.2: Factors contributing towards the increase in takeovers in the U.K. since the 
late 1960’s
The increase of hostile takeovers as a means of acquisition in the U.K. since the late 
1960’s was fuelled by a combination of factors such as: the rising stock markets, 
government policies, passing of legislations, lack of willing merger partners (Roberts 
(1987)), and the role of institutional investors and merchant banks in the City (Fallon 
and Srodes (1988)).
1.2.1: Rising stock markets
A substantial part of the consideration in takeovers is made up of shares, 
convertible loan stocks and cash. Shares are more readily accepted as a means of 
payments in takeovers when the stock market is rising.
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Convertible loan stocks are valued not on their interest rate alone but also on their 
right to be converted into shares. Cash is often raised through right issues, that is 
companies issue further shares for cash to their existing shareholders on a pro-rata 
basis at a discount to the market price. This is difficult to accomplish if the stock 
market is weak.
A rising stock market also implies greater demand for shares and therefore 
increased liquidity. Bidders would find it easier to issue new shares for financing 
takeovers.
The greater the demand for shares also implies that when bidders issue shares or debt 
instruments to raise money, they can finance their acquisitions at a lower cost of 
capital.
Rising stock markets are also indicative of an expansionary economy during which 
firms are concerned with expanding their productive capacity to cope with the 
potential increase in demand for their products. One way to speedily accomplish this 
is through acquisition of another firm to gain access to its underutilised production 
facilities (Sharma and Mathur (1989)).
1.2.2: Government policies
Rationalisation policy of the Labour government in the early 1970’s played a vital 
role in initiating takeovers. During this period U.K. firms experienced the impact of 
international competition in their major industries such as textiles, steel, shipbuilding 
and the manufacturing industries in general. It was a general belief that to compete 
effectively firms must be large enough to be cost-effective and must be competitive in 
technology, which required a large investment in Research and Development, 
possible only to large firms. This led to takeovers and mergers among the small and 
medium size firms facilitated by the government agency (now defunct) Industrial 
Reconstruction Corporation (IRC).
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1.2.3: Changes and passing of legislations
A series of legislation was passed from the 1960’s to the early 1980’s which 
directly or indirectly initiated takeovers, such as the abolition of the resale price 
maintenance in the mid 1960’s, the introduction of corporation tax in April 1965, and 
the phasing out of the investment allowance in March 1984.
(a) The abolition of ’Resale Price maintenance’ legislation.
The abolition of the ’Resale Price maintenance’ in the mid 1960’s, that is the right 
of manufacturers to dictate minimum prices at which their branded goods could be 
sold, eliminated the assured profit margins of retailers, and accelerated the growth of 
supermarkets selling greater volumes to compensate for thinner margins. This led to a 
series of takeovers and mergers in the food retail and manufacturing sectors.
The change in the household tradition also contributed towards takeovers in the 
food sector ( Business Week, 24 September 1984). Very few households today are 
still traditional with husband working and wife looking after the house. The dual 
career approach now predominates and such couples are willing to pay more for pre­
prepared meals.
Furthermore, consciousness about health and fitness has increased the demand for 
specialised high cost natural products which earn high profit margins and the 
relatively low growth rate and low share prices of firms in the food sector motivated 
bidders to acquire firms that had the capacity to serve the change in consumer 
demand.
(b) The introduction of corporation tax 1965
The introduction of corporation tax in April 1965 encouraged firms to reinvest 
their profits. Corporation tax was imposed on all profits at a relatively high rate, and 
whatever dividends paid were further subject to income tax. The effect was that firms 
had to generate a considerable amount of profits to maintain the net level of 
dividends they were paying to their shareholders.
3
The amount of profits increase required could not be generated through internal 
growth, and firms resorted to takeovers and mergers to increase their pre-tax profits 
by more than the increase in share capital on which dividends had to be paid.
(c) The phasing out of investment allowance 
The phasing out of investment allowances in March 1984, contributed to the 
latest wave of acquisitions. Before this legislation, firms could write off against their 
profits the entire cost of plant and equipment bought during the year.
This encouraged firm s to be more cap ita l in tensive, which led to rising 
unemployment.
This new legislation modified the speed with which the investment allowance could 
be written off against profits, and thus reduced the tax subsidy on direct investment 
and to a certain extent encouraged growth by acquisition.
1.2.4: Role of institutional investors and merchant banks
The financial backing of m erchant banks and the growth in the level of 
institutional equity holdings in firms has made it easier for bidders because if the 
target is not performing up to expectations, the institutional shareholders will prefer 
to sell their stake to a bidder with a more highly regarded management, very often 
taking the bidder’s own shares as consideration rather than cash. At present 
institutional shareholders such as Unit Trusts, Investment Trusts, Pension Funds and 
Insurance firms hold 70 % of the equity of listed companies in the U.K. (Stock 
Exchange Quarterly, 1988). The role of financial intermediaries such as merchant 
banks in the City also played an important part in initiating takeovers.
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In an effort to be competitive, they started to provide not only the cash needed to 
pursue an offer but also what came to be known as ’support operations’, that is 
buying shares in the open market for their clients, buying assets in the targets for 
their clients on their own accounts and providing the legal, financial, tactical and 
economic intelligence expertise.
This is further fuelled by the success-geared commission schemes, which reduce the 
cost of the takeover for the unsuccessful bidder (Gray and McDermott (1989)). In 
fact, as never before, in the 1980’s a corporate finance department of merchant 
banks (department responsible for the takeover activities) has become a highly 
profitable and prestigious business. For example, in 1985 Morgan Grenfell acted as 
financial adviser in 32 takeovers worth between them £3 billion, and in 1986 it 
handled bids worth £14 billion more than the total value of all bids made in the U.K. 
in any previous year. In 1988 it handled 108 takeovers and mergers worth £13.6 
billion which is 61 % of the total value of mergers and takeovers in 1988 (Sunday 
Times, 29th October 1989). Bids of this scale could not have been possible without 
the support of the merchant banks.
1.2.5: Lack of willing merger partners
Bidders’ inability to find a willing merger partner in their effort to expand into 
their core business so as to attain a fair share of domestic and international market, is 
another possible reason for firms initiating takeovers.
1.3: Means of acquisition in the U.K.
The acquisition of target firms in the U.K. can be consummated through private 
acquisition agreement, takeover bid, mergers by agreement and mergers by scheme 
of arrangement (Begg (1986)).
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1.3.1: Private acquisition agreement
In a private acquisition agreement, a detailed acquisition agreement is negotiated 
between the vendor who can be an individual negotiating on behalf of a tightly-knit 
family business or the management of a business firm and the purchaser, usually 
specifying the amount of shares to be acquired, the form and timing of payments and 
other relevant details such as warranties and indemnities on potential hidden 
liabilities.
1.3.2 Takeover bid
A publicly listed firm usually has a widespread ownership in which case it is not 
possible to negotiate a detailed acquisition agreement with the shareholders, and the 
shares of the target are acquired through a written offer. The bidder, through its 
financial intermediaries, prepares the offer document which details the bidder’s 
intention and presents selective but pertinent information about the offer to entice the 
target shareholders to sell their shares.
The target shareholders are given a limited period within which to accept the offer 
which they will signify by signing and returning forms of acceptance and transfer to 
the purchaser.
In a takeover bid of a listed firm, the bidder will not be able to obtain the protection 
that he could have sought under the detailed acquisition agreement, unless the offer is 
welcomed by the target board, in which case the bidder will have access to the target 
firm’s documents and records other than those publicly available. In a hostile 
takeover bid the bidder assumes a substantial amount of risk of hidden liabilities 
despite the considerable public information available at the disposal of the bidder and 
the fact that listed firms are subject to tighter constraints on their business operations.
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1.3.3 Merger by agreement
A merger by agreement is consummated when two firms of comparable size 
neither of which is in a dominant position, agree to amalgamate and form a new 
holding firm. The shareholders of the two existing firms then exchange their shares 
for the shares issued by the holding firm. The two existing firms which now 
become subsidiaries of the new holding firm, may then be wound up and their assets 
distributed to the new firm.
A merger of this nature is only possible where there is a limited number of 
shareholders involved, most of whom are in agreement with what is proposed, and 
where no third parties (i.e. creditors) are likely to be prejudiced by the merger. 
However in many instances, while the boards of the two firms are in full agreement 
of a merger, the shareholders are too numerous and widespread to permit an 
amalgamation, in which case a merger by scheme of arrangement is initiated.
1.3.4: Merger by scheme of arrangement
A merger by scheme of arrangement overcomes the problems of numerous and 
widely distributed shareholdings and the difficulty of securing consent from all 
shareholders. It requires the agreement of the boards of the firms involved which 
enables them to acquire by order of the court, all the capital of the firms concerned, 
provided the scheme is approved by a simple m ajority of the shareholders 
representing only three fourths in value of the shareholders present and voting at a 
meeting convened under the court’s direction. When the proposal to merge is 
approved by the requisite majority at the shareholders’ meeting, a petition is 
presented to the court for an order sanctioning the agreement.
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Provided the court is satisfied that the scheme is fair and reasonable in the sense that 
statutory requirements have been complied with and the creditors of the firms 
involved are not prejudiced, it will make the necessary order which becomes binding 
on all shareholders when the copy of the order is filed with the Registrar of 
Companies. The shareholders of the firms involved are then sent either cash warrants 
or share certificates depending on the form of consideration agreed upon.
1.4: Hostile takeovers
In the U.K. the term ’takeover bid’ is used for takeovers in contrast to the US term 
’tender offer’. In the U.K. the term ’tender offer’ is usually used in relation to the 
rules governing the Substantial Acquisition of Shares (SAR’s) by potential bidders. 
SAR’s provides a mechanism known as ’tender offer’ which is in effect a seven day 
partial offer up to 29.9 % of the target shares, in an effort to build up a substantial 
stake to be followed by a full offer.
Takeovers can be in a form of agreed takeovers, in which the target’s board 
recommends the bidder’s offer to its shareholders, or hostile takeovers, in which the 
target’s board advises its shareholders to reject the offer.
The increase in popularity of hostile takeovers in the U.K. in the 1980’s is possibly 
due to the lack of willing merger partners and the active role played by merchant 
banks in initiating takeovers.
1.5: Control versus financial motive in takeovers
In the U.K., a firm can purchase the shares of another firm with the intent to achieve 
entity control when its purchases exceeds 29.9% of the target’s outstanding shares. 
Entity control means the right to manage the resources of the target firm which 
includes the right to hire, fire and set the compensation level of top management 
(Fama (1980)).
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The shares purchased by one firm in another firm can also be viewed as a financial 
investment, which will provide a way for the purchaser to change the timing and/or 
risk of the net cash flows of its firm, for which purpose the purchaser can acquire a 
maximum of 29.9% of the target’s shares. However, for purchases exceeding 29.9% 
of the target’s shares, the Takeover Code requires the purchaser to make a formal 
offer to the target shareholders to acquire control of the target’s resources.
The relevance of this classification is important because it differentiates between a 
financial (i.e. no change in the targets current production/investments is required) 
motive and a control motive (i.e. which implies an implementation of a different 
production or investment strategy for the target). The fact that most takeovers 
specify a minimum number of shares that must be accepted by target’s shareholders 
before the offer will be considered unconditional, is consistent with control motive of 
bidders engaged in takeovers.
In the U.K. it is considered by the Takeover Panel and generally accepted that the 
holder of 30 % or more of the voting rights of a public firm can in practice secure the 
passing of an ordinary resolution and can therefore control the composition of the 
board of the firm. In practice, it is most unusual for a takeover offer in the U.K. to 
end in anything other than the achievement of total control of the target or in failure. 
In this respect, takeovers in the U.K. are different from those in the US or in 
Australia where it is common for takeovers to be made with the objective of 
obtaining only a majority of the voting rights.
Consistent with the control motive, takeovers are employed by bidding firms to 
effect a more profitable allocation of the combined resources of the two firms. 
However, control motive does not distinguish between cases in which a takeover is 
an attempt to improve the current operations of the target firm per se and those in 
which the objective is to realise the synergies available through a combination of the 
resources in both firms.
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1.6: Possible reasons for acquisitions
There can be many combinations of reasons for bidders to initiate takeovers such as 
synergies, management inefficiency, size maximisation, expropriation of wealth, 
increasing market share, to secure the source of supply of raw materials and the 
outlets for finish products, to acquire research and developm ent facilities, 
management expertise, distributional facilities and even establish brand names.
1.6.1: Synergy
Synergy is frequently cited as a justification for initiating takeovers (Bradley 
(1980), Bradley, Desai and Kim (1982), Asquith, Brunner and Mullins (1983)). 
Both firms in the takeover are assumed to have special resources, which when 
combined produces synergistic effects not achievable separately. The synergy 
hypothesis is based on the premise that the bidding firm is after the possession of a 
special resource that would enable a value increasing combination with the target 
firm.
This special resource could provide a growth opportunity for the bidding firm as a 
result of an exogenous change in consumer demand or shift in conditions of the 
supply due to some technological advance or generate financial gains through the 
use of underutilised tax shields, avoidance of bankruptcy costs and increase leverage 
(Benston (1980)). These resources could also further enhance the profitability of an 
investment programme that had been initiated long before the announcement of the 
offer. It is assumed that the bidder is first to recognise the existence of the special 
resource and has sufficient resources to exploit the available opportunity. Once the 
offer is announced, the market participants would be made aware of the bidder’s 
intention, the expected outcome of which will be reflected in the bidder and target’s 
shares.
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1.6.2: Management inefficiency
Inefficiency of the target management team is also a commonly cited reason for 
initiating takeovers ( Manne (1965), Malatesta (1983)). This inefficiency is 
presumed to be reflected in the target’s share price, that is the share price is lower 
than the potential value of the assets. The bidder assumes that there is a high positive 
correlation between corporate managerial efficiency and the share price of the firm. 
The lower the share price relative to the value of the assets with more efficient 
management, the more attractive the acquisition becomes to those who believe that 
they can manage the firm more efficiently.
However, low share prices do not necessarily mean that the management team is 
inefficient, since there are factors beyond the control of the management that can 
depress share prices. For example, government regulations, supply and demand 
conditions in the industry, political, social and economic changes in the domestic and 
international environment, all could adversely affect share prices (Rappaport (1986)). 
1.6.3: Size maximisation 
Maximisation of management utility is another possible reason for bidders to 
pursue targets (Mueller (1969), Mikkelson and Ruback (1985) Murphy (1985)). If 
management’s financial and non- financial compensation is positively related to the 
size of their firm, it can be expected that, after achieving a certain profit level, the 
management may transgress their fiduciary duty of maximising the shareholders 
wealth, by pursuing investments that increase the size rather than cash flows of the 
firm. Maximising size is also viewed as a defence tactic against takeovers as large 
firms are expensive and difficult to takeover (Ball (1987)).
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However, size is no longer a security against takeovers because there are various 
packages of financial arrangements available from merchant banks to enable smaller 
firms to acquire larger firms. Recent examples include the Elders IXL bid for Allied 
Lyons and also the Guinness bid for Distillers (Gray and McDermott (1989)).
1.6.4: Expropriation of target’s wealth 
Another possible reason for inter-firm takeovers is the opportunity to expropriate 
the target’s wealth (Grossman and Hart (1980)). If the inter-firm takeover is for less 
than 100 per cent of the target’s shares, this could imply that there is incentive for 
the bidder management to channel the target’s wealth to the bidder firm ’s 
shareholders. Theoretically, this can be achieved in two ways: first, through applying 
pressure on target management (subsequent to the offer becoming unconditional) to 
supply factors of production at a price less than the marginal costs and buy products 
from the bidder at a price above the marginal cost.
Second, the transfer of wealth could be achieved by selling off the target’s assets, 
also known as ’asset-stripping’. Asset-stripping was rife in the U.K. takeover arena 
from 1967 to 1975 when investors like Jim Slater, used to spot firms that were going 
through hard times, move in on them, cash their assets and use the profit to bankroll 
the next target (Fallon and Srodes (1988)).
However at present the U.K. acquisition market is closely regulated by the agencies 
such as the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Panel of Takeovers and 
Mergers, Mergers and Monopolies Commission (MMC), the Office of Fair Trading 
(OFT), The Stock Exchange and the European Commission by virtue of the Articles 
85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome. This makes it difficult for the bidder to expropriate 
the target’s wealth and if the market suspects that the bidder has such an intention it 
will force the bidder to pay ex-ante for any expected expropriations.
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1.6.5: Response to changing business environment
To survive, firms have to cope up with the changing business environment 
through strategic planning approach (Weston and Copeland (1988)). Rapid changes 
in the business environment often calls for rapid adjustments in the firm’s strategic 
planning process both at the business unit level and the corporate level. This 
adjustments concern decisions such as: increasing market share or preventing a 
competitor from increasing its market share or establishing a presence of existing 
product range in a potential new market; to strengthen or secure the sources of 
supply and outlets for goods or services; to widen the existing range of products or 
services and diversifying out of products and services which are declining.
To acquire resources in which the firm is perceived to be weak such as research and 
development facilities, management expertise, production and distributional facilities 
or even established brand names; and to take advantage of specific tax and financial 
incentives (Rapapport (1986)). These required changes could be met speedily by 
acquiring established firms and if the market for corporate control is competitive, 
buying such needs may imply that the value of such investment may be small. 
However, if such needs are bought with the intention to use them as a base for further 
investment in the future, it could benefit the shareholders in the long run.
1.7: Common regulated and unregulated features of takeovers in the U.K.
Hostile takeovers are opposed by the target management and without the support of 
the target management the bidder can be successful but the chances of failure are 
high. No two offers are alike and each bidder has its own unique way of planning 
and executing an offer (Cohen (1968)). Irrespective of the way takeover offers are 
planned and executed there are certain regulated and unregulated features which are 
common to most takeovers.
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The principal regulatory body for all takeovers in the U.K. is the Panel of Takeovers 
and Mergers which implements the Takeover Code on firms involved in takeovers 
and mergers. The Panel works together with other agencies such as DTI and OFT. 
One common regulated feature for all firms involved in takeover or merger is the 
requirement on the time period within which the acquisition should be executed. For 
example, the Takeover Code requires a takeover offer to be open for at least 60 days 
from the date of the announcement till the date the offer becomes ’unconditional’ as 
to acceptances.
It is normal practice, however, for the offer to be kept open for at least 14 days after 
being declared unconditional, allowing latecomers (especially small shareholders) to 
accept the offer. The bid itself must be kept open for at least 21 days after the 
posting of the offer document. Thereafter the bid can be extended or improved as 
much as the bidder likes, provided that the bidder has not definitely ruled out such a 
move and no changes are allowed after the 46th day. This allows shareholders 14 
days to consider any new offer before the curtain comes down on the 60th day.
The firms involved in takeovers are obliged to follow the requirements of the 
regulatory agencies otherwise they are subjected to disciplinary actions such as 
withdrawal of all services provided by the market.
However, there are also features common to most firms involved in takeovers which 
are not regulated in any way but which are adapted by the firms themselves to 
facilitate their acquisition, such as, gradual purchase of shares in the target, engaging 
the services of merchant banks, announcing the offer at a time when the target is 
experiencing some form of difficulty, and the use of unethical tactics by bidders in 
some large takeovers.
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1.7.1: Gradual purchase of shares
Most bidders gradually purchase their target’s shares in the market long before the 
official announcement. Target shares are purchased in the open market through 
investment bankers and brokers.
Gradual purchase is preferred because heavy buying in a short period of time drives 
up the share price and subjects the purchaser to scrutiny by the Stock Exchange and 
the Security and Investment Board. However once the bidders stake reaches 5 % the 
Stock Exchange requires the purchaser to declare its intention to prevent the 
purchaser using a ’greenmail’ tactic on the target firm. A ’greenmail’ tactic is a 
common feature of takeovers in the US in which the purchaser builds up a substantial 
stake in the target firm signalling to the target that an offer is on the way and then 
persuading the target to repurchase the stake at a premium with the promise that the 
purchaser will not pursue the purchase.
In the U.K., bidders prefer to hold a stake in the target before initiating a full offer 
for two possible reasons: first, it enables them to get the list of the shareholders in the 
target which allows them to communicate with the large shareholders (i.e. 
institutional investors) directly and persuade them to sell their stake. Second, if 
substantial amounts of shares are bought earlier than 12 months before the official 
announcement, it is possible for the bidder to purchase the target at a lower cost.
After an offer has been made, large shareholders are approached by the bidder and 
the target management separately, as the Takeover Code forbids calling a meeting of 
several institutions. The bidder usually reinforces the message in its offer document 
and clarifies anything which the investors may have found doubtful or difficult to 
understand. The rules of the Code do not allow the bidder to impart more material 
information than is in the formal document.
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The target management in their effort to counter the bid will approach the major 
investors and present their point of view on the offer and will usually try to convince 
them not to sell their stake to the bidder.
1.7.2: Engaging the services of merchant banks
The corporate finance department of merchant banks specialise in takeovers and 
mergers and at present are the most prestigious and profitable department of most 
merchant banks in the U.K. (Sunday Times, 29th October 1989). Merchant banks 
not only provide the necessary financial backing required in acquisitions but also a 
variety of other services such as administrative, legal, tactical and economic 
intelligence expertise.
Most bidders engage the services of the merchant bank in making acquisitions as they 
lack some or all of the expertise required to pursue the target effectively and also 
with the availability of success-geared commission schemes it is cheaper for firms to 
buy these services rather than build them in-house (Gray and McDermott (1989)). 
1.7.3: Timing of announcements
Takeover announcements are usually made at a time that is considered to be most 
conducive to gaining success, for example when the target firm is carrying out a 
restructuring which results in a temporary decline in profits or when the target 
announces a decline or delay in its dividends.
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1.7.4: Unethical tactics
In some major takeovers of the 1980’s such as Guinness versus Bell 1985, 
Guinness versus Distillers 1986 (Fallon and Scrodes (1988)) and Dixons versus 
Woolworth 1986 (The Observer Business, 15 Febuary 1987, and The Financial 
Times, 2 Febuary 1988), there have been attempts to employ tactics which are 
unethical by any standards by desperate bidders, such as character assassinations of 
target board of directors by making public statements about their private lives, 
tapping telephones of the board of directors, and even engaging in physical violence 
to scare off unyielding members of the board.
1.8: Forms of payment in acquisitions in the U.K.
The form of payment in a takeover or a merger may be cash, shares, loan stock 
(convertible or otherwise) or some combination of these. For firms not listed on the 
Stock Exchange, it is difficult to issue shares or loan stocks to finance an acquisition 
as shares without ready market will not normally be an attractive proposition for the 
target firm. One advantage of firms listed on the Unlisted Securities Market (USM) 
or fully listed on the Stock Exchange is their ability to use shares as a means of 
payment in acquisitions.
The choice of the form of payment by bidders will depend on the bidder’s share 
price, their stake in the target, their prospective gearing structure, their resource and 
tax position and the tax position of the target, expected target management’s 
resistance and the degree of competition for the target (Begg (1986)). The final 
choice of payment or the package of payment should not only be cost effective to the 
bidder but also sufficiently attractive to the target shareholders to secure the required 
level of acceptance.
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1.8.1: Share exchange
Acquisition of targets through exchange of shares tends to be popular in bull 
markets, and cash tends to be used in bear markets (Myers and Majluf (1984)) and 
the long bull market in the U.K. has pushed up the value of many companies’ shares, 
making them attractive bid currency (Macaulay and Smith (1988)).
However, in share offers even if the bidder’s shares are highly rated it does not mean 
that the target shareholders will prefer shares as the means of payment because the 
bidders’ shares are subjected to fluctuations and accordingly the value placed on the 
target firm’s shares by the bidder’s offer will fluctuate on a day to day basis. A 
consideration payable in cash, however establishes a fixed value on the target firm. 
Furthermore, large institutional shareholders do not appreciate their shareholdings 
being diluted by a substantial new issue of shares to the target firm. There are also 
circumstances when the bidder wishes to take advantage of a high share price to 
make share offers to the target shareholders and the latter insists on cash, in which 
case the bidder can make arrangement for ’vendor placing’ (Rose (1987)).
A vendor placing takes place when the bidder issues new shares but arranges for its 
brokers to place them with their institutional investors at a discount to the market 
price in order to raise the cash required to pay the target shareholders. The bidder 
shareholders may suffer double losses in vendor placing: first, they forfeit the 
opportunity for the capital gains (because the shares are issued at a discount to the 
market price) and second, they suffer an erosion of the firm’s wealth which rightly 
belongs to them.
However, section 89 of the Companies Act 1985 now mitigates the losses suffered 
by bidder shareholders by giving them the right to subscribe for the new shares pro­
rata to their existing shareholdings in case of equity issues for cash, which does not 
apply when shares are issued as consideration for acquisition.
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1.8.2: Loan stocks
Corporate loan stocks and debentures are also used as as a means of payment in 
acquisitions. This means was popular in the 1960’s but due to increasing interest 
rates and inflation over the years they have declined in use (Begg (1986)). For 
bidders, the use of loan stock has an advantage of maintaining or even increasing 
earning per share if the returns from the acquisition more than compensate the cost of 
debt. The interest payments on convertible loan stock are lower to reflect the 
conversion privilege. The cost of servicing interest payments on debts is fixed and 
tax deductible, whereas dividend payments on shares are made out of taxed income. 
Besides receiving regular interest payments, the holders of convertible loan stocks 
can convert the stocks to bidder’s shares at some future date or dates at a fixed price 
or sometimes in the form of subscription rights. If the bidder’s equity value 
increases, the market value of the loan stocks also increases to reflect the increase in 
value obtainable on conversion or subscription. Loan stocks also afford the holders 
who face substantial capital gains tax liability the opportunity to defer the tax.
Loan stocks issued by listed firms are usually secured by a trust deed entered into 
between the firm and a trustee appointed to represent the interest of the shareholders. 
The trust deed is usually a bank trust corporation or another financial institution.
1.8.3: Cash
Cash is a popular form of payment in acquisition. Even when shares or debt 
securities are issued for acquisitions, a cash alternative is frequently offered to target 
shareholders, which is an opportunity to sell to the underwriters the securities issued. 
Cash payments avoid the complexities of the shares and loan stock issues, and are 
usually financed by bank loans. The terms on which the bidder is able to borrow the 
necessary cash resources to make the acquisitions are an important consideration in 
the choice of cash as the form of payment.
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However under certain circumstances the bidder has no choice but to offer cash to 
its target shareholders. For example, Rule 9 of the Takeover Code requires a 
purchaser who has bought (individually or in concert with other parties) for cash 15 
% or more a class of a firm’s shares during an offer period and within the preceding 
12 months, must make a cash offer or an offer accompanied by a cash alternative to 
that class of shareholders at not less than the highest price paid for those shares 
within that period.
The same rule applies to a purchaser who already owns 30 to 50 % of the target 
shares and acquires in any period of 12 months additional shares carrying more than 
2 % of voting rights.
Similarly if the bidder and his associates have acquired a total of more than 15 % of 
the target shares in the preceding 12 months, Rule 11 of the Takeover Code requires 
that the offer for the rest of the shares be made in cash or with a cash alternative at 
the highest price paid during that period. The cash alternative provision allows the 
bidder to finance the acquisition by shares but allows the target shareholders to sell 
the bidder’s shares at a predetermined price to the bidder’s underwriters.
1.8.4 Combination offer 
There are also circumstances where it is sensible for the bidder to offer a 
combination of shares and cash. The bidder may happen to have large reserves of 
cash and a depressed share price rating which is inadequate to justify a purchase 
made only by shares. There may be a limit on the extent to which it is prudent to issue 
more shares which will dilute the equity interests of the existing bidder shareholders, 
or there may be a limit to the bidder’s borrowing capacity to make an exclusive cash 
or loan stock offer.
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Irrespective of the reason for the bidder’s choice of consideration, once the decision 
is made it has important implications for the bidder’s share price. There is a theory in 
corporate finance (Myers and Majluf (1984)) which suggests that due to the 
asymmetries of information in the market, the form of payments offered by bidders to 
their targets in a takeover signals the estimated value of the bidder’s shares at the 
announcement of the offer. Cash offers are perceived as a signal of undervaluation 
and share offers as a signal of overvaluation of bidder’s shares.
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Chapter 2
Statutory and Non-Statutory Requirements of Takeovers in the U.K.
2.1: Introduction
This study focuses on firms involved in takeovers in the U.K. All acquisitions in 
the U.K. are to comply with the statutory and non-statutory requirements of 
takeovers. This chapter explains briefly these requirements as a background to the 
study.
The corporate law in the United Kingdom does not prescribe the way takeovers 
and mergers should be effected. There are however, regulations which guide the 
takeover and merger activities of private and public firms.
A private firm can negotiate an agreement with its target’s owners, purchase new 
shares by private agreement or even acquire the assets of the target firm. All these 
transactions will be registered at the Companies House. An acquisition of a listed 
firm by purchase of shares on the Stock Exchange is subject to compliance with both 
the statutory requirements prescribed by the Companies Act 1985 and the non- 
statutory requirements of the Takeover Code.
When one publicly listed firm intends to take control of another listed firm’s 
resources, the following Act’s apply (Macaulay and Smith (1988), Cook (1988)):
2.1.1: Fair Trading Act 1973
This act empowers the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry to appoint a 
Director General of Fair Trading, whose duty is to keep a constant review on the 
business activities related to goods and services, such that under no circumstances 
should such activities adversely affect the economic interests of consumers.
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In reviewing takeovers and mergers, the Director General first consults the Panel of 
Takeovers and Mergers and then advises the Secretary of State as to whether a 
merger or a takeover should be investigated by the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission (MMC). From then on, it is the prerogative of the Secretary of State to 
refer the bid to MMC.
There is no requirement for firms to notify the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) of their 
intention to make a bid. In practice, the office collects information on bids not only 
from financial press but also from merchant banks, whose corporate officers working 
for their clients visit the OFT and selectively present facts in trying to lobby a 
recommendation to proceed with the bid. In hostile bids the target firms will lobby 
to get the bid recommended for reference to the MMC.
2.1.2: The criteria for reference and the responsibilities of the MMC 
The present minimum criteria for examining a bid for reference are:
(i) the target firm has assets of more than £30 million, or
(ii) the bidder and target together have 25 per cent or more of any identifiable U.K. 
market.
The first criterion is easily determined by reference to audited accounts of the 
target firm. The market share test is more difficult to determine because it involves 
the provision of statistics indicating the value and volume of the U.K. market for 
each category of goods and services produced by the firms to be merged, and also the 
share of that market estimated to be enjoyed by each of them.
All bids meeting the criterion for reference are examined by the Mergers Secretariat 
of the OFT to establish whether there are any public interest considerations. For 
those bids that are perceived not to be against public interest, the Director General 
will recommend to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry to clear such bids.
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In difficult cases, the Director General will meet with the Takeovers and Mergers 
Panel for details and discuss the issues as prepared by the Mergers Secretariat 
pertaining to public interest considerations, and a decision is then made after two to 
three weeks.
The business of establishing conclusively whether or not a merger or takeover 
operates against public interest is not a matter for the Director General but the task of 
the MMC. However, once the MMC concludes that a merger or takeover is against 
the public interest, the Director General is then responsible for advising the Secretary 
of State on the action to be taken. The Director General’s recommendation can be 
overruled by the Secretary of State. Conversely, the Secretary of State can decide to 
refer a bid to the MMC against the advice of the Director General. If he does decide 
to refer the bid, that decision itself usually spells the demise of the bid, because any 
offer will automatically lapse as the investigation involves a great deal of 
management effort and expense and the delay usually necessitates a renegotiation of 
terms.
The Trade and Industry Secretary can reject a verdict from the MMC that the 
proposed takeover would be against the public interest and let it go ahead. However, 
he has no power of veto when the MMC rules that the bid would not be against the 
public interest.
In essence, the government through the Fair Trading Act 1973 has an effective right 
of veto over certain U.K. acquisitions which are substantial in terms of size or market 
share, but the implementation of the act is not a government concern.
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The Monopolies and Mergers Commission consists of at least one lawyer and 
representatives from various public interest groups such as trade unions, consumer 
organisations, academic institutions, industrialists and environmentalists. Except for 
the chairman they are all part-time, although there is a full-time back up staff. The 
members of the commission are required to consider the matters referred to them and 
to decide whether or not they operate against the public interest.
The MMC makes a decision after 6 to 9 months. In the U.K., the merger and 
takeover policy is essentially favourable and the MMC works on the presumption 
that bids are beneficial, and to be approved, unless there is evidence to the contrary 
(Fallon and Srodes (1988)).
From the MMC’s point of view, competition in the market is the most important 
measure in considering and deciding the public interest effects of bids. Section 84 
(1) of the Fair Trading Act 1973 interprets ’public interest’ as follows:
(i) Maintaining and promoting effective competition between persons supplying 
goods and services in the U.K.
(ii) Promoting interests of consumers, purchases and other users of goods and 
services in the U.K. in respect of the prices charged for them and in respect of their 
quality and the variety of goods and services supplied.
(iii) Promoting through competition, the reduction of costs and the development and 
use of new techniques and new products, and of facilitating the entry of new 
competitors into existing markets.
(iv) M aintaining and prom oting the balanced d istribution of industry and 
employment in the U.K.
(v) Maintaining and promoting competitive activity in markets outside the U.K. on 
the part of producers of goods and suppliers of goods and services in the U.K.
29
Any bid which is perceived to reduce competition is regarded as against public 
interest. Competition is considered essential to the development of healthy markets 
and economy (Peston (1986)). It ensures that consumer’s preferences are efficiently 
met by industry and trade, that firms respond to changes in demand and in 
technology and that prices do not persist at levels above those necessary to attract and 
reward investment. The promotion and maintenance of competition in the domestic 
market is desirable for the interests of both producers and consumers.
In practice, there are reservations about the real beneficiaries of the competitive 
policy (Peston (1987)). If there are any benefits from competition, how are these 
benefits distributed among producers and consumers?
The consumer interest is more rationally measured in terms of the benefits they 
receive from a competitive policy rather than the detriments against them from an 
anti-competitive policy.
The 25 percent market share criteria is also ambiguous, because a competitive 
policy will naturally increase the firms market share. What happens when two or 
more firms acquire a 25 percent market share through competition rather than 
acquisition?
The OFT and MMC are obliged to interpret the government policies for industries 
and must subconsciously adjust to changing priorities on matters such as full 
employment in various regions against the need to rationalise the old declining 
industries, the desire to promote small and independent business units as against the 
need to permit concentration of power and economies of scale on a level which will 
allow U.K. industries to compete effectively in export markets.
MMC’s interpretation of large market power associated with large market share is 
also ambiguous because large market share does not necessarily mean increased 
market power, if new firms can enter the market quickly and cheaply.
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If the new entrants’ operating costs are not significantly higher than the existing firms 
and their set up cost is not large relative to the total costs, then firms with large 
market shares cannot be assumed to have the market power to act in an anti­
competitive manner. It is essential to consider the factor of potential competition and 
the propensity of the current firms to limit new entry in ascertaining the market 
power of the firms in the bid.
Competition, although an important criterion, is by no means the only criterion the 
MMC bases its decisions upon (Roberts (1987)). For example, concern about 
research and development in the pharmaceutical industry was a major factor in 
vetting the rival bids by Beecham and Boots for Glaxo in 1972.
In 1985, the concern about reduction in the research and development of 
sophisticated electronic equipment, the MMC decided against the GEC’s bid for 
Plessey.
On the basis that foreign ownership of a major local bank was undesirable, the 
MMC decided against the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation’s bid for 
the Royal Bank of Scotland.
To prevent further attempts of foreign investors taking ownership in important 
industries such as banking, oil, newspapers, insurance, coal and steel and Unit 
Trusts, these industries are given the ’regulated industries’ status.
These industries are regulated because they are either critical to the economy or 
otherwise politically sensitive and are subject to specific government control and 
required to be specifically licensed.
For gearing reasons, the bid by the Australian brewery group Elders IXL for 
Allied Lyons was referred to the MMC. About £1.6 billion of the £1.8 billion 
offered was being borrowed from a consortium of American banks (Gray and 
McDermott (1989)).
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Such borrowings can effectively only be raised on the strength of the target firm’s 
balance sheet, which means that the combined firm is saddled with a disproportionate 
quantity of debt, which unless cash flows are strong can only be discharged by 
substantial disposal of assets.
2.1.3: Competition Act 1980
This act prevents anti-competitive practices which complement the functions and 
powers of the Director-General as provided by the Fair Trading Act 1973. The main 
difference being that the Fair Trading Act applies to all firms in a complete market 
sector supplying the goods and services, whereas the Competition Act relates to 
individual firms which restrict, distort or prevent competition.
2.2: Regulation of the securities market
The securities market is self-regulated by the Council of the Stock Exchange, which 
is controlled by the SIB introduced by the Financial Services Act 1986. The Council 
is the competent authority for directives dealing with admissions, listing particulars 
and financial reporting of listed firms. Control affecting mergers and takeovers are 
imposed by the Stock Exchange and the Panel of Takeovers and Mergers.
The Stock Exchange imposes self-regulatory controls on its members, which are 
written in its annually revised book called ’Admission of Securities and Listing’ (also 
known as the "Yellow Book") which has a statutory backing on some requirements 
such as, the terms of admission, publication of ’listing particulars’ in relation to new 
issues and the publications of interim reports, whereas the remainder of the 
requirements are based on the Stock Exchange’s own self-regulatory authority. The 
regulations apply to bidders and targets that are listed on the main Stock Exchange 
and the Unlisted Securities Market (USM).
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2.3 City Code on takeovers and mergers and the Takeover Panel 
In the U.K. the foundation for hostile takeovers was laid in the Companies Act 1948 
(Tabb (1981)), but it was not until 1959 that Britain experienced its first contested 
takeover bid, when Sir Charles Clore made a £27 million bid for the brewer Watneys 
(Roberts (1987)). At the time the Takeover Code did not exist, and the Licensed 
Dealers Rules (now amended and known as 1983 Licensed Dealers Conduct of 
Business Rules) were the only set of rules available relating to offers by shares and 
to the detailed content of the offer documents. However, these rules proved to be an 
insufficient instrument of control and following a number of scandals and abuses, 
the Governor of the Bank of England with the co-operation of merchant banks, 
investment trusts, insurance firms and the London Stock Exchange ( also known as 
the City Working Party), published the ’Notes on Amalgamations of British 
Businesses’, which were the first general guidelines to firms involved in bids 
(Financial Times, 5 November 1989).
Among the important issues discussed were that the target’s board was entitled to 
have evidence of the real identity of the bidders and also that they had the resources 
to meet full acceptance. It was also required that the offer should be made through 
the target’s board and the latter was to advise its shareholders on the offer.
These early guidelines were revised in 1963, when directors and managers of firms 
involved in bids began to practice insider dealings, at the expense of their 
shareholders. In August 1967, these guidelines were again revised to include certain 
practices of large firms involved in bids, which were considered as unfair conduct 
towards their shareholders.
For example, in the GEC’s bid for AEI, the latter sold its lighting interests to Thom 
without consulting its shareholders. This ’scorched- earth’ policy was a deliberate 
attempt by AEI to make the GEC’s bid unattractive.
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In its attempt to takeover Murex, British Oxygen Company (BOC) declared its bid 
for Murex unconditional, but only later revealed that it had not gained 50 percent of 
the controlling rights to declare the bid unconditional. The effect was to make many 
Murex shareholders believe their firm had been taken over and surrender their shares. 
Courtaulds made a 15s a share offer for a textiles firm, Wilkinson and Riddell. Then 
it paid a higher price for the few shares it needed to secure control in open market 
purchase.
Similar practices which were unfair for some shareholders were becoming popular 
among firms involved in bids, as there were no regulations nor guidelines which 
restricted such acts.
The Governor of the Bank of England, in his unofficial role for overseeing the 
business activities in the City, with the help of the committee representing various 
parties interested in the conduct of takeover bids, consulted, revised and deliberated 
the 1963 guidelines. In March 1968, the 38 rules and 10 guidelines of the present 
Takeover Code were officially announced, which is basically a conduct of behaviour 
governing the way takeovers and mergers are conducted.
2.3.1: The City Code on takeovers and mergers
The provisions of the code can be divided into three main categories. First, there are 
10 principles or guidelines of conduct which are a summary of the rules of good 
commercial behaviour to be applied in the context of takeovers and mergers. Second, 
there are 38 specific rules some of which are basically examples of how the 
principles are to be applied and others are procedures designed to govern specific 
types of transactions.
Third, the rules are supplemented by ’notes’ which serve as a guide to the manner in 
which the rules are likely to be interpreted by the Panel of Takeovers and Mergers in 
the light of their experience and present economic conditions.
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The Code operates principally to ensure fair and equal treatment of all shareholders 
of firms involved in takeovers and mergers and represents the collective opinion of 
those professionally involved in the areas of takeovers, as to good business standards 
and as to how fairness to shareholders can be achieved. This collective interest is 
well represented on the Panel of Takeovers and Mergers which was created to rule 
on the interpretation of the Code.
2.3.2: Panel of takeovers and mergers
The Takeovers and Mergers panel consists of a Chairman, a Deputy Chairman and a 
non- representative member appointed by the Governor of the Bank of England, and 
representatives from government departments and other public authorities with 
special knowledge of a particular area of investment business. The Panel has no 
statutory prerogative, but a self-regulating agency which uses its collective power to 
persuade others to comply with its principles and rules. Those who do not conduct 
themselves according to the requirements of the Code are penalised in the form of 
withdrawal of facilities of the securities market in the U.K.
The Panel works on a daily basis through its executives who are responsible for the 
general administration of the Code, which includes investigations and monitoring of 
relevant dealings in line with the requirements of the Code.
The Panel co-operates with other regulatory authorities such as the Office of Fair 
Trading, the Stock Exchange, SIB, SRO’s and the Bank of England. Co-operation is 
in the form of mutual exchange of information and reporting of breaches of the code 
to the appropriate authority.
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In general, the panel implements the Takeover Code on three principles:
(a) Equality of treatment for all shareholders. The bidder or the target must not 
discriminate in favour of a few who might have voting control. Discrimination can 
be in many forms, but the most common is in the form of lack of information or even 
inaccurate information made available to shareholders and unequal terms offered to 
different shareholders.
(b) The spirit of the Code is more important than its precise wording. This means 
that the spirit of the code and the General Principles will apply in areas or 
circumstances not explicidy covered by any of its 38 Rules.
(c) Practical guidance. The executives of the Panel are responsible for the 
interpretation and explanation of the Code. By examining closely the documents 
made available for advice, the executives seek to prevent transgression rather that 
prosecute the intentional or unintentional offenders after the event.
Before 1983 the code was applied only to takeovers of listed and unlisted public 
firms. However, as a result of the 1980 Companies Act which reclassified public 
(pic’s) and private limited companies, a number of former public companies re­
registered as private companies. Furthermore, the 1980 Act also no longer restricted 
the number of shareholders in private companies, which meant that many private 
companies had a wide range of shareholders and any acquisition of their shares 
would invariably need to be effected by means of a public offer.
Accordingly, as from 1st June 1983 the code was revised to apply not only to public 
companies (listed or unlisted) but also to any private company which had some kind 
of public involvement in the 10 years prior to the acquisition.
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Public involvement among other interpretations, involves the company trading its 
shares on the Unlisted Securities Market (USM) or even listed on the USM during 
the preceding 10 years, or whose share dealings had been advertised in newspapers 
regularly for at least 6 months during the preceding 10 years and companies which 
have filed a prospectus for an issue of equity shares at the Companies Registry during 
the preceding 10 years.
2.4: Summary of the more important rules of the Takeover Code
(1) The offer should be put first to the board of the target firm or its advisers. In 
practice the observance of this rule has not much importance, because the bidding 
firm’s chairman can inform his counterpart in the target firm at a very short notice 
before the announcement of the offer.
(2) After the first announcement of an offer, details of the announcement are to be 
circulated by the target’s board to its shareholders. The bidders offer is required to 
be open for at least the first 21 days after posting the offer document. The offer may 
not be withdrawn without the Panel’s permission.
(3) Directors of bidder and target firms must always act in the best interest of their 
shareholders. If they are bidding for minority shareholders in a firm they already 
control, the bidders must arrange for those outside shareholders to be given 
independent expert advice. The target must give the same information to all bona- 
fide bidders, be they welcome or not. The targets are not allowed to buy or sell 
shares or assets in order to frustrate the bid. All documents which the target and 
bidder send to their shareholders must first be filed with the Takeover Panel 
executive for approval and any profit forecasts must be endorsed by auditors.
37
(4) Once the announcement has been made, the offer document should be posted 
within 28 days of the announcement. Information in the offer document should be 
prepared in compliance with the Companies Act 1948 (revised as Companies Act
1985).
The offer should remain open for at least 21 days after the posting of the offer 
document and a further 14 days after the posting of the revised offer. The last day on 
which the bidder can make any changes to its offer is the 46th day after the 
announcem ent of its offer, and for the target it is the 39th day after the 
announcement. No offer can be declared unconditional after the 60th day without 
the consent of the Panel.
Except in special circumstances, a takeover bid should not last more than 3 months 
and an unsuccessful bidder or any one acting in concert with him may not bid for the 
target again for at least one year, as it is considered harmful to the business for 
management time and energy to be persistently absorbed in a war of attrition. Once 
the offer is declared unconditional, it must remain open for at least a further 14 days.
(5) A bidder buying in the market at a price higher than he is generally offering must 
raise his entire bid to the highest price he paid and extend it to all shareholders who 
have already accepted, excluding those who sold in the market
This applies to other types of securities or loan stocks issued for the purpose of 
takeover. The bidder who has bought 15 per cent of its target’s shares for cash 
during or within 12 months of the bid, must in its terms match in cash the highest 
price it had paid.
(6) The effective control of a firm might be achieved through a 30 per cent holding, 
and once this level is reached, the firm must make an offer for the remaining shares. 
However, the bidder’s shareholders must approve the implementation of the full 
offer.
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(7) The bidder or the target firm cannot create a false market for either their own or 
the other party’s shares in the market
(8) Any person privy to price-sensitive information may not deal in the shares. It is a 
criminal offence under the Companies Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 to 
misuse confidential information about a firm to make an unfair profit in share 
dealings.
The ability of the Panel to regulate takeover activities in the U.K. has its 
shortcomings (Roberts (1987)). First, it relies on disclosures of information by 
bidders and targets, which is in fact the domain of the Companies Act and not the 
Takeover Code. The decision that the panel makes is only as good as the information 
supplied by the firms involved in the bid. How far the firms involved in the bid 
disclose all the relevant information or even when they disclose, how far this 
information is accurate are subject to question ( for example the Guinness takeover 
of Distillers in 1986).
The Panel’s rules are essentially voluntary and are founded on mutual interest and 
trust, and the fact that they are not enforceable by law has caused serious difficulties 
in dealing with those determined to flout the rules.
Second, the Code is exclusively concerned with the rights of shareholders and says 
nothing about the firm’s obligation towards its employees, especially the middle- 
management upon whom post- merger performance must eventually depend 
(Stallworthy and Kharbanda (1988)).
However, the EEC’s new requirements to improve employee rights are now 
incorporated in the U.K. domestic law. These protect employees on a transfer of 
business which employs them, as well as requiring employers to consult with the 
unions before closures and redundancies are implemented.
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One area in which the Code explicitly acknowledges some responsibility for the 
broader public interest is the rules on time limit within which the bid must be 
completed (60 days and in exceptional cases 90 days), which restricts the wastage of 
management time and energy for the benefit of the shareholders.
2.5: Rules governing the Substantial Acquisition of shares (SAR’s)
In April 1982 the Council for Securities Industry (CSI) introduced the ’rules 
governing acquisition of shares’ or commonly known as SAR’s in its effort to curb 
’dawn raids’ by foreign investors on British firms. Since April 1985 the CSI has 
been replaced by the Securities and Investment Board (SIB). The SAR’s are 
administered and enforced by the Takeover Panel without any legal backing although 
the SAR’s are not part of the Takeover Code, which means that SAR’s are not 
applicable to firms which are not listed on the main exchange or the Unlisted 
Securities Market.
The SAR’s were introduced in response to an alarming series of ’dawn raids’ on 
shares of U.K. public firms in 1979 and 1980, in which the bidders would send their 
brokers into the market as soon as it opened to acquire up to 30 % of the target firm’s 
shares at a premium over the market price. No prior notice of these raids was given 
and the buying spree was usually completed within minutes of the market opening.
An example of such a raid which appears to have prompted the CSI (now SIB) was 
the raid on Consolidated Goldfields by De Beers in the summer of 1980, in which De 
Beers accumulated over 13 % of the targets shares through a variety of nominee 
holdings and bought a further 12 % in the market in a matter of minutes by offering 
an 18 % premium over the market price (Macaulay and Smith (1988)).
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The SIB s main criticism of this and other similar raids was the speed at which the 
raids were earned out, excluding small shareholders from the higher price which was 
taken up by institutional investors enjoying privileged position.
The effect of the SAR’s is to restrict the speed with which one firm can increase its 
shareholdings of another firm to an aggregate of between 15 % and 30 % of the 
voting rights. However, raids for 15 % and below remain unrestricted (although a 
stake of 5 % or more has to be reported to the Stock Exchange) and for a stake of 30 
% or more Rules 5 and 9 of the Takeover Code takes over.
Rule 1 of the SAR’s prohibits anyone from acquiring 10 % or more of the voting 
rights of a listed or USM firm within any period of 7 days if that results in a holding 
between 15 to 30 %.
Rule 3 of the SAR’s requires an accelerated disclosure of the acquisitions of shares or 
rights over shares relating to such holdings. Specifically, it requires a person who 
acquires shares or rights over shares which give him 15 % of the voting rights of a 
firm, or has increased his holding of shares or rights over shares by a whole 
percentage point over 15 % to notify the target firm and the Stock Exchange on the 
dealing day following the acquisition. If there are two or more persons acting in 
concert, their acquisitions will be aggregated and treated as one for the purpose of the 
SAR’s.
There are however three exceptions to the restrictions on dealing imposed by SAR’s. 
The first, is where acquisition is from a single shareholder provided it is the only 
acquisition within any period of 7 days. A purchaser within this exception is 
nevertheless required to meet the notification requirement under Rule 3 of the SAR s 
mentioned earlier. The second, is where the acquisition is made by a tender-offer 
raking the purchaser’s aggregate holding to less than 30 % of the voting rights.
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The third, is where the acquisition immediately precedes and is conditional upon an 
announcement of an intention to make a general offer for the firm which is publicly 
recommended by its board, in which case the Rules of the Takeover Code will apply.
2.6: Tender offers under SAR’S
Tender offers were first introduced by the CSI in 1980 as part of a scheme to crack 
down on ’dawn- raids’. The objective was to ensure a fair treatment to all target 
shareholders specifically the small investors who were invariably excluded when 
these raids were executed. In a tender offer the purchaser or his agent advertises his 
firm offer to make a substantial purchase of shares and gives 7 days prior notice of 
his proposal through national newspapers to the target firm shareholders and the 
Stock Exchange.
Rule 5 of the Takeover Code requires that the notice includes details of the 
maximum number of shares the purchaser will bid and the maximum price offered 
for the shares.
If the offer is over subscribed, acceptances are usually scaled down on a pro-rata 
basis and the lowest ’striking price’ is established at which the purchaser’s 
requirements can be met. The purchaser then pays the ’striking price’ to all offers 
accepted at or below that price. Sometimes tender offers are made in anticipation of 
a full bid at a later date and conscious of this possibility, major shareholders normally 
are reluctant to sell at an early stage of the proceedings (for example , the C.H 
Beazer’s bid for SGB Group in October 1985 and Glen International’s bid for Pyke 
Holdings in December 1985). Recognising this danger, the purchasers usually offer a 
’top-up’ option which is a guarantee that the purchaser will top-up its offer if it 
makes a full bid for the shares at a higher price within the next 12 months.
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Chapter 3
Rationale for target management’s resistance towards unsolicited takeover attempts 
and defence tactics employed by target firms in major takeovers in U.K. 
3.1: Introduction
The market for corporate control in the U.K. has become more hostile for 
bidders in recent years as shown by an increasing tendency for target firms to 
defend themselves against unsolicited takeover attempts. For example, in 1988 
20 % of the firms subjected to takeover were involved in contested offers, which 
is higher than any previously recorded (Private Investor, Summer 1989). In 
takeovers, contested or recommended, it is the fiduciary duty of the target’s 
Board of Directors (BOD) and management to act in the best interests of their 
shareholders. However, in unsolicited takeovers, the target management may 
have a mixed reaction towards either supporting or resisting the offer, as part of 
the management may be in favour, part opposing and part undecided.
Those in favour of recommending the offer may be inclined to do so for a 
variety of reasons, such as, they are ready for retirement and want to cash- in 
their stake; they have received side payments from the bidder management, for 
example, security of future employment, promotion or even bonuses if the bidder 
succeeds; they want to cash-in their ’golden-parachute’. They are convinced that 
their firm can no longer stand alone or because they feel the offer price is too good to 
refuse.
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Those inclined to oppose the offer may have their justifications, such as: they fear to 
lose their position, compensation or job security; the target’s actual or potential value 
is not adequately reflected in the offer price; the bidder may not be offering a tax 
efficient deal for the accepting shareholders; the target management may be confident 
that the takeover is an ’asset- stripping’ exercise by the bidder; undesirability of 
foreign ownership in the firm, especially if it is in a regulated industry (Cohen
(1968)).
Target management facing an unsolicited takeover offer can oppose the offer 
either in good or bad faith. An opposition in good faith is in the best interests of 
their shareholders, and opposition in bad faith is in their self-in terest. In 
practice its difficult to identify whether management’s resistance is in good or 
bad faith. Empirical evidence on this subject is scarce and the findings from few 
sources available is inconclusive.
3.1.1: Previous research
Eddey and Casey’s (1989) study on whether the directors recommendations in 
response to takeover bids are in their own interest, concluded that directors of 
target firms act in a manner consistent with shareholders interests, even though 
personal wealth effects are greatest for directors who recommend acceptance to 
their shareholders.
Walking and Lang (1984) and Pastena and Ruland (1986) provides evidence 
that target board of directors place their own interest ahead of shareholders 
interest when faced with a takeover bid. Walking and Lang’s study concluded 
that there is substantial evidence that a decision to contest a takeover bid is 
conditioned on personal wealth changes of directors and management of the 
firm.
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Pastena and Ruland s examined the merger/bankruptcy alternative and concluded that 
self interest of target managers seems to be at least partly responsible for the 
merger/bankruptcy decision.
3.2: Views on target management’s resistance
There are many views on the target management’s resistance towards unsolicited 
takeover attempts. Fama and Laffer (1971), Hirshleifer (1971), and Roll (1986) 
argue that resistance ultimately elicits a higher price but is socially wasteful because 
the gains by the target shareholders are exactly offset by the bidders payment or the 
loss incurred to the bidder shareholders. In essence, they argue that resistance only 
results in expenditures that influence the distribution of gains but do not generate 
better performance.
Easterbrook and Fischel (1981) argue that resistance by target management 
towards unsolicited offers results in an increase in the price paid to target 
shareholders but will generally discourage bidders for other targets. Following 
the law of demand, the lower the demand, the lower the price of these other 
targets. The lack of incentive to bid by bidders affects the utility of outside 
monitoring and subsequently increases the agency costs and thus reduces the 
share prices of the other targets.
These arguments are, however, unreasonable on two assumptions. First, it is 
assumed that takeovers do not create wealth, which is naive as no rational 
bidder would pursue a target unless he expects some potential gains either in the 
short- term or long-term. Second, it is assumed that managers of target firms 
have not only a fiduciary duty of maximising the wealth of their shareholders 
but also of other firms’ shareholders and society at large.
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Bebchuk (1982) and Gilson (1981) suggest that target management should 
not totally resist unsolicited takeover attempts. Unlike Easterbrook and Fischel 
(1981), who propose total passiveness on the part of target m anagement, 
Bebchuk and Gilson suggest a qualified passiveness. This is achieved by urging 
the target management to provide information to potential bidders in an effort 
to fac ilita te  com petition, which is presumed to be beneficial to target 
shareholders. They postulate that facilitating competition serves as a check on 
a self-serving target management. In the absence of competition, the target 
management may choose to favour a bidder, not a firm that values the target 
assets most highly, but rather a firm that is most likely to retain  the 
management or offer them some form of side payments. Shareholders are quite 
vulnerable to such abuses because it is difficult to prove in the courts of law that 
the target management’s judgement has been in their own interest.
3.3: Evidence on target returns in contested offers
Resistance by the target is a key factor in determining the outcome of the bid ( 
McDougall (1974), Hoffmeister and Dyle (1981) and Hubbard (1987)) and Asquith 
(1983) showed that those targets that were successfully acquired had positive 
abnormal returns, while those that were not acquired had negative returns at the 
outcome date. However, empirical evidence on the effect of target management’s 
resistance on shareholder returns is inconclusive.
Kummer and Hoffmeister (1978) examined the abnormal returns associated 
with takeovers that are opposed and unopposed by target management. The 
average abnormal returns to target shareholders of successful targets in which 
managers did not oppose the offer was a significant 15.45 per cent, whereas the 
returns to shareholders of successful targets in which managers did oppose was 
a significant 19.8 per cent.
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Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983) also reported similar results for their sample of 
successful targets.
Dodd (1980), however, provides evidence that managerial opposition harms 
shareholders. He divides his sample into two groups, one group composed of 
takeovers terminated by target management, and the other group terminated by 
bidders or a third party. He reports that the average abnormal target return on the 
two-day announcement period is a significant negative 5.57 per cent for cancellations 
by the target and a significant negative 9.75 per cent for cancellations by the bidder. 
He interprets these results as consistent with the target managers not acting in the best 
interests of their shareholders. He argues that if target management were acting in 
the best interest of their shareholders by resisting the offer, for example, in 
expectation of a higher value offer, the abnormal returns on announcement of the 
cancellation should be positive rather than negative.
Sheleifer and Vishny’s (1986) study suggests that m anagerial resistance 
d irectly  decreases the value of target firms because resistance conveys 
information to the market about weakness in the target firm.
3.4: Rationale for resistance
Empirical evidence on target returns in successful takeovers from the United States 
(Jensen and Ruback (1983), Travlos (1987)) and the United Kingdom ( Franks, 
Harris and Mayers (1988)) shows that shareholders of target firms in successful 
takeovers always gain. Based on this evidence, if the target managers are acting in 
the best interest of their shareholders, why do they then oppose unsolicited 
takeovers?
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In the event of an unsolicited takeover attempt, the target management would 
evaluate the terms of the offer and examine the possibility of a more profitable 
alternative. Since target managers are familiar with the operation of their firm, they 
are assumed to have the comparative advantage in discerning the true intentions of 
the bidding firm. Consequently, the information produced and disseminated by the 
target management in the post announcement period may indicate that the terms of 
the outstanding offer do not fully reflect the alternative value of the target shares. 
They may also indicate that other bidders or they themselves could reallocate the 
target resources to a higher value use. In this respect, it is a rational reaction on part 
of target management to oppose the offer.
There is a possibility for the target management to misrepresent the value of 
the outstanding offer. However, Fama and Jensen (1983) pointed out that if 
target managers have equivalent employment opportunities elsewhere, then 
there w ould be no incentive for them to m isrepresent the value of the 
outstanding offer. They argue that if management compensation is a lagged 
function of managerial performance, then it would be in the long-run interests 
of the target managers to see the target resources are transferred to the firm 
that paid the target shareholders the highest offer price.
It is also possible that unsolicited takeover attempts are not limited to cases of 
bidding firm trying to effect a value increasing investment in its own firm. It 
may be the case that the bidder intends to effect a value increasing change in the 
operations of the target firm itself, which will contribute towards the wealth of 
the combined firm (for example in horizontal takeovers where the bidder is well 
informed on its business and the industry).
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If this is the case, then the target managers, having been made aware of the bidders’ 
intentions through the announcement of the offer, may be in a better position to 
exploit the available opportunity themselves. In this case, the target managers would 
best serve their shareholder’s interest by opposing the offer. And to the extent that 
there are costs associated with takeovers, the post execution price of the target shares 
is expected to be higher if the unsolicited offer is rejected and incumbent managers 
adapt a higher value operating strategy themselves.
In essence, the target management’s decision to support or oppose a given offer 
depends upon the impact of the decision on the market value of the firm’s shares. 
Target managers’ resistance towards unsolicited offers seems to be consistent with 
the objective of extracting the highest possible price from the bidder, but what 
remains inconclusive is the motive behind the target management’s resistance, is it 
the effect on their personal wealth or the wealth of their shareholders?
3.5: Measures employed by target management to resist unsolicited offers
In the past the tactics used to ffustate a bid in the U.K. have often consisted of the 
issue of additional shares by the target to shareholders of another friendly firm which 
is not interested in controlling the target’s resources (Tabb (1981)). This practice is 
now prohibited by Rule 21 of the City Code, except when shareholders’ approval is 
obtained, and this makes it difficult for the target managers to protect themselves in 
this way. Rule 21 also prohibits the target board from granting options, conversion 
rights or subscription rights in respect to its shares, nor can the board buy or sell or 
dispose of assets equal to 10 % or more of the value of the firm’s gross assets, nor 
can it enter into contracts other than in the ordinary course of business.
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The target s Board of Directors are also required to comply with Rule 22 and Rule 
37.3, when subjected to a takeover attempt. Rule 22 requires the target board to 
promptly register the transfer of its shares so that the purchaser can freely exercise 
its voting rights, and Rule 37.3 prohibits the board from buying its own shares.
The common defence measures employed by target firm s subjected to 
unsolicited takeover attempts are as follows:
3.5.1: Advertisements and personal contacts
Target managements usually keep an updated list of names, addresses and phone 
numbers of all their current shareholders, and in the event of a takeover attempt, they 
are able to convey their view on the takeover to the major shareholders directly and 
quickly.
In the U.K., institutional investors such as the investment trusts, unit trusts, 
pension funds and insurance firms are the major shareholders of firms listed on 
the London Stock Exchange (LSE), in total they hold about 70 % of the equity 
of listed firms (Stock Exchange Quarterly, 1988). Institutional investors invest 
in firms with the hope of maximising gains, and it is in their shareholders best 
interest to sell off the target’s shares to the highest bidder, if the target is not 
performing up to expectations.
It is a practice of target managers facing takeovers to convey their view on the 
takeover to their major shareholders, especially when it is not in favour of the 
bid.
In some major takeovers, there had been attem pts by targets to pursue 
aggressive publicity campaigns through news releases and press conferences, 
basically criticising the contents of the offer, and exposing the private lives of the 
bidder’s Board of Directors.
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For example, if expenditure on advertisement is any measure of the importance of 
publicity campaigns, in the Guinness 10 weeks contest for Distillers in 1986, 
Guinness spent £1.9 million on advertising expenditures alone, and Argyll group in 
their attempt for D istillers spent £820,000 arguing their cases through the 
newspapers (Fallon and Srodes (1988)). It was during this takeover battle (in March
1986) that the Takeover Panel introduced amended rules to control the type of 
advertising which can be used in bids. All advertisements which do not qualify as 
product or corporate image advertising or notices required by the Stock Exchange 
were banned (Takeover Code (1988)).
3.5.2: Measures to affect common stock prices of target firms.
Target firms facing unsolicited takeovers have developed and employed various 
measures which can have a positive effect on their share prices, such as declaring 
higher dividends, offering scrip issues, and repurchasing their own shares in the 
market to support the price, which makes it difficult and expensive for the bidders to 
secure control. Raising dividends is assumed to instil confidence in the shareholders 
about the future of the firm. For example, when Hanson Trust bid for London Bricks 
in 1984, the target not only revalued its assets and made a high profit forecast but 
also doubled its dividend payout. Although it lost out in the end, it nevertheless 
made the bidder pay expensively (Fallon and Srodes, (1988)).
Scrip issues have very often been associated with dividend increase. Scrip 
issues (or stock splits) by the target firm are also interpreted as extra dividends 
and may result in an increase in share prices (Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll
(1969)). For example, if the bidder offers the target shareholders £70 per share 
(whose m arket value is £50) at a premium of 40%, and the incum bent 
management proposes a 10 to 1 issue, after the issue, the pre-issue price is 
equivalent to £5 per share and the bid price of £7 per share does not look as 
attractive anymore.
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Theoretically, scrip issues should not increase the value of the share, but in 
practice the market usually shows greater interest in lower priced shares than in 
higher priced shares (Rose, (1987)), and this may result in demand for the lower 
priced shares and the 10 issues may command a higher market price than the 
former whole.
Repurchases of own shares in a takeover are, until recently, illegal in the U.K., 
unless with the shareholders consent (Companies Act 1985, Takeover Code
(1988)). However, observing the major takeovers in the 1980’s (for example, 
Elders IXL versus Allied Lyons, Hanson Trust versus United Biscuits for 
Imperial Group, Guinness versus Argyll for distillers, GEC versus Plassey, 
Dixons versus Woolworth, BTR versus Pilkington and Nestle versus Jacobs 
Suchard for Rowntree) shows that dividends and scrip issues are not as popular 
as repurchases of own shares in the market. For example, in 1986 Morgan 
Grenfel, acting for United Biscuits in the latter’s attempt to make a reverse 
takeover of Imperial Holdings, (in which Hanson Trust was the rival bidder), 
and acting for Guinness in the la tte r’s attempt to act as W hite-Knight for 
D istillers (in which Argyll group was the rival bidder), spent £360 million 
buying shares in Imperial and another £70 million buying shares in Distillers.
These purchases were not directly on behalf of the clients but on its own 
account, which were later found to be indemnified by the clients against any 
losses on the purchases (Gray and McDermott (1989)).
3.5.3: Charter amendments
Amendments to the Charter of firms, sometimes known as shark-repellent or by-law 
amendments, are also employed against unsolicited takeovers. Amendments may be 
in the form of super-majority approval of shareholders or directors before any action 
is taken to support or oppose an offer. For example, in 1983, a major shareholder of 
the House of Frasers and executive chairman of the Lonrho Industries (Mr Tiny
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Rowland), attempted to demerge Harrods (the crown jewel of the House of Fraser), 
from the House of Frasers with the intent to buy.
He failed as the Board of Directors of the House of Fraser had an amendment to 
their charter requiring 75 percent majority before such a move can be executed. 
Mr Rowland and his supporters on the Board had only 53 percent of the votes in 
favour of a resolution to demerge Harrods and was outmanoeuvred (Fallon and 
Srodes(1988)).
Amendments may also be in the form of abolition of cumulative voting rights to 
make it difficult for the opposition to obtain representation on the board. This 
is particularly true if the target firm practice a system of staggered election of 
directors, thereby increasing the time it will take to gain control of the Board. 
Provisions affecting removal of directors is another variant of the shark- 
repellent strategy.
An extrem e form of shark-repellent strategy is a ’po ison-p ill’. It can be 
invoked in four forms (Roberts (1987)): first, the target management can make 
a large issue of convertible shares, thereby increasing the prospects of diluting 
the earning per share if the bidder succeeds. A dilution in earnings per share figure 
can have denting effects on the share price of the bidder firm. Second, target 
management can increase debt and distribute it as dividends. Third, a more practical 
version of poison pill was exhibited by Distillers. When the Argyll group bid for 
Distillers in 1986, Distillers invited Guinness to bid for it as a White-Knight. 
Guinness agreed to this invitation on the condition that if the Argyll groups won the 
battle, Distillers would pay for all the costs incurred by Guinness in the takeover 
attempt. This was a poison pill to Argyll group, because if they won, they would 
burden not only their own costs of bidding but also that of Distiller s, which would 
effectively be the costs incurred by Guinness.
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The fourth version of the poison-pill is the ’crown-jewel lock-up5 strategy. For 
example, in 1985, when Hanson Trust pic made a bid for an American company 
SCM, SCM were hostile towards the bid and made an agreement with their bankers, 
Merrill Lynch partners, that in case Hanson gains control of SCM, Merrill Lynch 
could buy away the most attractive bits of SCM (the pigment business for $350 
million and Durkee famous foods for $80 million). The attractive bits of SCM had a 
total market value of at least $625 million. In this way, SCM executives secured 
themselves some cash to continue their own war for control, while making SCM less 
attractive to Hanson.
3.5.4: Pacman strategy
This involves the target firm trying to counter takeover by purchasing the shares of 
the bidding firm. In U.K., this strategy has been used by bidders and targets in 
recommended offers to circumvent the requirement of the Merger and Monopolies 
Commission (MMC) (Gray and McDermott (1989)). For example, when Imperial 
Industries bid for United Biscuits, this bid was referred to the MMC on competition 
grounds because Imperial and United Biscuits between them had 41 percent of the 
£360 million a year snack market in the U.K., which exceeded the 25 percent 
maximum threshold imposed by MMC.
On the other hand, when Hanson Trusts bid for Imperial, it was not referred to 
the MMC because there was no overlap between their businesses.
The Imperial group preferred United Biscuits to Hanson Trust, and came up 
with a plan such that United Biscuits would now bid for Imperial, and with the 
help of their bankers disposed part of the Imperial assets related to the snack 
market, (ie Golden Wonder to Dalgety) leaving the snack market share to be 
unchanged. This plea-bargaining tactic worked and they were given permission 
by the MMC to proceed with the bid.
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However, in the end Hanson Trust won Imperial by purchasing heavily its shares in 
the market which allowed its offer to surpass the £2.5 billion offer by United 
Biscuits.
3.5.5: Golden parachutes
This defence strategy is widely practised in the American takeover arena 
(K noeber (1986), Lambart and Larcker (1985)). It is a term ination 
compensation package for the top executives in case of a takeover of their firm. 
This technique intends to make it expensive for the bidders. For example, when 
Hanson Trust pic bid for SCM, the SCM BOD authorised ’golden-parachute’ 
triple-pay cheques for 23 of its top executives in the event that Hanson bought 
20 per cent of its shares and subsequently forced any of them out within two 
years (Fallon and srodes (1988)).
3.5.6: Character assassination of bidder’s executives
In 1986, when Argyll group bid for Distillers, Distillers not only invited 
Guinness as a White- Knight, but also started probing into the private life of Mr 
James Guilliver, the chief executive of the Argyll group. It was later found out that, 
in the ’Who’s Who’ entry, filled out by the individual himself, Guilliver listed his 
education as ’Glasgow and Harvard’. It turned out that it should have read ’Glasgow 
and Georgia Institute of Technology’. When the story broke out in the Sunday 
Times, the institutional investors switched their allegiance and decided to support the 
Guinness bid. The institutional investors had the impression that if he could mislead 
about small things, there was a fundamental lack of trustworthiness (Stallworthy and 
Kharbanda (1988)).
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3.5.7: Management buy out (MBO)
This strategy is executed when the target sells off an important division or 
subsidiary to its incumbent management, which makes the target worth less for 
the bidder. MBO is also an antidote for large holding companies whose 
management is overstretched (Grundy (1986), Wright, Robbie and Thompson
(1989)). The first MBO in the U.K. was carried out in June 1985, when the 
management of Halden pic, a quoted engineering firm, beat off a £37 million 
contested offer from Trafalgar House with a £56 million MBO bid (Acquisitions 
Monthly, June 1985).
3.5.8 Mutual pacts
These are secret arrangements with friendly firms to acquire the target shares 
in the open market. In U.K., the friendly firms are usually the financial 
intermediaries, who not only provide the financial arrangements but also other 
services such as purchase of shares and assets of the target. These friendly 
firms are also known as grey-knights (Stallworthy and Kharbanda (1988)). 
Besides grey-knights, there are also white-knights, who are invited by the target 
to directly compete with the hostile bidder. For example, in the case of Eagle 
Star and BAT Industries, where Eagle Star was seeking to prevent its 
acquisition by Allianz. Similarly, Guinness was seen as a White Knight by 
Distillers faced with a bid from Argyll.
3.5.9: Appeal to shareholders’ loyalty 
The target may appeal to its shareholders’ loyalty, as for example, in the case 
of Lloyds Bank’s offer for Standard Charted, where the offer failed narrowily 
leaving Lloyds with purchases and acceptances totalling 42 %.
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It was insufficient to declare its offer unconditional as to acceptances (the Takeover 
code requires 50 % acceptances before the offer can be declared unconditional) 
largely because of substantial market purchases by major shareholders loyal to 
Standard Charted. This tactic is a rare commodity in a listed firm and does not 
always work in favour of the target (Roberts (1987)).
3.6: Popular defence measures of the 1980’s 
In U.K., General Principle 7 of the Takeover Code restricts the target’s board 
to manoeuvre against an unwelcome bid. In view of this constraint, the three 
popular defence measures employed by target firms facing hostile bids are 
(Stallworthy and Kharbanda (1989)):
3.6.1: Acquisitions of other firms
The targets when subjected to hostile bids, begin their own acquisitions to make 
themselves larger and expensive for the bidder. For example, when Elders IXL 
bid for Allied-Lyons for £1.8 billion, Allied-Lyons made a £1.25 billion bid for 
the Canadian group, Hiram-Walker.
The same tactic was applied by Plessey, when it tried to acquire an American 
firm, DSC Communications whilst the GEC’s bid for Plessey was referred to the 
MMC.
3.6.2: Invitation to white-knights
The target may seek a White Knight, when it decides that market sentiment is 
such that it is bound to be taken over. This tactic can result in a series of 
increased bids and counter bids by rival bidders which normally benefits the 
target shareholders
3.6.3: Reference of the bid to the MMC
The target may lobby the Office of Fair Trading to refer the bid to the Mergers 
and Monopolies Commission, which is often accompanied by intensive political 
lobbying.
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The reference to the MMC effectively kills the bid, because it takes on average 
6 to 9 months and a lot of management time before a verdict is given. This long 
lapse of time allows the target to prepare its defence effectively. Alternatively, 
the target may approach the EEC commission on the basis that the bid might 
adversely affect competition within the EEC or might constitute an abuse of a 
dominant position under Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome.
3.7: Offensive tactics by bidders
To match the ingenious defensive tactics by target firms, devised and employed by 
merchant banks on their behalf, the same merchant banks usually devise offensive 
strategies for the bidders. Besides the more common tactics like lobbying the 
institutional investors, advertisements, open market purchases of shares, there are a 
few new tactics borrowed from the American experience (Fallon and Srodes (1988)): 
3.7.1: Warehousing
It refers to the mutual agreement by bidders with their merchant banks with respect to 
buying the target’s or bidder’s shares. This seems to be a fairly standard informal 
practice among city merchant banks, which works on the premise that ’you buy 
shares of the target in the interest of my acquisition plan, I will do the same in 
relation to your next target firm’.
For example, in the Guinness bid for Distillers, Morgan Grenfell asked a favour 
from a smaller bank (Henry Ansbacher) on behalf of its client (Guinness) to buy 
Guinness shares to support the share price with an agreement that it will do the same 
for Henry Ansbacher for their next client. Henry Ansbacher then purchased £7.5 
million worth of Guinness Shares (Fallon and Srodes (1988)).
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3.7.2: Bear market operations
In a classic bear market operation, shares are sold short and the seller hopes to buy 
back at a lower price at delivery time. The difference between the selling price and 
the buying price is the seller’s profit. In the midst of the takeover battle for 
Distillers, the Argyll group and their supporters planned to sell off Guinness shares in 
the market, which will force the share price down, and make it even more expensive 
to bid for Distillers. It was this fear that motivated the former Guinness Chief 
Executive (Mr Ernest Saunders) to mount the support operation, that is purchasing 
their own shares in the market, at whatever cost.
This study was conducted on a sample of hostile takeovers and a sample of 
mergers. Chapters one to three provide a brief summary of the environment in which 
acquisitions are planned and implemented in the U.K. Although they have no direct 
relationship to research study, they are intended to explain the corporate acquisition 
arena in the U.K., so that comparison with the United States can be made in context.
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Chapter 4 
Objective of Study
4.1: Introduction
Compared to the US, there is little published evidence in the UK on the behaviour 
of announcement period returns of firms involved in takeovers. The earlier studies by 
Newbould (1970), Utton (1974), Singh (1971), Franks, Broyles and Hecth (1977), 
Barnes (1974), Firth (1980) and Dodd and Quek (1985) centred on firms involved in 
mergers rather than takeovers. The lack of published evidence on takeovers could be 
due to the lack of a database on such activities and/or the lack of demand for 
empirical studies on the subject as regulators in the UK do not depend on empirical 
evidence to guide regulatory policy formation (English, 1987).
This study intends to contribute to the literature on the behaviour of announcement 
period returns of bidders and targets involved in takeovers and mergers in the UK 
during the period 1985 to 1988. Specifically the following aspects of takeovers and 
mergers will be studied:
4.1.1: Takeovers
(1) To test the validity of the ’information hypothesis’ as suggested by Myers and 
Majluf (1984) on bidder returns in cash and share offers.
(2) To ascertain whether target shareholders in cash offers earn higher abnormal 
returns than those in share offers, in view of the presence of capital gains tax liability 
for shareholders in cash offers and the possibility that the bidders compensate them 
for the liability.
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(3) To ascertain the effect of the takeover announcement on returns to bidders and 
targets respectively.
(4) To ascertain whether takeover announcements do create wealth for the 
shareholders of the combined firm.
(5) To ascertain the presence of the ’co- insurance’ effect in terms of higher returns 
to bidder shareholders with high level of financial leverage than those with low level 
of financial leverage at the announcement of the offer.
4.1.2: Mergers
(1) To ascertain the effect of a merger announcement on the returns to bidders and 
targets respectively.
(2) To ascertain whether a merger announcement creates wealth for the shareholders 
of the combined firm.
4.2: Information Hypothesis
In complete markets with symmetric information and in the absence of taxes, 
shareholders should be indifferent to the means of payment used in takeovers. The 
share price response should reflect any changes in the fundamental values induced by 
the takeover. However, the presence of a non- neutral tax system and the specific 
features of the capital market encourage the use of particular type of payments in 
takeovers (Franks, Harris and Mayers (1988)).
In the US, Myers and Majluf (1984) suggested that due to asymmetries of 
information in the market, the forms of payment offered by bidders in takeovers 
provide a signal to investors of the estimated value of bidder’s shares. They postulate 
that a bidder is better informed about the true value of its shares (which the market is 
not aware) and hence will offer equity to the target shareholders when its shares are 
overvalued.
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The fact that the bidder has a choice of alternative forms of payment such as cash or a 
combination package signals further that in a share offer the bidder’s shares are 
overvalued and it is seeking to exploit the situation to take control of the target’s 
resources. The bidder will offer cash to target shareholders if its shares are 
undervalued rather than to share the potential increase in value with target 
shareholders.
The information hypothesis suggested by Myers and Majluf is silent on the issue of 
combination offers. It is possible that the bidder will offer a combination of shares 
and cash if it is uncertain about the true value of its shares and intends to mitigate 
this uncertainty by offering an equity participation to target shareholders. 
Consequently, the net effect of the combination offer on the bidder’s share price will 
depend on the weight of the cash and share portion in the offer. If the share portion 
is greater than the cash portion, a negative effect on the bidder’s share price will be 
expected. On the other hand if the cash portion is greater than the share portion it 
will have a positive effect on the bidder’s share price at the announcement of the 
offer. If the combination offer consists of an equal portion of shares and cash, the 
positive effect of the cash portion may offset the negative effect of the share portion 
and the net effect of the combination offer on the bidder’s share price would not be 
significantly different from zero.
The bidder’s incentive to use a particular form of financing is assumed to be based on 
the fact that the quality of the bidder’s shares becomes evident only after the bid is 
announced and the revaluations will subsequently take place.
Hansen (1987) suggested that if the target is better informed about its own value 
and its estimated value is revealed only after the offer announcement, equity offers 
will be prefered to cash when the equity is believed to be undervalued. Target firms 
prefer to retain an equity participation in the combined firm in order to capture the 
potential gains fom the combined resources.
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If information effects are present, the bidding firm’s share price change at the 
announcement of the offer will reflect both the gains from the takeover and the 
information effects. It is not possible to separate the effect of the form of payment 
per se on the bidder’s share price because the form of payment is an essential part of 
the offer and is always announced with the offer.
It is therefore assumed that the effect of the bid itself is equal for cash, share and 
combination offers, and by segregating the sample with respect to the form of 
payments and comparing the differences in the announcement period returns will 
ascertain the effect of the form of payments on the bidder share price. Assuming 
other things being equal, the returns to bidding firms in cash offers will be higher 
than in share offers at the announcement of the offer. Information hypothesis also 
predicts that the pre announcement share price of cash bidders is low relative to the 
post announcement share price.
Specifically the following hypothesis will be tested:
HQ : The returns to bidder shareholders in cash offers are higher than those in share 
offers at the two-day announcement period.
Hj : The returns to bidder shareholders in cash offers are equal to or lower 
than those in share offers at the two-day announcement period.
Fishm an (1986) suggested that cash offers are associated with large bid 
premiums provided by the bidder. Bidders are assumed to incur fixed costs for 
collecting information to value the prospective target. Based on this estimated 
value, bidders make high value bids, partly to deter other firms from paying for 
information and initiating competing bids. Cash offers should therefore be 
associated with high premiums for the target firm, low level of competition and 
positive abnormal returns for bidders after the bid announcement.
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This study seeks to ascertain the validity of Fishman’s suggestions on bidder returns 
in cash offers, specifically with respect to the positive abnormal returns to bidders in 
the post announcement period.
4.3: Announcement period returns to target firm shareholders in cash and share 
offers, and the possibility of bidders compensating target shareholders in cash offers 
for their capital gains tax liability
In the UK, cash and share offers have different tax implications for target 
shareholders. Cash offers generate immediate capital gains tax liability for the 
accepting shareholders, whereas in share offers the capital gains tax liability of 
accepting shareholders are deffered until the shares are sold.
The bidder’s decision to use cash or shares as the means of payment for their 
acquisition may also have different tax implications. For example, if the bidder 
offers cash as the means of payment for its acquisition, the Statem ent of 
Standard of Accounting Practices Number 14 (SSAP14) would require the bidder to 
use the ’acquisition accounting method’ for the takeover. In the acquisition 
accounting method, SSAP14 requires that the target firm’s assets and liabilities are 
included in the consolidated accounts at fair values (which is the market value of the 
assets at the effective date of the takeover). Consequently, this will increase the 
writing-down allowances (depreciation charges) , decrease the amount of taxable 
income and increase the amount of cashflows.
On the other hand, in share offers the bidder is required to apply the merger 
accounting method and SSAP14 does not make it necessary for the bidder to 
adjust the values of the assets and liabilities acquired from the target to their fair 
values in its own books or on consolidation. The only adjustments appropriate are 
those to achieve uniformity of accounting policies in the bidder and target firms.
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Studies in the US by Wangley, Lane and Yang (1983), Huang and Walking (1987) 
and provide evidence that all target shareholders in takeovers earn significant 
positive abnormal returns at the two-day announcement period irrespective of the 
forms of payment offered to them. Also, due to immediate capital gains liability for 
target shareholders in cash offers, the bidding firms pay a higher acquisition price in 
cash offers to offset the liability of accepting target shareholders.
Unlike the US, the capital gains tax in UK is designed to encourage both large and 
small investors to invest in shares through the various Business Expansion Schemes 
and investment schemes offered by institutional investors such as Unit Trusts, 
Pension Funds, Investments Trusts and Insurance firms.
Investors in the UK are allowed to deduct certain expenses from the gains on 
sale of shares such as buying and selling expenses, losses on sale of other shares 
during the same period, and allowance for inflation. After deducting all these 
expenses, if the gains exceed £5000 (1989/90) they are taxed at their top slice of 
income tax.
Individual investors in the Personal Equity Plans schemes are exempted from 
capital gains tax provided they they do not withdraw their investments for the 
first one or two years, and they are also allowed to buy and sell shares to 
establish losses or gains to mitigate the capital gains tax liability (Hommers and 
Burrows, 1988).
Furthermore, institutional investors in the UK such as the Unit Trusts and the 
Investment Trusts are exempted from capital gains tax and this is significant 
because 70 % of the equity of publicly listed firms in the UK are held by 
institutional investors (Stock Exchange Quarterly, 1988). Therefore unlike in 
the US, there is a possibility that target shareholders in cash offers in UK are 
not compensated for the capital gains tax liability.
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In the UK, only Frank, Hams and Mayer’s (1988) study provides some evidence of 
announcement period returns to target shareholders in cash and share offers in 
takeovers. Their findings show that targets in cash offers earn higher monthly returns 
than in share offers at the announcement month. They concluded that since their 
sample include firms involved in takeovers before 1965, whereas capital gains tax 
was only introduced in 1965, their findings of higher announcement month returns to 
target firms in cash offers cannot be completely explained by the capital gains tax 
liability factor.
In light of the evidence from US that target shareholders in takeovers always 
earn positive daily abnormal returns at the announcement of the offer (Jensen and 
Ruback (1983), Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983)), the following hypothesis will be 
tested on target shareholders in the UK:
HQ : Target shareholders subjected to cash, share and combination offers earn 
positive abnormal returns at the two-day announcement period.
Hj : Target shareholders subjected to cash, share and combination offers earn 
zero or negative abnormal returns at the two-day announcement period.
With respect to the possibility that target shareholders in cash offers in the UK are 
not compensated for the capital gains tax liability, the following hypotheses will be 
tested on target firms in cash and share offers:
H0 : Target shareholders subjected to cash offers earn equal or lower returns than 
those in share offers at the two-day announcement period.
Hj : Target shareholders subjected to cash offers earn higher returns than those in 
share offers at the two-day announcement period.
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4.4: Returns to bidders and targets in takeovers and mergers 
4.4.1: Takeovers
Published evidence on returns to bidders and targets in takeovers in the UK is 
scarce. The earlier studies by Newbould (1970), Singh (1971), Utton (1974), 
Franks, Broyles and Hecth (1977), Firth (1980), Barnes (1978, 1984, 1985) and 
Dodd and Quek (1985) were related to mergers rather than takeovers.
Newbould (1970) used a questionnaire approach to study a sample of merging 
firms and concluded that the contribution of mergers to improve performance 
and profitability is unimpressive.
Singh (1971) studied a sample of mergers using a ’before and a fte r’ 
comparison of profitability and concluded that there was in a majority of the cases a 
decline in the relative profitability of bidder firm as late as two years after the merger. 
Utton (1974) used a technique of comparing performance of groups of firms 
distinguished by the relative importance of internal and external components of 
their expansion over a given time period.
He compared the profit performance of merger intensive firms both in relation 
to industry performance and in relation to the performance of a randomly 
selected group of internal growth firms. He concluded that merger intensive 
firms performed poorly compared to the group of internal growth firms.
Franks, Broyles and Hecth (1977) used the residual analysis approach to study 
firms merging in the brewing and distilling sector and concluded that the 
announcement month gains and the combined gains to bidders and targets were 
significantly  positive, implying that mergers did create wealth for the 
shareholders in the combined firm.
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Firth (1980) used the residual analysis approach to study the returns to firms 
merging in the industrial sector in general, and concluded that in the announcement 
month, the abnormal returns to bidders were negative and to targets were positive and 
the combined gains were not significantly different from zero.
Barnes (1978) used the residual analysis to investigate the behaviour of share 
prices of acquiring firms at and around the time of merger. Using a sample of 
mergers between June 1974 to Febuary 1976, he concluded that there was a 
slight increase in prices over the period leading up to the merger and a slight 
decrease immediately following, although these were not statistically significant.
In a follow-up study, using the same sample but extended period of analysis, Barnes 
(1984) found that there were slight share price gains initially followed by a 
substantial decrease as the time elapsed.
Barnes (1985) studied a sample of mergers in the UK Building Societies using 
M anagem ent Expenses Ratio and Total Assets Ratio and concluded that 
mergers between small societies and between small and medium size societies do 
not materialise any benefits either in terms of increased operating efficiency or 
enhanced organisational effectiveness.
Dodd and Quek (1985) used the residual analysis approach to study the returns 
behaviour of a sample of acquiring firms in the industrial sector, in the period 
1974 to 1976. They concluded that, for the overall sample, the announcement 
month returns were negative but not significantly different from zero. The 
acquiring firms experienced an increase in their share price relative to the 
market for the first 25 months after the announcement, after which the share 
price declined.
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These studies were done on a sample of merger rather than takeover firms possibly 
due to the availibility of data on merging firms and/or the popularity of mergers as a 
means of acquisition during that period.
In current markets, takeovers are as popular as mergers, but little published evidence 
is available possibly due to lack of research on firms involved in takeovers. This 
study intends to ascertain the behaviour of announcement period returns of firms 
involved in hostile takeovers for the period 1985 to 1988.
Evidence from the US on bidder returns in takeovers shows mixed results. For 
exam ple, A squith’s (1983) study showed that the two-day announcement 
abnormal returns for bidders are positive but not significantly different from 
zero. Dodd’s (1980), and Asquith and Kim’s (1982) studies showed that bidders in 
takeovers earn significant negative returns at the two-day announcement period, 
whereas Bradley (1980) and Bradley, Desai and Kim’s (1983) studies showed that 
bidders in takeovers earn significant positive abnormal returns at the two-day 
announcement period.
Generally, most findings on daily and monthly returns to bidders in takeovers in the 
US tend to be either negative or insignificantly positive and the returns to target 
firms are consistently positive (Jensen and Ruback (1983), Rappaport (1987)).
At the announcement of the bid, the bidder is expected to offer a price above 
the current market price of the target firm but below the bidder’s estimated value for 
the target. If the bidder has a high chance of acquiring the target firm at a price below 
the estimated value for the target, part of the potential gains from the takeover 
identified by the bidder should accrue to the bidder’s shareholders. Consequently, 
the bidder’s shareholders should earn positive abnormal returns at the announcement 
of the offer.
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To ascertain the behaviour of announcement period returns of bidders and targets in 
takeovers in the UK, the following hypotheses will be tested:
(Bidder Returns)
Hq : Bidder shareholders earn positive abnormal returns at the two-day 
announcement period.
Hj : Bidder shareholders earn zero or negative abnormal returns at the two-day 
announcement period.
(Target Returns)
HQ : Target shareholders earn positive abnormal returns at the two-day 
announcement period.
Hj : Target shareholders earn zero or negative abnormal returns at the two-day 
announcement period.
4.4.2: Mergers
This study also intends to ascertain the behaviour of announcement period 
returns of bidder and target firms in mergers in the UK for the period 1985 to 
1988. The earlier studies on mergers were on either a sample of an industrial 
group (for example, Dodd and Quek’s study (1985)), or a sample of firms on the 
stock market in general (for example, Firth’s studies (1979,1980)) or from a 
small but widely drawn sample (for example, Barnes studies (1978, 1984)). The 
merging firms sampled for this study are from the industrial, financial, and 
services sectors, which decreases the possibility of a specific industry effect on 
returns to bidders and targets.
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This study intends to revisit the subject of the earlier studies on the returns to bidders 
and targets in mergers, in the context of more recent evidence. This is in view of the 
considerable economic and regulatory changes that has taken place in the market 
since the the earlier studies were conducted and the possible effect of these changes 
on returns to bidder and targets in mergers. Specifically the following hypotheses 
will be tested:
(Bidder Returns)
Hq : Bidders in mergers earn zero or negative abnormal returns at the two- 
day announcement period.
Hj : Bidders in mergers earn positive abnormal returns at the two-day 
announcement period.
(Target Returns)
Hq : Targets in mergers earn positive abnormal returns at the two-day 
announcement period.
H | : Targets in mergers earn zero or negative abnormal returns at the two- 
day announcement period.
(Combined Returns)
H0 : The combined returns of bidders and targets in mergers are zero or 
negative at the two-day announcement period.
Hj : The combined returns of bidders and targets in mergers are positive at 
the two-day announcement period.
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4.5: Do takeovers create wealth for the shareholders of the combined firm?
Bidders who initiate takeovers with the intention of creating wealth usually expect 
to exploit some form of synergy from the resources of the combined firm. Synergy 
may manifest itself in many forms such as an increase in market power, better 
distributional and marketing facilities, better techonology and research and 
development facilities, management expertise, economies of scale in production and 
sales, or any other form which will contribute towards an increase in wealth. In 
residual analysis, it is difficult to point out the paticular type of synergy present but 
the presence of synergy is detected if the combined returns of bidders and targets are 
significantly positive.
To ascertain the presence of the market’s expectation of synergy in takeovers in the 
UK, the following hypothesis is tested:
HQ : The combined returns of bidders and targets are positive at the two-day 
announcement period.
H j : The combined returns of bidders and targets are zero or negative at the two- 
day announcement period.
4.6: Size maximisation hypothesis
In recent years, takeovers are more frequent between firms in unrelated or loosely 
related industries (Acquisitions Monthly, December 1988). This behaviour on the 
part of active bidders could be due to a response towards the goverment s tough anti­
competitive policy. When one firm takes over another in the same industry, other 
firms in the industry may feel threatened and resort to defensive measures such as 
increasing their own size through takeovers, even of firms in unrelated industry.
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The increase in size makes it difficult and expensive for potential bidders and resets 
some form of equilibrium in terms of relative firm size in the industry.
The acquired targets are usually left to operate as an autonomous division 
managed by the same team that controlled it before the takeover (Stallworthy 
and K harbanda, 1988). Acquired targets are left to manage their own 
businesses due to either the bidder’s lack of expertise in the target firm ’s 
business and/or the difference in bidder’s management style (i.e strategic 
planners or financial control) which is a potential area of conflict in the post­
acquisition period.
Strategic planners (for example, ICI, Plassey and Courtaulds) usually have a 
small number of core businesses and their subsidiaries help to implement global 
plans to their mutual competitive advantage. As the company becomes diverse, 
the strategic planners at the headquarters concentrate on helping their 
subsidiaries formulate their own detailed plans.
In financially controlled companies (for example, BTR, GEC, Hanson Trust 
and Tarmac), the managers at the headquarters judge their subsidiaries by numbers 
representing the financial targets they have prescribed. There is a tight control on 
finances and the headquarters staff is small but consists predominantly of 
accountants, and the acquired target managers enjoy a great deal of autonomy in the 
daily runing of the business.
Robin Marris (1964), Mueller (1969) and Murphy (1985) suggested that 
bidders initiate takeovers to increase size rather than profits because size 
provides both pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits to the bidder managers. If 
most bidders pursue takeovers for growth purposes rather to maximise 
shareholders wealth, the combined gains to such bidders and targets would be 
either zero or negative. Positive and significant combined gains would not be 
consistent with Marris, Mueller and Murphy’s suggestions.
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4.7: The presence of co-insurance effect
Lewellen (1971) and Franks, Broyles and Carleton (1985) suggested that when a 
bidder takes over a target whose cashflows are not perfectly correlated with its 
own, there would be a reduction in the default risk of the combined firm’s debt 
and a concomitant increase in the market value of the debt. Assuming that the 
takeover is a zero net present value investment (the combined returns to bidders 
and targets are not significantly different from zero), the increase in the market 
value of debt would be offset by a corresponding decrease in the value of equity.
This phenomenon is termed the ’co-insurance effect’ and can also take the 
form of wealth transfer from debtholders to the shareholders if the bidder 
management invests in risky projects with new debt.
To ascertain the total co-insurance effect of wealth transfer between shareholders 
and debtholders requires a sample of bidders involved in takeovers which, on 
average, are zero net present value investments, which is beyond the scope of this 
study.
However, it is possible that when a highly leveraged bidder takes over a low 
leveraged target there is an increase in the market value of debt due to decrease in the 
risk of default of the combined firm and thereby increase the borrowing capacity of 
the combined firm. The increase in the borrowing capacity and the tax-deductable 
interest payments increase the shareholders’ wealth.
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For this purpose, the bidders in takeovers in this study are divided into categories of 
low , medium and ’high’ financial leverage, measured in terms of the ratio of total 
debt to total capital employed.
Since the range of the ratio for the sample was between zero to 29 %, it was 
arb itrarily  decided that bidders with a ratio of zero to 9.99 % w ill be 
considered as low leveraged bidders, those in the range of 10 % to 19.99 % as 
medium leveraged and those with higher than 19.99 % as highly leveraged. The 
financial leverage is measured by the ratio of total loan capital to total capital 
employed as per latest balance sheet before the announcement of the offer. This 
measure is used because it was easily available.
Specifically, the following hypothesis will be tested:
HQ : Bidders in the ’high’ leverage group earn higher returns than those in the 
’low’ leverage group at the two-day announcement period.
Hj : Bidders in the ’high’ leverage group earn equal or lower returns than 
those in the ’low’ leverage group at the two-day announcement period.
4.8: Difference between this study and that of Franks, Harris and Mayer’s 
(1988) study on bidder and target returns in the UK
Although Franks, Harris and Mayer’s (1988) comparative study of firms involved in 
takeovers in the UK and US provided some evidence with respect to the effect of the 
forms of payment on bidder and target returns in the UK, this study differs from 
Franks et.al study in two respects.
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First, it uses daily rather than monthly returns. The use of daily returns permits the 
use of specific day of the month on which the takeover was announced and better 
enables the research design to control for the effects of other events on bidder and 
target returns at the announcement of the offer. Brown and Warner (1985) report that 
the use of daily returns increases the power (as measured in terms of minimising 
type-one and type-two errors and increasing the probability of correctiy rejecting the 
null hypothesis) of the market model used to generate the expected returns.
Second, this study intends to revisit the subject of announcement period returns of 
bidders and targets in takeovers in the context of more recent evidence, by using a 
sample of firms in takeovers from 1985 to 1988. There have been considerable 
economic and regulatory changes since 1985, and there is a possibility that these 
changes effect the returns to bidders and targets in takeovers. Frank’s et. al study 
used a sample from January 1955 to June 1985.
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Chapter 5 
Evidence from prior studies 
5.1: Form of payments in takeovers and their effect on bidder and target 
announcement period returns 
5.1.1: Bidder returns
An analysis of the effects of different forms of payment on bidder returns in 
takeovers has been suggested by Myers and Majluf (1984). They argue that if 
bidding firms have acquired some positive information about their value, which is 
not publicly available, they will prefer to finance an acquisition by cash to avoid 
sharing the potential gains with the target shareholders. Conversely, if the bidder 
management believe that their firm is overvalued they would prefer the target 
shareholders to retain an equity holding and hence will offer a share exchange.
When shares are offered by the bidder, the ultimate gains to the shareholders of the 
target firm will depend on the value of the shares offered, which is determined by the 
expected success or failure of the acquisition attempt and if successful, the expected 
outcome in the post takeover period. It is assumed that the bidder signals information 
about its equity value through the form of payment it offers to the target shareholders 
at the announcement of the offer.
By offering a cash offer the bidder signals that its equity is undervalued, which will 
increase the demand for the bidder’s shares and consequently increase the share 
price. A share offer signals that the equity is overvalued and the bidder is seeking to 
exploit the situation by offering the target’s shareholders an equity participation.
In share offers, investors will sell their shares if they believe that the shares are 
overvalued and this will result in a selling pressure on bidders share.
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Fishman (1986) suggested that if a target possesses positive information about its 
value which is not publicly available, it will only accept a share offer if it perceives 
the bidder s shares to be undervalued so that it can benefit from the expected gains 
after the takeover.
The suggestions by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Fishman (1986) are also known as 
the ’information effect’, which assumes information asymmetry between the 
bidder’s management and the market. The bidder management is assumed to possess 
valuable information about their own firm which is not available to the market until 
the announcement of the offer.
In the US, Travlos (1987) provided evidence that there was a significant difference 
between abnormal returns of bidders offering shares and those offering cash. His 
findings confirmed the presence of the information effect. He reported that the two- 
day announcement cumulative abnormal returns of share financing bidding firms is 
significantly negative ( CAR= -1.47%, Z=-5.07) and for bidders offering cash is not 
significantly different from zero (CAR=0.24%, Z =l.ll).
Jensen and Ruback (1983) summarised the evidence of takeover activity in the US 
and reported that the returns to bidding firms’ shareholders in successful takeovers 
were positive, whereas those of successful mergers were zero. None of the empirical 
work discussed investigated differences due to the exchange medium. However, the 
presence of the information effect is implied in the findings as most takeovers in the 
US are financed by cash and mergers by exchange of shares.
Smith (1986) and Asquith, Brunner and Mullins (1987) show that in takeovers 
financed with new equity issues, the returns to bidder firms are significantly lower 
than in offers financed by cash.
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In the U.K., the only published evidence of the effect of the form of payments on 
bidder returns in takeovers is reported by Franks, Harris and Mayers (1988).
Their study showed that neither cash nor equity considerations displayed significant 
abnormal returns to bidders’ shareholders in the announcement month. It is possible 
that either information leakage before the announcement and/or the confounding 
effects of monthly returns could have obscured the effect of the form of payments on 
bidder returns in their study.
However, the effect of the form of payments on bidder returns in mergers have 
been reported by Barnes (1978) and Dodd and Quek (1985). Bame’s (1978) research 
on the effect of merger news on the share price of 39 publicly listed bidders in the 
industrial sector between 1974 to 1976 showed that in the announcement month the 
average residual of bidding firms offering share exchange was a negative 2.6 percent, 
whereas for bidders offering cash the average residual was a positive 1.6 percent, 
which is consistent with the information hypothesis.
Dodd and Quek (1985) studied a sample of 70 publicly listed U.K. industrial firms 
for the period 1974 to 1976. They found that in the announcement month, the 
average residual of bidders offering shares was a positive 0.78 percent, and for those 
bidders offering cash was a negative 1.93 percent. Their findings are not consistent 
with the information hypothesis.
Firth (1976) has suggested that during the period 1974 to 1976, firms generally 
faced tight liquidity and in these circumstances any firm offering cash for acquisition 
purposes was interpreted as bad news. Firms offering cash for their targets in tight 
liquidity situations are assumed to finance their acquisitions through borrowings at a 
high cost, which will reduce the expected returns on the investment. However, if 
Firth’s suggestion is true, it does not explain Barne s (1978) findings on bidder 
returns in industrial sector during the same period, 1974 to 1976.
92
5.1.2: Target returns
Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983), Huang and Walking (1987), and Gordon and Yagil 
(1981) showed that in the US target firms’ shareholders subjected to cash offers 
earned higher returns than those subjected to share offers. They explained that the 
target shareholders subjected to cash offers were compensated for the capital gains 
tax liab ility . Cash offers generate capital gains tax liability for accepting 
shareholders, whereas in share offers the tax liability is deferred until the shares are 
sold.
Franks, Harris and Mayer’s (1988) study in the U.K., showed that the target 
shareholders subjected to cash offers earned significantly higher monthly abnormal 
returns than target shareholders subjected to share offers. They suggested that the 
difference cannot be completely explained by capital gains tax liability factor, 
because their sample include firms involved in acquisitions before 1965. The capital 
gains tax was introduced in the U.K. in April 1965.
Furthermore, the capital gains tax factor for target shareholders in cash offers in the 
U.K. may not be as important as in the US because the capital gains tax system in the 
U.K. is designed to encourage small and large investors to invest in shares. For 
example, an investor is only subjected to the capital gains tax when its gains from the 
sale of shares exceeds the £5000 (1988/89) threshold. This threshold is calculated 
after deduction of expenses such as buying and selling expenses, inflation allowance 
and losses from the sale of shares during the same period. Institutional investors such 
as Unit Trusts and Investment Trusts are exempted from the capital gains tax and for 
investors in the Business Expansion Schemes any shares which are issued after 18th 
of March 1986 are exempted from the capital gains tax on their first disposal 
[Hommer and Burrows (1988)].
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5.1.3: Possible reasons for the bidder’s choice of the form of payment
In US, Jensen (1986) suggested that bidder management may prefer to use the 
residual cashflows (i.e. cashflows in excess of the amount required to finance 
attractive investment opportunities other than acquisitions) to takeover other firms 
rather giving out as dividends. Dividends are subjected to tax whereas reinvestments 
in a form of acquisition increase the firms market value, especially when substituted 
for internal investments that are less profitable.
In the U.K., Section 151 of the Companies Act 1985 prohibits a firm to repurchases 
its own shares, except under special circumstances and with the consent of the 
shareholders (Companies Act 1985). Therefore, cash offers could be a disguised 
form of repurchase which represents an outflow of cash from bidder that no longer 
anticipates profitable internal investments. Using the takeover route also allows the 
bidder management to settle any uncertainty in the market about the firm’s future 
expected growth.
Carleton, Guilkey, Harris and Stewart (1983), suggested that the difference in 
accounting treatment of takeovers in the US influence the choice of the method of 
financing acquisitions. This may also be true in the U.K. as bidders are subjected to 
the requirement of Statement of Standard of Accounting Practice number 14 
(SSAP14) to use either acquisition or merger accounting method in takeovers. The 
final choice of the form of payment will depend on the type of acquisition initiated 
(merger or takeover).
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Merger accounting method is allowed only for share offers (especially mergers) 
because of the requirement that target shareholders retain an ownership position in 
the bidding firm. In the merger accounting method, the book values of assets, 
liabilities and equities of the bidder and target firms are not added together at fair 
values (which are the market values at the effective date of the merger), and thus 
does not allow for a higher written-down allowance (depreciation charges). One 
advantage of merger accounting is that all the pre-acquisition profits of the merging 
firms for the period in which the merger takes place is combined without any 
adjustment for part of the period prior to the date of the merger. The pre-acquisition 
profits of the target are subsequently paid as dividends to the bidder and forms part of 
the bidder’s distributable profits which may be paid out to shareholders as dividends. 
Acquisition accounting method is allowed for cash offers. Using this method, any 
excess of purchase price over the market value of the target is reported as goodwill 
and amortised from the net earnings after tax. This has the possibility of diluting the 
earning per share figure. It may, however, increase cashflows as SSAP14 allows the 
bidder to add the target’s assets and liabilities to its balance sheet at the market value 
on the effective date of the takeover, thereby increasing the wntten-down allowances 
and consequently the cashflows ( Cook (1988), Begg (1986)). A bidder management 
whose performance and compensation is based on earnings figure may prefer the 
merger accounting method and therefore offer share exchange. If management 
performance is based on the market value (i.e. cashflows) then acquisition accounting
method may be preferred.
Bidding firms management who expect strong resistance from the target 
management may prefer to offer cash because cash offers are less complex, easier to 
administer and speedily executed than share offers, which increases the chances of 
success (Hayes and Taussig (1967)).
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5.2. Difference in announcement period returns of bidders and targets in 
takeovers and mergers 
5.2.1: Bidder returns
Studies on corporate takeovers in the US provide conclusive evidence of significant 
positive returns to target firm shareholders in takeovers and mergers but are 
inconclusive with respect to bidder firm returns at the announcement of the 
acquisition. Studies on takeovers by Dodd and Ruback (1977), Bradley (1980), 
Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983), Travlos (1987) and Jarrel and Poulsen (1989) 
showed that bidders earn significant positive abnormal returns at the announcement 
of the offer. Studies on mergers by Dodd (1980), Firth (1980), Eger (1983) showed 
significant negative returns, whereas Asquith (1983), Eckbo (1983), Dennis and 
McConnell (1986), Amihud, Dodd and Weinstein (1986) showed insignificant 
positive returns for merger bidders at the announcement of the merger.
Mergers are consummated when bidder management negotiates a deal with the 
target management to take control of the target’s resources. A takeover is executed 
when the bidder management intends to take control of the target’s resources by 
approaching the target shareholders directly and persuading them to sell their shares 
at a premium to the prevailing market price. The bidder management do not 
negotiate with the target management, but are required by the Takeover Code to 
inform the latter of its intention which is usually done at a short notice before the 
official announcement.
The inconsistency in bidder returns in mergers and takeovers at the announcement 
of the acquisition is conjectured by Carleton, Guilkey, Hams and Stewart (1983) to 
be due to the difference in the form of payments. Travlos s (1987) study showed a 
significant difference in the announcement period returns of bidders in mergers and 
takeovers employing different forms of payment, consistent with Carleton, Guilkey, 
Harris and Stewart’s conjecture.
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The difference in returns to bidders in mergers and takeovers at the announcement, 
however, could be due to a combination of two effects. First, the effect of the 
method of payments and second, the effect of the type of acquisition (merger or 
takeover) employed.
There is a technical difference between a merger, which is a negotiated deal, and a 
takeover which is a surprise attack on the target management through a direct appeal 
to the target shareholders to sell their shares. The information conveyed to the 
market by the bidder using a takeover would be that it has a comparative advantage 
over the potential gains from the takeover.
In takeovers the bidder is presumed to possess some valuable information about the 
possibility of exploiting the potential gains which the target management is either 
unaware or lacks the capability of exploiting themselves.
The information conveyed to the market by a bidder proposing a merger would be 
that the potential gains from the combination are unique to the particular pair of 
bidder and target firm, than to either one individually. Both the target and the bidder 
management realise that individually they are not able to generate an equally 
profitable investment or production strategy in such a short period of time.
Merger implies that neither the target nor the bidder has a comparative advantage 
over the potential gains from the combination.
5.2.2: Target returns
Bradley and Kim (1985) have suggested that the choice between merger and takeover 
is motivated by the cost of acquiring a firm, which is directly linked to the premium 
paid to the target shareholders or the premium required by the target management for 
their shareholders. Mergers allow the bidders to pay the premium directly to the 
target management, otherwise control related increments in takeover premium is 
paid to all accepting target shareholders.
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This implies that target shareholders will earn lower premiums in mergers.
Jensen and Ruback (1983) suggests that target shareholders in takeovers earn 
higher returns than those in mergers. They reported an average return of 29.9% for 
target shareholders in successful takeovers and 15.93% for targets shareholders in 
successful mergers over one month before the announcement.
Huang and Walkling (1987) in their study on target abnormal returns associated 
with acquisition announcements, found that after controlling for the payment method 
and the degree of resistance, the difference in abnormal returns between targets in 
takeovers and mergers is insignificant.
5.3: Combined returns to bidders and targets in takeovers and mergers
An attempt by a bidding firm to gain control of the target’s resources and 
implement a higher valued strategy is assumed to create wealth through synergistic 
effects. Synergy is realised when an increase in the aggregate market value of the 
two firms is more than a simple sum of market value of each firm (Weston and 
Copeland (1988)). The increase in aggregate wealth of the combined firm can be a 
product of improved management and production techniques, economies of scale, 
financial and tax advantages or even increased marketability of the bidding firm s 
shares.
In empirical research, it is not possible to identify which particular source of synergy 
is present in a takeover or merger but the presence of synergy is detected if the 
combined returns of bidders and targets at the announcement of the offer is 
significantly positive.
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In the U.K., there is no published evidence of combined returns of firms in 
takeovers at the announcement of the offer, but findings on combined returns to 
bidders and targets in mergers has been reported by Firth (1980) and Franks, Broyles 
and Hecht (1977). Firth (1980) found that the combined gains of bidders and targets 
in the announcement month was virtually zero. Franks, Broyles and Hecht (1977) 
found that combined gains of bidders and targets at the announcement of the merger 
were positive, implying the presence of synergy for firms merging within the brewing 
and distilling sector.
In US, studies on takeovers by Dodd and Ruback (1977), Bradley (1980), Bradley, 
Desai and Kim (1983), Schipper and Thomson (1983) found large and significant 
positive abnormal returns for target shareholders and small but significant positive 
abnormal returns to bidding firms’ shareholders, implying that the combined gains 
are positive. Mandelker’s study (1974) concluded that bidding firms earned normal 
returns whereas abnormal returns from mergers accrue to target shareholders, 
implying positive combined gains.
However, when the combined gains to target and bidding firms’ shareholders are 
not positive, it implies that there is merely a transfer of existing rights of ownership 
from target to the bidder. Roll (1986) in his analysis of successful takeovers in US 
suggested that gains by targets are a simple wealth transfer from bids that are more 
their worth. Dodd (1980) found significant negative returns for bidders and positive 
returns to target firm’s shareholders at the announcement of the bid and concluded 
that gains arising from the acquisition to the target shareholders were at the expense 
of the bidding firm’s shareholders.
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5.4: The presence of co-insurance effect
One possible reason for bidders to pursue takeovers is to exploit the potential 
financial synergies (Weston and Copeland (1988)). Financial synergies may manifest 
themselves in the form of reduction in the cost of capital, which could be due to 
economies of scale in flotation and transaction costs and the presence of co-insurance 
effect, use of unused debt capacity and the use of operating loss carryovers.
Lewellen (1971) suggested that a combination of two firms whose cashflows are 
less than perfectly correlated, would reduce the risk of default of the combined firm’s 
debt and increase the market value of the debt. The increase in the market value 
coupled with the tax deductability of interest payments provide an economic 
incentive for shareholders to pursue takeovers of other firms. If the combined gains 
from the combination is not significantly different from zero (i.e. the net present 
value of the acquisition is zero), which implies that the total value of the combined 
firm has not changed, the increase in the value of debt would result in a concomitant 
decrease in the value of the equity. Lewellen has termed this phenomenon as the co- 
insurance effect in a form of wealth transfer from the shareholders to debtholders.
The co-insurance effect can also take the form of wealth transfer from debtholders 
to shareholders if the shareholders venture into risky projects with new debt capital. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that there is an incentive for shareholders of 
leveraged firm s to expropriate the bondholders wealth by undertaking investments 
which increase the firm’s riskiness. The increase in risk will increase the variability 
of the firm’s cashflows and shareholders will earn higher returns at the expense of 
bondholders. The bondholder loses because of the increase in default risk of existing 
bonds. The net effect represents a wealth transfer from bondholders to shareholders.
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Higgins and Schall (1975) and Galai and Masulis (1976) took up Lewellen’s 
suggestion and tested it on a sample of firms involved in takeovers whose combined 
returns were not significantly different from zero. They showed that there was an 
increase in the market value of the combined firm ’s outstanding debt and a 
concomitant decrease in the market value of the combined firm’s equity. This 
implied a wealth transfer from shareholders to bondholders and a fall in share prices. 
However, empirical studies by Kim and McConnel (1977), Asquith and Kim (1982) 
and Eger(1983) in US found that neither the bidding nor the target firm s’ 
bondholders experience significant abnormal gains (or losses) around the 
announcement of the merger.
It is possible that when a highly leveraged bidder takes over a low leveraged target 
there is an increase in the market value of the debt due to the decrease in the risk of 
default of the combined firm and thereby increase the borrowing capacity of the 
combined firm. The increase in the borrowing capacity and the tax-deductable 
interest payments increase the shareholders’ wealth.
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Chapter 6 
Assumptions underlying this study
6.1 The assumptions
This study is based upon the following assumptions:
(a) Investors are rational wealth maximising price takers. It is assumed that 
investors’ decisions are based on a wealth maximising objective (maximum returns 
per unit of risk), and that the price of securities are not determined by any single 
investor.
(b) Transaction costs exist in the market, and vary inversely with the size of the 
transaction (Pym and Kochan (1988)). Since the majority of the firms sampled in 
this study were large firms, it is expected that their transaction costs are relatively 
low and it is assumed that any variation in transaction costs between the firms is 
minimal and would not significantly influence the findings. However, the market is 
assumed to be perfect in the sense that transaction costs are zero.
(c) There exists only one type of share, that is the ordinary share. A large portion of 
shares of any listed public firm is made up of ordinary shares. The purpose of this 
study is to ascertain the wealth effects of the various hypotheses tested, which can 
best be measured through the changes in the prices of ordinary shares.
(d) Shareholders of any one firm represent a homogeneous group in all relevant 
dimensions. Investors are assumed to evaluate the firm’s performance with a 
common yardstick, for example, the expected returns on their investment in the firm. 
Any new information received by investors is evaluated with respect to the yardstick 
and, on average, they are expected to respond similarly to the information.
(e) Corporate managers pursue operating strategies that maximise the wealth of their 
shareholders.
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(f) The capital market in which the firms trade their shares is semi-strong efficient.
The purpose of these assumptions is to enable the research findings to be 
interpreted in light of the hypotheses tested. However, assumptions (e) and (f) are 
vital to this study, which if not met, invalidate the study. The importance of 
assumptions (e) and (f) are discussed below.
6.2: Rationale for corporate managers to pursue ’maximisation of shareholders 
wealth’ objective
Economics of the late 19th and early 20th centuries were based on the premise 
that entrepreneurs sought to maximise profits (Berle (1962), Manne (1962)), which in 
modem financial literature is equivalent to maximising the value of the firm, where 
value represents the discounted value of the future stream of earnings.
The profit maximisation motive of these entrepreneurs was based on the identity of 
ownership and control by the entrepreneur.
In most modern businesses, however, ownership is vested in the hands of the 
shareholders and control is vested in the hands of professional managers (Berle 
(1968)). To the extent that these managers have a negligible interest in the firm, it is 
open to question as to what motivates them to make corporate decisions in 
congruence with the shareholders’ interest. For example, there is evidence that 
managers’ personal goals of security, power, prestige, advancement and personal 
income take precedence over corporate profits (Kaysen (1960), Gordon (1961), 
Marris (1964) and Murphy (1985)).
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In theory, shareholders elect corporate directors, who have the right to appoint or 
dismiss corporate managers. Since the operations of the business are in the hands of 
the corporate managers rather than directors (who are policy makers), the former 
may pursue a course of action which relate to their perceived interests or their 
perceptions of corporate self-interest rather than those of the shareholders. 
Management would be tempted to take this view, if they perceive shareholders as 
short-term investors rather than long-term owners of the firm (Rappaport (1978)). 
Managers may pursue second to best investments given the constraints of the 
business, legal and regulatory framework they have to work with. They may take 
considerable discretion in providing themselves with perquisites such as large 
expense accounts, plush offices, and higher salaries at the expense of the 
shareholders. Managers may also make large contributions to charities 
(Manne,(1962)), or even spend large sums of money on improving the conditions of 
work (Berle, (1962)), which could have been invested to generate more earnings.
Diamond and Varrecchia (1982) suggest that, assuming the full consequences of 
the managerial actions are not measurable at the end of the contract period, and are 
also costly to recontract, managers may pursue investments which increase their 
expected utility, rather than that of their shareholders. This is achieved by investing 
in less risky investments relative to more risky investments with higher returns, or 
consuming more perquisites than that agreed upon, or even just being incompetent. 
Studies by Kamarchen (1968), Monsen and Dawn (1965), Radice (1971), Boudreaux 
(1973) and Amihud and Lev (1981) suggest that management-controlled firms are 
associated with lower systematic risk than owner-controlled firms. To a large degree, 
the explanation for their findings was consistent with the presumed desire of 
managers of management-controlled firms to exhibit lower risk measures.
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Mams (1964), Mueller (1969) and Murphy (1985) have suggested that managers 
tend to be more interested in maximising corporate growth rather than shareholders’ 
wealth. Beyond achieving a certain satisfactory level of profits managers pursue a 
size maximisation strategy, which is positively related to financial (i.e. salaries, stock 
options, bonuses) and non-financial (i.e. prestige and authority) perquisites they 
enjoy. Size is also viewed as a defence against takeover as it is more difficult and 
expensive for the bidder to acquire the control over the target’s resources and hence 
provides more avenue for the target managers to pursue their own goals (Ball 
(1987)).
Shareholders perceive these actions by managers as a deviation from the objective of 
maximising their wealth.
Managers should pursue the objective of maximising their shareholders wealth 
because in the long-term no matter how powerful or independent they are, any 
divergence from the stated objective would certainly work against their favour. 
Managers are referees who harmoniously balance the interests of various corporate 
constituents such as employees, creditors, suppliers, customers and shareholders. 
The very existence of the firm and the managers depends on the managerial ability to 
balance the financial relationship between the firm and each of its constituent. For 
example, customers need high quality products and services at competitive prices, 
employees need competitive wages, creditors and suppliers require money due to 
them to be settled on time, and shareholders require cash dividends and appreciation 
in the share price. If the firm fails to satisfy these claims, it will cease to exist in the 
long run.
I l l
To fulfil its obligations, the firm requires cash which can best be generated through 
its business activities or through loans and share issues. Generating cash through 
business activities means to pursue investments that maximise the net cash flows, 
which implies maximising the shareholders’ wealth. Even when the managers do 
generate enough cash to fulfil their obligations to the various constituents through 
business activities, it is always open to question as to whether they could have 
generated more cash, or did they pursue the most optimal investments subject to the 
constraints, if they did not then they are still diverging from the objective of 
maximising shareholders wealth.
In the final analysis, the long term survival of the firm will depend upon its 
corporate managers to pursue investments that maximise the net cash flows and 
consequently maximise the market value of their firm’s outstanding shares.
6.3: Market efficiency
This research assumes that the capital market is at least semi-strong efficient, which 
means that all publicly available information relating to a share will be rapidly and 
fairly reflected in the share price. This implies that only those investors who have 
access to inside information can consistently earn excess returns over a simple buy 
and hold strategy. Empirical studies on market efficiency of the U.K. capital market 
by Firth (1972, 1976, 1977, 1979, 1980), Franks, Broyles and Hecht (1977), Brealey 
(1970) and Morris (1975) suggest that it is semi-strong form efficient.
This assumption is important because if the share price performance is not up to 
expectations, which could be due to either poor financial performance or even 
unsuitable management, it will lead to a takeover and give an opportunity for new 
management to employ a higher value operating strategy on the available assets
(Brealey (1979)).
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Correct pricing of shares, especially at the time of takeovers and mergers is 
essential because mispricing can lead to misjudgement of the target’s value by 
bidders and may create financial problems in the post-acquisition period. 
Furthermore, if the share prices are irrationally priced, the shares will be subjected to 
serious fluctuations around the time of acquisition, caused by increase speculative 
activity and this may reduce investor confidence in the firm. Lack of investor 
confidence will contribute towards the selling pressure on the shares and will make it 
difficult to raise capital on the market.
The assumption of an efficient market also enables shareholders to delegate the 
management of their firm to professional managers. As long as shareholders can 
adjust the time and risk pattern of their cashflows by buying and selling their shares 
at fair prices on the market, the professional manager need not burden himself with 
individual tastes but to concentrate on maximising the value of the firm through 
profitable investments.
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Chapter 7 
The Sample
7.1: Introduction
The sample of bidder and target firms for this study were drawn from the published 
reports of announcement and completion of takeovers and mergers of U.K. public 
firms listed on the London Stock Exchange in the Acquisitions Monthly magazine. 
For counter reference of the date of announcement, completion, and other details, the 
Financial Times newspapers, Business Research Index, Fair and Trade Publications 
and the Stock Exchange Year Book were consulted. The announcement date was the 
date of the first offer for the target whereas the completion date was the date on 
which the offer became unconditional.
Only successful takeovers and mergers during the period January 1985 to July 1988 
were sampled. The final sample of 90 bidder and 90 target firms in hostile takeovers 
satisfied the following criteria:
(1) All firms in the takeover sample were not preceded by merger attempts by the 
bidder.
(2) The shares of bidders and targets were in trade for at least eleven days 
surrounding the announcement.
(3) For each firm in the sample daily share prices were available for at least 58 
trading days before day -5 and 58 trading days after day +5.
(4) The firms did not experience any other major corporate event such as death or 
appointment of chief executive or members of the board of directors, announcements 
of financial reports and/or investment programs during the eleven days surrounding 
the announcement of the offer.
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The 21 bidder and 21 target firms in the merger sample were also subject to 
requirements (2), (3) and (4).
The final sample of bidder and target firms in hostile takeovers were classified 
according to the form of payments offered by bidders to their targets at the 
announcement of the offer. The mergers were all consummated through exchange of 
shares. This classification is summarised in Table 7.1 below:
Table 7.1
Sample classified according to the form of payment
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
Takeover Mergers Total
Cash Shares Combination Shares
Bidders 30 30 30 21 111
Targets 30 30 30 21 111
7.2: Sample of firms from different lines of businesses
The total sample of firms in this study are from eighteen different lines of business 
(Table 7.2). Thirty percent (30 %) of the firms are from the industrial sector, nine 
percent (9 %) each from the engineering and building and construction sector, six 
percent (6 %) from the financial sector and rest from various other business sectors. 
This minimises the chances of ’sector effect’ on the findings.
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7.3: Relative size of bidders and targets 
7.3.1: Takeovers
Tables 7.3 and 7.4 show the size of bidders and targets measured by their market 
value at the announcement of the offer. These tables show that bidders in takeovers 
are much larger than their targets in terms of total market value at the announcement 
of the offer. Sixty-seven percent (67 % ) of the targets are in the category of 0 to 
£50 m whereas only twenty-one percent (21 % ) of the bidders are in this category. 
About thirty- one percent (31 % ) of the bidders are in the category of £500 m 
whereas only six percent (6 % ) of the targets are in the same category.
7.3.2: Mergers
For the merger sample, majority of the bidders and targets are about the same size. 
Fifty-two percent (52 %) of the bidders are in the 0 to £50 m category and seventy- 
two percent (72 %) of the merger targets are in the same category. Nineteen percent 
(19 %) of the bidders are in the £50 to £100 m pounds category and fourteen percent 
(14 %) of the targets are in the same category.
7.4: Percentage of target’s equity held by bidders at the announcement of the 
offer
7.4.1: Takeovers
In terms of the percentage of equity held by bidders in the targets before announcing 
the takeover offer, Table 7.5 shows that fifty-two percent (52%) of the bidders had no 
equity holdings in the target and thirty-seven percent (37%) had equity in the target 
ranging from 1 to 29.9 percent, and only thirteen percent (13%) of the bidders had 
equity exceeding 30 %. The percentage of equity held by bidders in their targets is 
fairly distributed.
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This therefore minimises the chance of influencing the expected success of the offer 
and consequently the bidder returns at announcement. The distribution of equity held 
by bidders also reflects the surprise nature of most offers in the sample.
7.4.2: Mergers
As for the merger sample Table 7.6 shows that seventy-five percent (75%) of the 
bidders had equity holdings in the target ranging from 20 to 29.9 percent and ten 
percent (10%) had equity holdings ranging from 5 to 10 percent, and there was no 
bidder in the sample that did not have any equity at all at the announcement. The 
large percentage of equity held by most bidders in their targets (Table 7.6) and the 
equal firm sizes of the majority of bidders and targets in mergers (Table 7.4) might 
explain the formers offer to merge rather than takeover.
7.5: Distribution of announcement day
Table 7.7 shows the distribution of the announcement day over the various day of 
the week for all bidders in takeovers and mergers. Twenty five percent (25%) of the 
bidders in takeovers had their announcement on Mondays, twenty one percent (21%) 
on Thursdays and twenty three percent (23%) on Fridays. Since twenty-five percent 
(25%) of the bidders in takeovers announced their offer on Monday, it is possible that 
the bidders’ average abnormal returns at announcement are partially influenced by 
the ’day of the week’ effect.
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Table 7.2
Bidders and targets classified according to their line of businesses
Line of business Takeovers Mergers Total
Bidders Targets Bid. Tar.
C S C&S C S C&S (S)
B anking&Finance 3 2 - 3 3 2 1 - 14
Animal feed&
Dairy Products 1 - - 1 - - - - 2
Engineering 3 3 3 1 2 2 2 3 19
Food mfg.&
Distribution 3 1 - 4 1 1 1 1 12
Timber&Timber
Products 1 2 1 1 - - 1 1 7
Building Const.&
Materials 4 - 5 3 - 4 2 1 19
Chemicals&
Chemical Products 1 1 1 2 1 1 - 1 8
Textiles&textiles
Products 1 2 2 1 1 1 3 3 14
Jewellery Product
& Retailing 2 - 1 1 - 1 - - 5
Retailing 1 2 2 3 2 2 1 1 14
Oil,Gas&Coal 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 6
Electronic
Products 2 - - 1 1 1 3 2 10
Publishing&
Printing - - 2 - - 1 - - 3
Brewery, Wine&
Spirits - - 1 - - 1 - 2
Services Industry - 1 1  - 2 1  2 2 9
Property
Development  2 2 4
Industrial
Holdings 7 15 10 8 1411 1 1 67
Car Components
Mfg.&Dist. ' - - 1 - 2 1 1  2 7
Total 30 30 30 30 30 30 21 21 222
Notes:
Form of payments: Cash = C 
Shares = S
Combination of cash and shares = C&S 
Bid. = Bidders 
Tar. = Targets
Source: Acquisitions Monthly Magazine, January 1985 to July 1988
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Table 7.3
Total market value of bidders at the announcement of the offer
Takeovers Total % Merger %
Range of market
values (£ m ) C S C&S S
0 -5 0 6 8 5 19 21 11 52
50 -100 2 7 6 15 17 4 19
100 - 200 3 3 7 13 14 3 14
200 - 300 2 4 3 9 10 1 5
300 - 400 3 - 2 5 6 1 5
400 - 500 1 - - 1 1 - -
>500 13 8 7 28 31 1 5
Notes:
C = Cash S = Shares C&S = Combination of and cash 
Source: Acquisitions Monthly Magazine, January 1985 to July 1988
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Table 7.4
Total market value of targets at the announcement of the offer
Takeovers Total % Mergers %
Range of market
values (£ m ) C S C&S S
0 -5 0 22 22 16 60 67 15 72
50- 100 3 3 3 9 10 3 14
100 -200 2 3 5 10 11 3 14
200 -300 - 1 2 3 3 - -
300 -400 1 - - 1 1 - -
400 -500 1 - 1 2 2 - -
>500 1 1 3 5 6 - -
Notes:
C=Cash S=Shares C&S=Combination of cash and shares 
Source: Acquisitions Monthly Magazine, January 1985 to July 1988
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Table 7.5
Percentage of equity held by bidders in the targets at the announcement of the 
takeover offer, classified by the form of payments
% of equity held Cash Shares Combination Total %
0 14 20 13 47 52
1-10 4 2 3 9 10
10-20 2 3 6 11 12
20 - 29.9 2 5 6 13 15
>30 8 - 2 10 11
30 30 30 90 100
Source: Acquisitions Monthly Magazine, January 1985 to July 1988
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Table 7.6
Percentage of equity held by bidders in targets at the announcement of merger
% of equity held Total %
0 - -
1 -5 1 5
5 -10 2 10
10-20 1 5
20 - 29.9 16 75
>30 1 5
21 100
Source: Acquisitions Monthly Magazine, January 1985 to July 1988
127
Table 7.7
Distribution of the announcement of takeovers and mergers by bidders on 
various days of the week
Number of announcements
Day of the week --------------------------------------------
Takeovers % Mergers %
Monday 23 25 5 24
Tuesday 13 14 3 14
Wednesday 15 17 4 19
Thursday 19 21 4 19
Friday 20 23 5 24
90 100 21 100
Source: Acquisitions Monthly Magazine, January 1985 to July 1988
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Chapter 8 
Methodology
8.1: Return generating models
In any event study it is necessary to specify a model generating expected returns, 
before abnormal returns can be calculated. Share price performance can only be 
considered abnormal relative to a particular benchmark and it is necessary to specify 
a model generating normal equilibrium returns (i.e. expected returns) before 
abnormal returns can be measured. The abnormal returns for a given share price at 
any time period is the difference between its actual ex-post returns and those 
expected under the assumed equilibrium return generating process. The abnormal 
returns in this study are calculated by taking the difference between the actual returns 
and the expected returns, the latter is estimated by the market model:
Rit = a i + piRmt + eit (1)
ei t = ^ i t '  (a i + Pi^mP ^  
where,
= actual return on stock i on day t 
e-t = the abnormal return for stock i on day t
= the market return on day t proxied by the all share index 
oc^ , |3j = firm specific constants.
Rit’ Rmt’ ei t 310 random variables
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There are many models available to generate expected returns with different degrees 
of sophistication and assumptions. Some of these which are discussed briefly below 
are: mean-adjusted returns model, market-adjusted returns model, market model, 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM), Black’s zero beta asset model, tax-adjusted 
CAPM, arbitrage pricing theory model and multivariate regression model (MVRM) 
(Brown and Warner (1980), Beaver (1972), (1981), Landsman and Magliolo (1988), 
Dyckman, Philbrick and Stephan (1984)):
8.1.1: Mean-adjusted returns model
This model assumes that the expected returns for a stock is equal to a constant, 
estimated by averaging a series of past returns. The a  in equation (1) is set to be an 
average return over the estimation period and (3 is set to zero. This model does not 
take into account market-wide factors and risks. It is possible to obtain false results 
indicating excess performance using market and capital asset pricing model (CAPM) 
models if the ex-post market portfolio is not efficient. The mean adjusted returns 
model is useful because it does not depend on any measure of market portfolio and 
thus serves as an independent check on the results obtained by other models. 
However, Brown and Warner (1980) found that the power of the t- test in detecting 
excess returns using the mean adjusted model is very low.
8.1.2: Market-adjusted returns model or the index model
This model assumes that the expected returns for a stock i at time t is equal to the 
market return for that period. Expected returns are assumed to be constant across 
securities but not across time. The c l in equation (1) is set to zero, and J3 is set equal 
to one. This model ignores the firm specific risks.
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8.1.3: Market model
This model can be expressed algebraically in the following way:
Rit = a i + PiRmt + eit 
The above equation states that the return on stock i during time period t (Rjt) depends
upon the return on the market index during the same period (Rmj;)- It assumes that
individual security returns are related to each other only through a common
relationship with some basic underlying factor, known as market index. Each
security’s relationship with the market index is linear. The intercept ( (Xj) can be
interpreted as the average return on the ith security when the market index is zero.
The term P jR ^  is the portion of the returns to security i that is due to market wide
factors.
The ejt is a random error term which measures that part of the return to the firm 
which is not due to the movement in the market and is assumed to satisfy the 
following assumptions of linear regression: the random error has a mean value of 
zero (E(ep = 0), and is assumed to be uncorrelated with the market returns (COV (ej 
Rm) = 0), the error term of other securities (COV(e-, ep= 0)) and error terms of the 
same security over time (COV(ejt, ejt) = 0).
The the slope of the regression line, (also known as the characteristic line), 
measures the security’s systematic or market risk, which indicates the manner in 
which the security’s returns change systematically with the changes in market 
returns. The P is defined as the ratio of the covariance of security returns and the 
market returns ( COV^m ) to the variance of the market returns ( (? m).
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This model abstracts the effect of market wide events from the security returns and 
focuses on the portion of the return that reflects events peculiar to the firm.
The ability to control for the effect of market wide events on the security returns has 
several advantages ( Brown and Warner (1985)):
(a) a substantial portion of variation in security returns is due to variations in the 
movement of the market. King’s (1966) study on monthly returns from 1960 through 
1962 found that, on average, approximately 52 per cent of the variation in an 
individual security returns could be explained by its commencement with the market 
factor. In this research, approximately 55 percent of the variation in individual 
security returns was explained by the market factor. The ability to isolate the 
individual component of the security returns increases the probability of detecting 
the information effect of the event under study. Otherwise, the effect of market 
movements on the share price will obscure the effect of the particular event of 
interest under study.
(b) The use of market model permits to pool data from different time periods, 
resulting in an increase in the number of observations. Large number of observations 
tend to increase the power of the statistical tests in terms of correctly rejecting the 
null hypothesis.
(c) The residual term in the model is expressed in terms of ex-post rather than ex-ante 
returns, which makes it responsive to empirical testing.
In empirical research, the market model is used in a simple linear regression form 
with one independent variable (R ^) and one dependent variable (Rjt).
The parameters of the model ( ccp (3j) are estimated using the Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) method, that is by regressing the security returns with the market returns.
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8.1.4: Capital asset pricing model(CAPM)
This model assumes that the measures of individual security risk is its beta and that 
there is a linear relationship between risk and return (Markowitz (1952), Sharpe 
(1964), Lintner (1965), (1968), and Mossin (1966)). The CAPM comes in two 
forms, that is the Capital Market Line and the Security Market Line ( Black, Jensen 
and Scholes (1972), Fuller and Farrell (1987)).
The Capital Market Line (CML) provides the framework for determining the 
relationship between expected return and risk for efficient portfolios of securities. 
The CML shows that for a portfolio, the expected rate of return in excess of the risk­
free rate is proportional to the standard deviation of the portfolio, which is expressed 
as follows:
expected returns on the market portfolio, r  ^ is the returns on the risk-free asset, is 
the standard deviation (measure of risk) of the market portfolio and is the standard 
deviation of the combination portfolio.
A derivative of CAPM is the Security Market Line (SML), which provides the 
framework for determining the relationship between expected return and risk for 
individual securities, as well as portfolios (which can be efficient or inefficient).
where, [■— ] is the reward per unit of risk
Vrn
where E(rD) is the expected returns of the combination portfolio, E(rm) is the 1:
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Under the SML, the measure of risk used for an individual security is that component 
of the total risk ( o) which cannot be diversified away (or the systematic risk), 
measured by the security’s beta and applies to all assets and portfolios whether 
efficient or inefficient. In a portfolio context, it is the additional risk that the 
individual security adds to the risk of the market portfolio, which is relevant. The 
beta is expressed as the covariance of the security’s returns with the returns on the 
market portfolio standardised by the variance of the market portfolio.
The expected return of a security i is expressed as follows:
The expected return of a security can be rewritten in a much familiar form as follows:
Despite its appeal as a yardstick to measure returns on assets with different levels 
of risk, CAPM has shortcomings with respect to the assumptions on which it was 
developed (Roll (1971), (1978)), for example:
(i) It is convenient to take the returns on short- term treasury bills as a proxy for 
returns on risk- free asset, however in an inflationary environment, there will be 
uncertainty of the real returns. Short-term treasury bills are free of credit risk and 
interest rate risk, but are subjected to purchasing power risk, which is intensified with 
a high rate of inflation.
(ii) Investors’ ability to borrow and lend freely at the risk free rate is not a valid 
representation of the real market place. Financial intermediaries usually charge a 
higher rate on their loans than the rate at which they borrow to incorporate a profit 
margin and premium to compensate for the credit risks of the borrower. Investors 
thus pay a higher rate on borrowed funds than they would receive for lending funds.
E ( r i)= r f + |3i (E(rm) - r f)
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(iii) CAPM assumes no taxes. Taxes are an integral part of any economy today. 
Taxation becomes even a more important element in the pricing of securities, if there 
is a significant difference between capital gains tax and taxes on dividends. If the 
capital gains tax are lower than taxes on dividends, we can expect investors with 
different tax status to hold different portfolios of risky assets even when the 
expectations about pre-tax returns for those portfolios were the same, and hence the 
equilibrium prices for assets will differ from a circumstance where taxes do not 
matter.
(iv) In CAPM, the market portfolio is assumed to be efficient. Roll (1977) 
demonstrates that the choice of incorrect portfolio or index to proxy for the market 
portfolio can lead to misestimates of the systematic risk of individual securities and 
portfolios, and result in an inappropriate estimate of the SML. Roll argues that this 
misestimation error cannot be corrected by the use of powerful statistical tools. The 
error can only be avoided by properly identifying ex-ante efficient market portfolio, 
which is a very difficult task as it requires the ability to capture investor expectations 
concerning all capital assets.
8.1.5: Black’s zero-beta asset CAPM.
Realising the violations of the risk-free asset assumption of CAPM, Black (1972), 
amended CAPM to accommodate this violation by substituting a zero- beta asset or 
portfolio for the risk free asset. This zero-beta asset or portfolio is designed such that 
it has no correlation with the market.
The zero-beta version of CAPM has a similar structure to the original CAPM except 
for the zero- beta factor substituting the risk-free rate, which can be expressed as 
follows:
E (ri) = E (rz) + pi [E(rm)-E (rz)]
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8.1.6: Tax-adjusted version of CAPM.
Brenan (1970), realising the shortcoming of the no- tax assumption of CAPM, 
developed a tax-adjusted CAPM, by assuming dividend yields are certain and the 
existence of differential tax treatment on capital gains and dividends. The tax- 
adjusted form of CAPM is given as follows:
Efri) =rf (1 - T) + [E(rm) -rf - T(Dm - rf)] + TD^
where T = --------
l - T g
Where
= average tax on dividends 
Tg = average tax on capital gains 
Dm = Dividend yield on market portfolio 
D- = Dividend yield on ith stock.
If there is no differences in tax rates on dividends and capital gains, the tax- 
adjustment parameter equals to zero (T= 0), and the model reduces to the basic form 
of the CAPM.
8.1.7: Arbitrage pricing theory model (APT)
Ross (1976) developed a model of equilibrium in securities market known as 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT), which does not critically depend on market 
portfolio. As in CAPM, APT assumes that
(i) investors have homogeneous beliefs,
(ii) investors are risk averse utility maximisers
(iii) markets are perfect so that factors like transactions costs are not relevant.
136
And in contrasts to CAPM, APT does not assume:
(i) a single-period investment horizon
(ii) there are no taxes
(iii) investors can freely borrow and lend at risk free rate
(iv) investors select portfolios on the basis of the mean and variance of return. 
However, APT assumes that security returns are generated according to what is
known as a factor model. This model takes the view that there are underlying factors 
(which could be economic variables such as inflation or financial variables such as 
dividend yield) that give rise to returns on stocks. The final form of the risk-retum 
relationship derived from the APT can be expressed in the following form:
E(ri> = rz + bi [E^) - rz ] +..
Since APT does not assume an ability to borrow and lend freely at risk-free rate, the 
rz can either be a risk-free return or zero-beta return as derived by Black (1972). The 
term [E(rp -rz] (where i = 1,2, 3....n,) represents the risk premium that is associated 
with the factor, and often represented by the symbol x . The bj coefficient (where i = 
1, 2 ,3....n,) measures the responsiveness of the share’s expected returns to change in 
the factor.
If we are assuming that there is only one factor determining security returns, the basic 
APT return equation becomes similar to SML. Thus,
E(rp = rz + ^  x
The main obstacle in using APT is determining what are the underlying factors that 
are significant in asset pricing, as this model per se does not provide any perspective 
in either identifying nor indicating the number of these factors that are significant in 
asset pricing.
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8.1.8: Multivariate regression model (MVRM)
MVRM or Systems Method has an intuitive appeal because it incorporates 
information about the interrelationships between groups of securities experiencing 
the same event. Binder (1985) and Schipper and Thomson (1985) provide rigorous 
arguments in support of this method.
MVRM is basically appending zero-one dummy variables to market model equations. 
The coefficients multiplying the event dummy variables measure the event’s impact 
on share returns. MVRM was developed to overcome some of the statistical 
problems associated with the market model, particularly the assumption that the 
market model residuals are independent and identically distributed. There are 
apparendy three problems with this assumption. First, the abnormal returns are likely 
to differ across firms. Second, there is evidence that the residual variance differs 
across firms [Fama (1976, pp. 129-39)]. Third, the residuals will not be independent 
if the event occurs during the same calendar time period for some firms, and these 
firms are in the same or related industries.
The MVRM methodology begins by parameterizing the abnormal returns Y i n  the 
individual returns equations using dummy variables Dat.
A
Rit = ctj + pj Rmt + 2  Yja Dat + p,jt
a=l
If there are A announcements about the event, each Dat equals one during the period 
of the ath announcement and zero otherwise.
This approach allows individual returns to differ across firms, and the disturbances 
within each equation are assumed to be independent and identically distributed, but 
the variances differ across equations.
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MVRM also assumes that across firms, the contemporaneous covariances of the 
disturbances [E( e^t, ejt)] are non zero, whereas the non- contemporaneous 
covariances [E( e t^ e j ,^ ) ]  are all zero. The main advantage of this approach is in 
hypothesis testing since heteroscedasticity across equations and contemporaneous 
dependence of the disturbances are explicitly incorporated into the hypothesis tests. 
However, MVRM is developed on the assumed structure of variance-covariance 
matrix of the disturbances, which requires the observations in each equation to be 
from the same calendar time period, this makes MVRM to be best suited to test joint 
hypotheses, which is important in a single event context, affecting all firms and 
where there is a good reason to believe that the event benefits some firms and hurts 
others (i.e. regulatory changes). MVRM has problems concerning the choice of test 
statistic, because several tests statistics used are shown to bias against the null 
hypotheses even when large numbers of observations are used (Binder (1985)).
8.2: The choice of model
The market model is chosen to generate expected returns on shares in this research 
for the following reasons:
(a) There is empirical evidence to support the view that it performs well under a 
variety of conditions relative to more sophisticated or even simpler models.
Brown and Weinstein (1985) compared the performance of the statistical factor 
model (APT) and the market model in the context of event studies and concluded that 
for a variety of estimation procedures and experimental designs, the statistical factor 
model provides only limited additional value relative to the use of a simple market 
model.
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Dyckman, Philbrick and Stephens (1984) did a simulation study on the Means 
Adjusted Returns Model, Market Adjusted Returns Model and the Market Model 
using daily stock returns. They concluded that the abilities of all the three models to 
detect correctly the presence of abnormal performance are similar, although there is a 
slight preference for the market model, the difference being statistically significant.
Brown and Warner (1980) examined the performance of the Mean Adjusted 
Returns Model, the Market Adjusted Returns Model and the Market and Risk 
Adjusted Models (CAPM, Blacks (1972) version of the CAPM and the Market 
Model) which are used in event studies to measure security price performance. They 
concluded that the market model performs well under a wide variety of conditions, 
and in some situations even simpler methods which do not explicitly adjust for 
market wide factors or for risk perform no worse than the market model.
The MVRM, which is supposed to overcome the problems associated with the 
assumption of the market model residuals, is also not suitable for this research for 
two reasons. First, this study is not a single-event study but a type-of-event study. 
Second, there is evidence which shows that MVRM provides no significant benefits 
over the market model. Malatesta (1986) extended the MVRM approach to 
noncontemporaneous events and used the General least Squares (GLS) framework, 
which reflects the cross-sectional dependence between abnormal returns of different 
securities. Using simulation techniques comparable to those of Brown and Warner 
(1985) to assess the frequency distribution of the estimator and power of the test 
statistic of GLS approach, the market model and the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
approach. He concluded that there is no evidence that GLS approach provides any 
benefit in identifying abnormal returns.
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McDonald (1987) extended Malatesta’s study by using securities experiencing actual 
events, using daily and monthly returns and iterative techniques comparable to OLS 
and GLS methods. He concluded that there are no measurable gains in using any of 
the systems methods for event study applications, confirming M alatesta’s 
conclusions.
(b) Events such as takeovers and mergers generally tend to be concentrated in the 
bull market periods (Roberts (1987)). For example, it is easier and cheaper for 
bidders to effect an acquisition through exchange of shares in a bull market. Even if 
the bidder offers cash, this cash can be easily raised through rights issue, which is 
difficult to succeed in a bear market situation.
Klein and Rosenfeld (1987) provide evidence that the Mean-Adjusted Model and 
Raw-Returns Model (which assume that constant security return is zero) are 
misspecified when the event occurs during either bull or bear markets. Both these 
models seem to generate biased abnormal returns (i.e. upward (positive) bias in a bull 
market and downward (negative) bias in a bear market). Their results for these 
models are statistically significant over selected pre-event and post-event periods.
In contrast, they showed that market-adjusted and single-index models (i.e. market 
model is a special case of the single index model) show far less evidence of such bias 
over the same periods.
(c) Market model has been extensively used in evaluating share price performance 
in a large number of research studies. For example, Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll 
(1969) used the market model to test the information of stocks splits on stock prices, 
Scholes (1972) used on determining the effect of secondary distributions. Ball and 
Brown (1968) used the market model to measure the impact of the release of 
accounting information. Franks, Boyles and Hecth (1977) examined the profitability 
of mergers in the breweries and distillers sector in the U.K. using the market model.
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Firth (1979) used the market model to test the profitability of mergers in the U.K., 
and Limmack (1989) used it to observe the distributions of returns to shareholders of 
U.K. companies in merger during 1977 to 1986. Asquith and Kim (1982) used the 
market model to measure the impact of merger bids on participating firms security 
holders. Travlos (1987) examined the effects of takeover bids and methods of 
payments on stock returns using the market model.
Dodd and Quek (1985) observed the share price movements of bidder firms in the 
U.K. using the market model, and Madden (1988) used it to examine corporate 
takeovers and market efficiency.
Brown, Harlow and Tinic (1988) used the market model to test the risk aversion, 
uncertain information and market efficiency, and Keown and Pinkerton (1981) used 
it to test the effect of merger announcement and insider trading.
The popularity of the market model does indicate its relative potential in generating 
expected returns on stocks relative to the more sophisticated and simpler models, 
and/or the unavailability of a better model to measure expected returns.
(d) Extensive studies on the market model by Fama and Roll (1968), Fama and 
Babak (1968), and Bhattberg and Sargent (1971) indicate that the assumptions of 
linearity, stationarity and serial independence of market model residuals are not 
seriously violated. The estimated residuals, however, appear to be more closely 
approximated by a class of a stable paretian distributions with a characteristic 
exponent of less than two, of which normal distribution is a member. A stable 
paretian distribution has a characteristic exponent a which determines the height of 
the extreme tail areas of the distributions and take any value in the interval 0 < a < 2. 
When a = 2, the relevant stable paretian distribution is the normal or Gaussian 
distribution.
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When a is in the interval 0 < a < 2, the extreme tails of the stable paretian 
distribution are higher than those of normal distribution (i.e. also termed as 
leptokurtic) and the total probability in the extreme tails is larger, the smaller the 
value of a. The distribution will contain more relative frequency near the mean and 
in the extreme tails than would be expected under the Gaussian distribution. When a 
takes the value of 1 < a < 2, the distribution of price changes will have means but 
their variances will be infinite.
A non-normal but stable paretian distribution also implies that the variances of the 
distribution of price changes is only finite when a = 2, but the mean exists as long as 
a>  1.
The parameter b of the distribution indicates the skewness of the distribution, and 
takes the value of -1 < b < 1. Under normal distribution, the value of b will be zero, 
or the distribution is symmetric. When b > 0, the distribution is skewed to the right 
and when b < 0, the distribution is skewed to the left ( Fama, (1976, p. 26)).
Under the stable paretian distribution assumption, the price of a share will tend to 
change by large amounts in a very short time or the price level of the share will be 
discontinuous compared to share price behaviour under a normal distribution.
This characteristic of the stable paretian distribution conforms well to the reality of 
the dynamic and uncertain nature of the economics and politics of most countries in 
the world. If we assume that the successive price changes are independent, the 
discontinuity of price levels in the paretian distribution would imply that the intrinsic 
value of shares often changes by large amounts during short period of time, which is 
consistent with the Efficient Market Hypothesis.
The Efficient Market Hypothesis postulates that at any point in time, share prices on 
the stock exchange represents the best estimate of its intrinsic value, and any change 
in the intrinsic value caused by new information will be discounted instantly in the 
share price.
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The behaviour of share prices under the stable paretian distribution also implies that 
the market is more risky than under normal distribution and consequently shares are 
expected to earn higher returns. Fama (1970) has shown that for stable distributions 
with finite expected values, the least square estimates of (3j are unbiased and 
consistent, but not efficient.
8.3: Analysis
The Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) methodology is used to determine the 
effect of announcement of takeovers and mergers on bidder and target share prices. 
This methodology (also known as ’residual analysis’) involves a cross-sectional 
analysis of residuals of each firm, estimated by the market model. Cross sectional 
residuals for a group of firms on a given announcement day and cumulative residuals 
for a given time period are used to test the null hypotheses. The object of inquiry in 
this study is the effect of the announcement of takeovers and mergers on bidder and 
target returns in general rather than on the returns of a single firm.
The market model is used to calculate the expected returns on shares, which 
expresses the linear relationship between daily returns on a share and the daily 
market index as follows:
*n ^ i t = °4 + ^i n^ ^ m t+ eit 
where, ln Rjt is the logarithm of observed daily returns on a share price, after
adjustments for capital change and dividend contributions.
ln Rmt is the natural logarithm of the return on daily market index.
ejt is the residual or abnormal returns of security i on day t.
0Cj, J3- are the model parameters which vary from share to share and are estimated 
using the OLS approach.
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The abnormal return of each firm on a particular day is calculated by taking the 
difference between the observed return and the expected return on the share on that 
day. The abnormal return is expressed in the following way:
Abnormal return (ejt ) = Observed return (lnRjt) - Expected return (oq + (3^1nRm t). 
The abnormal return (which is also known as the unsystematic return because it 
implies that it is uncorrelated with the market returns) is assumed to satisfy the 
following assumptions of the linear regression model:
(i) it has zero expectation and variance independent of t.
(ii) it is serially independent,
(iii)the distribution of the residual term is independent of Rmt
However, ejt and Rmt may not necessarily be independent because the process 
generating (lnRjt, ^ R ^ ) , might be a quadratic function, in which case E ^ / ln R ^  ) 
10.
The effect of the announcements is studied on returns rather than share prices 
because a given share price change is a different economic quantity depending on the 
initial investment (Fama (1976) p. 19).
The abnormal return rather than return (R|t) is used to measure the impact of the 
event of interest on the bidder and target’s share price at the two- day announcement 
period because it has three potential properties which makes it better than R-t (Beaver 
(1981), p. 118)):
"...first, it can result in a transformation of such that a common expected 
value of the security metric (e^) exists over time and across firms; second, it can 
have smaller variance than R^, leading to a more powerful statistical tests and 
more efficient estimates of the security return effects of the event of interest; and 
third, it can result in a smaller correlation among observations than R^ would, 
and in this sense e^ would more closely conform to conventional significance 
tests than R^ would..."
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In an attempt to detect the impact of the event of interest on the firm’s share price it 
was desirable to remove from all the firms the effects of market wide factors on the 
share price which can cause random variations in the share prices and obscure the 
impact of the event of interest. The use of the abnormal return instead of return is a 
means of removing the unwanted variations in the returns due to market wide factors 
(Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969)).
The observed returns ( R .^), are calculated in the following way:
v  - p i ( t - i )
R.t =  ----------------
Pi(t-1)
where Pjt* is the market share price of firm i at the end of day t and Pj^t _ ^  is the 
price per share of firm i at the end of day t - 1. The price Pjt is adjusted for capital 
changes such as scrip issues/bonus issues and dividends, so that it is comparable to 
Pi(t _ For example, if there was a stock split two for one on day t, its actual 
closing price on day t is doubled. For dividends, it is assumed that on the ex- 
dividend day, the value of the individual share falls approximately by the amount of 
the dividend per share. The adjustment is made by adding back the dividend per 
share to the price of the share on ex-dividend day.
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8.4: The analysis and estimation period, average abnormal returns (AR) and 
the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR)
For each firm, the announcement day is designated as day 0, and the analysis 
period is from five days before the announcement day (day 0) to five days after 
the announcement day. The estimation period is 53 days before the day - 5 and 
53 days after the day + 5.
analysis period 
estimation estimation
period period
(53 days) -5 0 +5 (53 days)
The parameters of the market model ( otj, pj) are estimated using the returns 
of the sampled firms in the estimation period (i.e. day -58 to day -6 and day +6 
to day +58) and the returns on the market index during the same period. The P 
is adjusted for thin trading of some securities using the Dimson’s aggregated 
coefficient approach (Dimson (1979)). These parameters are than averaged and 
used to calculate the abnormal returns in the analysis period.
The abnormal return (e t^) for each firm is calculated from day -5 to day +5 and 
the cross- sectional average abnormal return (ARt) for each day t is calculated 
as follows:
N
ARt = £ [ei t ]/N  
i=l
N is the number of firms in the sample.
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To observe the daily cumulative effect, the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR^) 
are calculated by summing up the AR  ^over various days of interest.
For example, the CARy from day Tj through day T2 is derived as follows:
T2
CARt  = £  [ ARt]
t=Ti
Assuming that the abnormal returns for each security are approxim ately 
normal and independent across time and across securities, the t-statistics which 
follows the unit normal distribution as used by Dodd and Warner (1983) and 
Travlos (1987) are used to test the hypothesis that ARt and CA Rj are equal to 
zero.
The statistics t for ARt and t^ for CAR^ are calculated as follows: 
for ARt, t =Jn * ARt
forCARt , tT = ---------------  ^7
The abnormal returns (ARt) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARj) are used to 
measure the effect of the event on the share price. The use of ARt and CARj 
implicitly implies that equal amounts of money are assumed to be invested in each of 
the N securities at the start. Then at the end of each day, the portfolio is rebalanced 
so that the total wealth is again equally distributed across securities.
The rebalancing is achieved by reducing the investment in securities with high 
abnormal returns and increasing investment in securities with low or negative 
abnormal returns ( Bowman (1983)). In practice, however, this rebalancing strategy 
is only useful if the correlation of abnormal returns of securities is negative.
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To facilitate the comparison of abnormal returns between two portfolios of bidding ( 
target) firms, the daily mean differences is derived by subtracting the associated 
average abnormal returns. For example, for day 0, the daily mean difference between 
abnormal returns of bidders (or targets) in cash offer and those in shares offer is 
calculated as follows:
ARd = ARcask - AR^gj-gg 
To test the statistical significance of the difference in the abnormal returns, the 
following t-statistic is used (Travlos (1987)):
A D  A Dcash “ shares
Where, Sc^ is the variance of returns in the cash offer sample 
Ss^ is the variance of returns in the shares offer sample 
Nc , N§ is the number of firms in the cash offer and shares offer sample 
respectively. This t- statistic is based on the assumption that the variances of 
returns of the cash and share samples are not equal.
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8.5: Some relevant adjustments to the abnormal returns (AR)
8.5.1: Autocorrelation
Studies by Scholes and Williams (1977), and Copley, Cooley and Rosenfeldt 
(1984) provide evidence of significant autocorrelation in m arket model 
residuals. Schwart and Whitcomb (1977) suggests that beta estimates of the 
market model may be severely biased because of negative autocorrelation.
If the residuals of the regression equation are correlated, contrary to the 
assum ption that [E(et, e t_j) = 0, J -I 0], M addala (1977) suggests that the 
estim ates of a and (3 obtained using the least- squares approach will be 
unbiased, consistent but not efficient, and the values of R~ and t statistics will 
tend to be exaggerated, leading to type-one errors.
To account for the autocorrelation problem in the abnormal returns in this 
study, the presence of first-order autocorrelation in the returns of each firm in 
the sample was tested using the Durbin and Watson’s (1951) approach.
If significant first-order autocorrelation was detected in the returns, it was 
corrected using Cochrane-Oreutt’s (1949) quasi-first-difference approach.
8.5.1(A): To test the presence of first-order autocorrelation in the returns using 
Durbin and Watson’s (1951) approach
For each firm in the sample, the presence of any first-order autocorrelation in the 
residuals was detected using Durbin and Watson’s (1951) approach. They proposed 
a test to track down the first-order autocorrelation by examining the successive 
residuals according to a test statistic (d) formulated as follows:
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T2  <er e(t- i))2
t=2
d=  ----------------------------------
T
£  (e t)2
t=l
where et is the residual from the regression. The value of d is estimated in the 
following way:
d » 2 ( l - f )
where is the first-order autocorrelation coefficient. If there was no 
autocorrelation,(f= 0), d should be approximately equal to 2.
For positive autocorrelation, > 0), d will be less than 2 and for negative
correlation, < 0), d will be greater than 2 with d approximately equal to 4 for
perfect negative correlation.
The statistical significance of the autocorrelation present is identified by 
comparing the calculated value of the d statistic with the lower (d^ ) and upper 
limit (dy ) values of d (5 percent level of significance) as provided by the Durbin- 
Watson Statistic Table. The decision rules applied are as follows:
Hq : j 7 = 0 (no autocorrelation).
Hj : / * 0
If d < d ^  ord > 4 - d^, reject HQ 
If d > d and d < 4 - dy, accept HQ
If d L < d < dy  or if 4 - dy < d < 4 - dL, indecisive region.
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8.5.1(B): Cochrane-Orcutt’s (1949) quasi-first- difference approach to eliminate 
significant first- order autocorrelation
For firms, whose residuals were found to have significant autocorrelation, 
Cochrane-Orcutt’s (1949) the quasi-first-difference method was applied to 
eliminate the impact of the autocorrelation before estimating a  and (3 for the 
analysis period.
The procedure is as follows:
It is assumed that residuals generated by the market model (Zl) are found to 
have significant first-order autocorrelation.
R jt= ^  ftR-mt ®t*
where et ^  + e t and satisfy the assumptions of the error term in a linear 
regression model. The a  and p are parameters to be estimated, but it is assumed that 
there is first-order autocorrelation (f) between successive residual terms in the model. 
To transform Zl to an equation without autocorrelation, we first difference it by the 
correlation coefficient, as shown below. The model for period t - 1 will be written as 
follows:
Rj,( t - l)  = a  + PRm (t-l) + e( t - l)  (Z2)
Then, multiplying both sides by f  we get
f  ^ .( t  - 1) =f a  4  P ^ c t  - 1) +f  e(t - 1)(Z3)
And subtracting equation Z3 from equation Zl gives
Rjt - c f R j ( t . !> = «(1 -i )  + p a w  - f a m t- 1) + ( et h t  - 1)> (Z4)
Equation Z4 now contains an uncorrelated residual term by equation Z2, which 
can be expressed as follows:
Rjt - <fcj(t-i)) = «  a -A  + p a w  -^Rm (t-i))+ e t (zs)
Denoting (R=t - (fRj( t_ jj) = Rjt*,
O W  'fRm(t-l)) = W t ’ a  C1 4 )  = a
and p = p*, the equation (Z5) can be rewritten as follows:
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Rjt*  = «* + P X / + et (Z6)
Since^can be estimated, Rjt and Rmt can be computed. This is followed by 
* *
regressing Rjt on Rmt . The intercepts and slope of equation (Z6) can now be used 
to calculate the estimate of cc and (3 in equation (Zl), where,
<** *
a  = ---- -- and |3 = (3
1 - /  
8.5.2: Daily returns
Daily share prices are used to calculate the daily returns in this research for the 
following reasons: (a) There is evidence to suggest that it is a better choice. 
Brown and Warner (1985) in their simulation study reported that with the use 
of daily prices, rejection frequencies for the null hypothesis of no abnormal 
returns when abnormal returns were introduced into the sample, is roughly 
three times that reported for monthly data. The power of the market model to 
identify abnormal returns increases with the knowledge about the precise timing of 
an event. The power is measured in terms of minimising the type-one and type-two 
errors, and increasing the probability of correctly rejecting the null hypothesis.
Type-one error is the error of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis, when it is 
true. Type-two error is the error of falsely accepting the null hypothesis, when 
it is false.
The use of daily prices is potentially useful because it permits taking advantage 
of prior information about the specific day of the week on which the event took 
place. Also, the use of daily prices allows one to control the effect of some other 
events surrounding the event of interest on the share prices.
(b) Fama (1976), reports that daily returns have smaller standard deviations 
than monthly returns. The lower the standard deviations, the higher will be the 
probability of detecting abnormal returns when they are present.
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(c) Unlike monthly returns, the use of daily returns allows a study of the impact 
of an event immediately surrounding the announcement date.
8.5.3: Non-synchronous trading of shares
Daily returns are subjected to non-synchronous trading problems, because 
some shares are more frequently traded than others. Scholes and Williams 
(1977) suggested that since the reported closing prices of shares represents 
trades prior to the actual close of the trading day, measured returns often 
deviate from true returns. This nonsynchronization of measured returns across 
securities introduces errors in the market model variables.
Fisher (1966) studied new stock-market indexes and concluded that an index 
constructed from shares that are infrequently traded tends to induce positive 
autocorrelation into the returns and the estimated variance of returns of the 
index is biased downward (therefore exaggerating the t-value and increasing the 
chance of committing type-one error).
Dimson (1979) suggests that when some securities are more actively traded than 
others, the securities which are less active tend to have a downward biased 
estimate of p, while those actively traded have upward biased estimates of p.
Copley, Cooley and Rosenfeldt (1984) provides evidence of a consistently inverse 
relationship between volume of trading and negative autocorrelation (i.e. also 
known as the ’Fisher Effect’), which support Roll’s (1981 p. 887) contention that 
"....trading infrequency seems to be a powerful cause of bias in risk assessments..." 
To mitigate this problem in this research, two filter rules were applied:
(i) only firms which are traded as alpha stocks on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) were sampled. Alpha stocks are the most actively traded stocks on the 
exchange, and there are about 500 such stocks on the exchange at present.
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(ii) firms which had a complete set of share prices for the estimation and analysis 
period were sampled.
Despite these filters, the parameters of the market model were adjusted for non- 
synchronous trading problem using the Dimson’s Aggregated Coefficient approach. 
The Scholes-Williams or Vasicek’s approach to estimate the parameters of the 
market model were not used because there is evidence that the ordinary least square 
approach of estimating market model parameters perform as well as these 
approaches, whereas these approaches were supposed to correct the thin trading bias 
in daily security returns estimated through the ordinary least squares approach ( Jain
(1968), Morse (1984)).
8.5.3(A): Dimson’s aggregate coefficient approach to estimate a consistent beta
Dimson’s aggregated coefficient approach involves regressing security returns 
against lagged, matching and leading market returns, and an estimate of p is obtained 
by aggregating the slope coefficients from these regressions.
For example, to estimate a p for day -50, security returns on day -50 were regressed
with the market returns of leading day (day -49), the market returns on lag day (day
-51), and market returns on the matching day (day -50).
The slope coefficients that result from these regressions are summed to obtain an 
estimate of P on day -50 as follows:
[( P-49 + P-50 + P -51) = P-50^
For each day in the estimation period, the beta is calculated in the same way. The a  
for day -50 is estimated in the following way: 
a  50 = 1/N ( IR it) - p_50 [1/N ( ZRmt)]
where ZR-j. is the sum of the returns on each day in the estimation period.
N is the number of days in the estimation period.
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^ m t  *s sum market returns on each day in the estimation period.
Once the a ’s and p’s of each security are estimated for each day in the estimation 
period, they are averaged over the 106 estimation days for each security. The 
averaged a  and p is then used to estimate the abnormal returns in the analysis period 
for the security.
8.5.4: Non-normality of daily returns
Fama (1976) and Brown and Warner (1985) provide evidence that the distributions of 
daily returns exhibit substantial departures from normality. This violates the 
assumptions of the market model that the joint distribution of the returns on securities 
is multivariate normal and hence reduces the possibility of parametric testing. 
Normality of distributions is essential because it allows to make probability 
statements about the future rate of returns, and allows the use of past rates of returns 
and their variability to estimate the future returns and variability. Normal 
distribution also enables the use of the standard statistical tools (i.e. means and 
standard deviations) to analyse the movement in share prices.
In practice, however, no statistical tools have yet been developed to deal with non­
normal distribution problem. Empirical evidence, however, shows that the non­
normality of daily return distributions is mitigated by the use of reasonable sample 
size. Brown and Warner (1985) reported that the non-normality of daily returns is 
not a serious problem because the mean abnormal returns in a cross-section of 
securities converges to approximately normal as the number of sample securities 
increases.
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Dyckman, Philbrick and Stephen (1984 p. 29) did a simulation study to detect 
whether the abnormal performance from daily prices would change appreciably if the 
initial residuals were normally distributed, before inducing an abnormal performance 
and concluded that,
"...the non-normality of individual security daily-return residuals has little 
effect on the inferences drawn from the use of t-test applied to portfolios..."
In this research, the daily abnormal returns are assumed to be approximately near the 
normal distribution, and t-statistics are employed to test the hypotheses.
8.5.5: Skewness in the distribution of daily returns 
Fama (1976) provides evidence that daily returns distributions are more skewed to 
the right, and Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) provide evidence of right 
skewness in security specific performance measures such as market model residuals. 
Skewness in the distribution of abnormal returns causes the sampling distribution of 
the test statistics assumed for the hypothesis tests to be misspecified (i.e. different 
from the actual distribution) which results in false inferences such as the true null 
hypothesis could be rejected more frequently than that given by the significance level 
of the test. Skewness in the distribution is caused by the bias in the information 
structure or the process by which information about an event is collected and 
disseminated to investors. Firms have a tendency to release good news promptly and 
bad news at their own convenience, and market participants anticipating such 
behaviour build it into the returns.
Demodaran (1985) have observed that a greater propensity to release good news than 
bad news introduce a negative bias in the observed skewness, and the skewness 
measured over a short time interval will be lower than that measured over longer 
intervals. The negative bias is caused by the probability of large negative 
information releases relative to large positive releases.
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To mitigate the problem of skewness in the daily returns distribution in this 
research, natural logarithm of returns rather than simple returns were used. Fama 
(1976, p. 31) suggests that the use of natural logarithm of returns helps to pull in the 
right tails of the distribution and stretching out the left tails, thus reducing the degree 
of right skewness of the distributions.
Simkowitz and Beedles (1978) have shown that skewness is rapidly diversified away 
as securities are combined into portfolios. Singleton and Wigender (1986) provided 
evidence that skewness is sensitive to log transformation, although the stationarity of 
the skewness is not affected by such transformation. They also reported that 
skewness of individual stocks and portfolios of stocks does not persist across 
different time periods.
The use of natural logarithm of daily returns is also important because when least 
squares approach is used to estimate the parameters of the market model (although 
P’s are later adjusted using Dimson’s approach) the abnormal returns conform well 
to the assumptions of simple linear regression model (Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll
(1969)). The natural logarithm of daily returns also imply that (Fama (1976 p. 17- 
20),
".... the returns are continuously compounded and therefore more consistent 
with a normal distribution than simple returns..".
However, Thompson (1988) using a simulation approach provided evidence that 
transformation from simple returns to continuously compounding returns only 
resulted in a marginal improvement in the power of the firm’s t-test accompanied by 
an increase in type one error. This implies that the form of returns used in event 
studies is not a critical consideration.
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8.5.6: Length of analysis period
The analysis period consists of eleven days surrounding the announcement. This 
choice was influenced by two factors. First, this study examines the impact of 
announcement of an event of interest on the two-day announcement period (day - 1, 
and day 0) abnormal returns. Assuming an efficient market, there is no reason to 
extend the analysis period beyond the five days period. Second, there was a trade-off 
between a longer analysis period and the sample size. The research was designed to 
eradicate any confounding effects of exogenous events on the daily returns in the 
analysis period at the time of the announcement of the event of interest, and the 
longer the analysis period chosen the more difficult it became to find reasonable 
number of firms satisfying this sampling requirement.
8.5.7: Effects of exogenous events on the analysis period returns
To mitigate the contamination effect of other important announcements on the 
share price at about the same time as the acquisition announcement, any firm which 
had any announcement such as publications of earnings reports, changes in the board 
of directors, appointment of chief executive and board of directors, new investment 
programmes, or launch of new products, in the five days before and five days after 
the official acquisition announcement was eliminated from the sample.
8.5.8: Systematic measurement errors
Every research is susceptible to the problem of measurement errors of one kind or 
another. In this study, the firms sampled experienced the event of interest at different 
calendar times and therefore any measurement errors are expected to be off-set over 
different firms and on average reduce the problem of systematic measurement error. 
Collins and Dent (1984) suggest that the distribution of calendar times also help to 
reduce the cross-sectional correlation of abnormal returns among firms.
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The sample of firms in this study were from 17 different sector of business and the 
announcement of the event of interest was on different calendar times, it is therefore 
assumed that even if there is any cross-sectional correlation among abnormal returns 
it will not be significant to cause a higher incidence of type-one error.
8.5.9: Non-identical distribution of abnormal returns 
The firms sampled in this study are from different sector of businesses and it is 
unlikely that the residuals of these firms are identically distributed. In testing the 
significance of the average abnormal returns (ARt), any test which assumes the 
abnormal returns are independently and identically distributed in cross-section is 
likely to be inappropriate.
To mitigate this problem, previous research used the non-parametric Wilcoxon Sign- 
Test which assumes that the observations are independent and identically distributed 
(Ball, Brown and Finn (1977), Caplan and Roll (1972), Collins and Dent (1979)). 
However, Brown and Warner (1980) report that due to the asymmetry in the 
distributions of residuals, (Wilcoxon Test assumes that the distribution is symmetric) 
the Wilcoxon Test has low power in terms of correctly rejecting the null hypothesis. 
To correct the problem of non-identical distribution of abnormal returns in this 
study, Patel’s (1976) approach is applied which requires the abnormal returns of each 
security in the analysis period to be standardised by the security’s estimated abnormal 
return’s standard deviation calculated from the estimation period as follows:
<!
This procedure, however does not control for any cross-sectional dependence in the 
abnormal returns.
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With respect to independence of residuals, 86 out of 90 takeover announcements 
occured on different calender dates, and there are never more than two 
announcements on the same day. Therefore it is reasonably assumed that the 
residuals are independent.
8.5.10: Increase in variance of returns around announcement
There is evidence that a substantial increase in variance of security returns occurs 
around the announcement of events (Beaver (1968)). In this study, the market model 
parameters are estimated from the estimation period, and these parameters are then 
used to calculate the abnormal returns in the analysis period. It is suspected that the 
variances of security returns increase in the analysis period. Since for individual 
securities there is a positive empirical relationship between variance of returns and 
systematic risk (as well as market model residual variance and systematic risk)(Fama 
1976, pp. 121-124), it might be expected that the tests for abnormal performance will 
be more powerful for low risk securities than for high risk securities.
This implies that there could be a tendency to commit type-one error. Conversely, if 
the analysis period is included in the estimation of parameters, this could increase the 
variance of the abnormal returns and lead to a non rejection of the null hypothesis as 
frequently as it should be (i.e. committing type-two error).
This is important for targets in cash offers, where after the announcement of the 
offer the target share price rises and it is reasonable to expect that the market’s 
response to the new share price will be minimal, implying a reduction in risk.
To resolve this issue, the abnormal returns calculated for the analysis period using 
parameters calculated from the estimation period are standardised by a correction 
factor (Theil (1971)). The correction factor takes into account the changes in the 
variances over the estimation and analysis period.
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The adjustment is incorporated in the following way:
where e^ t* is the abnormal returns.
q  of the standard deviation of the security’s abnormal returns, calculated from the
The correction factor takes into account deviations of market returns from their 
average returns in the following way:
L is the number of days in the estimation period ( i.e. 106 days). The numerator of 
the correction factor is calculated from the analysis period, whereas the denominator 
is calculated from the estimation period.
The average market return for the estimation period is calculated as follows:
8.5.11: Clustering of events
The findings of ’events-type’ empirical studies could be biased by the effect of event- 
clustering. Clustering may be by industry, by time, or both. Brown and Warner 
(1980) examined the clustering issue in the context of monthly returns and explained 
the possible effect of industry and time clustering on the statistical significance of 
abnormal returns.
estimation period, andv^F is the square root of the correction factor.
k;±
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With respect to time clustering, they concluded that,
"...the general impact of clustering is to lower the number of securities whose 
month ’0’ behaviour is independent...if performance measures such as the 
deviations from historical mean returns or market model residuals are positively 
correlated across securities in calendar time, then such clustering will increase 
the variance of the average residual and hence lower the power of the 
tests..."(Brown and Warner (1980) p. 232)
With respect to industry clustering, there is a chance that the sample may consist of 
securities with higher (or lower) than average systematic risk and Fama (1976) 
suggests that there is a positive empirical relationship between variance of returns 
and systematic risk, which means that test for abnormal performance will be more 
powerful for low risk securities than for high risk securities.
Brown and Warner (1980 p. 236) suggest also that,
..." it seems reasonable to expect that the tests for abnormal performance will 
be more powerful for low risk securities than for high risk securities, the 
intuition is simply that a given level of abnormal performance should be easier 
to detect when ’normal’ fluctuations in sample security returns (and the 
standard errors of parameter estimates such as (3) are small rather than large..." 
The sample of firms in this study are from seventeen different sectors of businesses, 
and the maximum number of bidder firms in any one sector is not more than 9 out of 
a total of 111, and for target firms it is 8 out of 111. As for the event time, not more 
than 7 firms out of 111 had their announcement on the same day. It is therefore 
assumed that the industry and time clustering effects have no significant influence on 
the findings of this study.
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8.5.12: Two-day announcement period returns
In this study, two-day announcement period returns ( i.e. day -1 and day 0) are used 
to measure the impact of the announcement of the event on the share prices. This is 
to account for the possibility of leakage of the news or announcement before the 
market closes on the day prior to the official announcement.
If information is released just before the Stock Exchange closes on day -1, some 
price reaction to the announcement can be expected to occur on day -1 and the rest of 
the impact can be expected to continue the next day. If the information is leaked 
before the market closes on day -1, the effect of the announcement on the 
announcement day would have been partially discounted into the price of day -1. 
8.5.13: Day of the week effect
Fama (1965), Cross (1973), French (1980), Gibbon and Hess (1981) and Jacobs and 
Levy (1988) suggested that share prices in major stock exchanges are subjected to the 
’day of the week effect’(also known as ’the Weekend Effect’ or the ’Blue-Monday 
effect), which implies that prices of shares tend to be persistently low on Mondays 
relative to other trading days of the week. One explanation given for this 
phenomenon is that firms release bad news before the market closes on Fridays, the 
full impact of which is impounded on Mondays, although this explanation is 
inconsistent with efficient markets.
In this study, 25 % of the takeover announcements fell on Monday and it is possible 
that the ’day of the week effect’ could have partially influenced the findings of bidder 
and target returns.
To ascertain this possibility, dummy variable regressions were run for all the bidders 
and targets in takeovers in which the dependent variable is the two-day 
announcement abnormal returns and the independent variable is given the value of 
one if the announcement falls on Monday and zero if it falls on other days.
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The regression equation is expressed as follows:
Yi = Po + PlXl +ei 
where,
is the two-day announcement cumulative abnormal returns.
Xj = 1, If the announcement of the offer is on Monday otherwise its set to zero.
PQ is the parameter of the model, e^  is an error term assumed to be normally 
distributed with zero mean and constant variance and covariance,(cov (ep ej) = 0 for 
i^j). Cases implicitly coded in the intercept term represent announcements of 
takeovers on days other than Mondays.
The test of the hypothesis is equivalent to test of the coefficient pp 
Hq : Pi = 0 (Monday effect vs. the rest of the days).
Hj : P i*  0
Under the null hypothesis, the coefficient is zero and assumed to be distributed 
according to t - distribution.
Most of the above adjustments are incorporated in this study in view to provide a 
reasonable validity to the findings in context of the hypotheses tested.
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Chapter 9 
Empirical Findings 
9.1: Bidder returns
In pursuing takeovers, bidders offer alternative forms of payments to target 
shareholders such as cash, shares and, more often, a combination of shares and cash. 
The type of payment offered by the bidders could be influenced by a combination of 
factors. These include the importance of the target resources to the bidder; degree of 
competition for the target; the financial backing available; the amount of stake the 
bidder holds in the target; the target’s expected resistance; the strength of the bidder’s 
shares in the market and the general climate of the stock market as influenced by the 
national and international economic and political situation; the takeover accounting 
practices of bidder; the taxation implications and the requirements by the U.K. 
Takeover and Merger Code.
In empirical research it is often difficult to ascertain what particular combination of 
factors might have influenced the bidder’s decision to offer a particular type of 
payment to the target shareholders. However, once the decision is taken and 
implemented it has important implications for the bidder’s share price.
Myers and Majluf (1984) have suggested that the means of payment offered by 
bidders in takeovers provides a signal to investors of the estimated value of the 
bidder’s share. They argued that information asymmetries exist in the market in the 
sense that the bidders are privileged to possess valuable information about the value 
of their own shares which is not available to the market, but which may be signalled 
by the type of payment offered for the target.
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A share offer conveys a negative signal to the market because the bidder is assumed 
to believe that his shares are overvalued and is seeking to exploit the situation to take 
control of the target’s resources. A cash offer conveys a positive signal because the 
bidder shares are assumed to be undervalued and the bidder is not willing to share the 
potential increase in value with the target shareholders. These suggestions have been 
collectively termed as the ’information hypothesis’ by Myers and Majluf. This 
hypothesis assumes that at an announcement of a cash offer will have a positive 
impact and a share offer a negative impact on the bidder’s share price. Other things 
being equal, the returns to bidding firms in cash offers will be higher than in share 
offers.
For combination offers, it is possible that the bidder is uncertain about the true value 
of its shares and intends to mitigate this uncertainty by offering an equity 
participation to the target shareholders. However, the net impact of the offer on the 
bidder’s share price will depend on the weight of the share and cash portion in the 
combination. If the share portion of the combination is greater than the cash portion, 
we expect a negative impact on the bidder’s share price at announcement of the offer 
and if the cash portion of the combination is greater we would expect a positive 
impact on the bidder’s share price. If the combination offer consists of an equal 
portion of shares and cash, a neutral effect on the bidder’s share price is expected.
If the information effects are present, the bidding firm’s share price change at the 
announcement of the offer will reflect both the gains from the takeover and the 
information effects. It is not possible to separate the effect of the announcement of 
the bid from the effect of the announcement of the means of payment on the bidder s 
share price per se because the means of payment is an essential part of the offer and 
it is announced with the offer.
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It is therefore assumed that the effect of the bid itself is equal for cash, share and 
combination offers and by segregating the sample with respect to means of payments 
and comparing the differences in the two-day announcement abnormal returns will 
ascertain the impact of the means of acquisition financing on bidder share price.
In this study a test of the ’information hypothesis’ is conducted in two steps. First, 
by observing the abnormal returns for the eleven days surrounding the announcement 
for bidders offering cash, shares and a combination offer. The detailed results are 
presented in Tables 9 (A), (B) and (C) in the Appendix and the summary of the 
results is presented in Table 9 below. Second, the differences in the abnormal returns 
for the eleven days surrounding the announcement for bidders offering the different 
means of payment are calculated and the detailed results are presented in Tables 9.1 
(A), (B) and (C) in the Appendix. The summary of the results is presented in Table
9.1 below.
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Table 9
Summary of the abnormal returns (AR) and the two- day announcement 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for bidders in the cash, share and a 
combination offers. The t-statistics are in parentheses.
Means of Payment
Event Day Cash Share Combination
N=30 N=30 N=30
-1 0.1129 -0.3662 -0.0296
(0.618) (-2.006) (-0.162)
0 -0.3699 -0.8898 -0.8871
(-2.026) (-4.874)** (-4.858)**
CAR (-1,0) -0.257 -1.256 -0.917
(-0.995) (-4.860)** (-3.550)**
** Significantly different from zero at 1 % level
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9.1.1: Bidders in share offers
The results in Table 9 show that for share bidders, the abnormal return on the day 
prior to the first announcement (day -1) of the offer is - 0.3662 which is not 
significantly different from zero (t=-2.006). The abnormal return on the 
announcement day (day 0) is -0.8898 which is significant at 1 % level (t=-4.874). 
The two-day (day -1 and 0) announcement CAR is -1.256 which is also significant at 
1 % level (t=-4.860). These results indicate that, on average, the shareholders of 
bidding firms offering shares as a means of payment to the target shareholders in 
takeovers experience significant losses at the announcement of the offer. These 
results are consistent with the predictions of the information hypothesis that the 
announcement of share offers have a negative impact on the bidder’s share price. 
The announcement of the shares offer may have conveyed a negative signal to the 
market about the true value of the bidder’s shares. The market perceive that the 
bidder’s share price is overvalued and it tries to exploit the situation by making a 
share offer. As a consequence, there is a selling pressure on bidder’s share price at 
the announcement of the offer.
However, the significant negative abnormal returns to bidders in share offers at the 
announcement could be partially due to market’s perception of share offers vis-a-vis 
cash offers. The market’s perception of a lower probability of success of share 
offers relative to cash offers could have also contributed towards the bidders’ 
negative abnormal returns at the announcement of the offer. Jensen and Ruback 
(1983) in their analysis of takeovers in the US showed that share offers had a higher 
probability of failure than cash offers.
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9.1.1 (A): Evidence on the possibility of bidders purchasing their own shares 
after the announcement of the offer
Fallon and Srodes (1988) suggest that in share offers, bidders are sometimes 
suspected of supporting their share prices by repurchasing their own shares in the 
market through the financial intermediaries after the official announcement.
Although repurchasing of own shares was until recently illegal in the U.K., there is 
evidence in some major takeovers (for example, Guinness takeover of Distillers, 
Hanson Trust’s takeover of Imperial Group, and even in the BTR’s bid for Pilkington 
(Gray and McDermott (1989)) that bidders do practise this support operation to: (a) 
counter the fall in their share price after the announcement and hence make the share 
offer attractive and (b) to offset the possibility that a rival bidder, who may be a 
white knight to the target, will sell the initial bidders’ shares in the market and 
encourage others to do the same, on the basis that the initial bidder’s share price 
would fall significantly and the offer would be unattractive and likely to fail, or even 
if the bid succeeds, to ensure that the winning bidder pays expensively.
If most bidders practise the support operation, the post-announcement abnormal 
returns of bidders in share offers can be expected to be significantly positive.
Evidence from Table 9 (A) in the Appendix (bidder returns in share offers) is not 
consistent with the hypothesis that most bidders support their share prices after the 
initial announcement of the offer. Although the abnormal returns in the post­
announcement period for bidders in share offers show a positive trend, they are not 
significantly different from zero. However, it is possible that the positive trend in 
the price becomes significant as the closing date of the initial offer approaches, which 
is beyond the scope of this study.
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9.1.1 (B): Evidence of leakage of information in the pre-announcement period 
for bidders in share offers
Takeovers have a smaller probability of being anticipated relative to mergers 
because of the way they are planned and executed. Nevertheless, there is always a 
possibility of a takeover being leaked before the official announcement. In share 
offers, where considerable administrative and regulatory requirements need to be 
complied with before making the offer, the possibility of leakage is higher relative to 
cash offers. The findings in Table 9 (A) show that the pre-announcement (day -5 to 
day - 2) abnormal returns of share bidders are not significantly different from zero. 
The abnormal return on day -1 which was significantly negative probably because 
the bidder made the offer announcement before the market closed. These findings 
suggest that for the sample studied, there is no evidence of information leakage from 
day -5 to day -2 before the announcement of the offer.
9.1.2: Bidders in cash offers 
For bidders offering cash as the means of payment to their target shareholders, 
Table 9 shows that the abnormal returns on day -1 (AR=0.1129, t=0.618) and the 
announcement day (day 0) (AR=-0.3699, t=- 2.026) are not significantly different 
from zero. The two-day announcement CAR is -0.257 which is also not significantly 
different from zero (t=- 0.995). These results indicate that shareholders of bidding 
firms in cash offers neither lose nor gain at the announcement of the offer. The 
results are not consistent with the prediction of information hypothesis which 
suggests that cash offers have positive impact on the bidder’s share price at the 
announcement of the offer. The statistically insignificant two-day announcement 
abnormal returns for bidders in cash offers could be possibly due some information 
leakage about the offers before the official announcement and the effect of the 
announcement on the bidder’s share price was small.
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However, the abnormal returns of cash bidders from day -5 to day 0 are not 
significantly different from zero (Table 9 (B)), which suggests that there is no 
evidence of information leakage immediately before the announcement of the offer 
and if information leakage did occur it must have taken place before day -5.
9.1.3: Bidders in combination offers 
For bidders in the combination offers, Table 9 indicates that their shareholders 
experience negative abnormal returns on the announcement day (AR=-0.8871, t=- 
4.858) and for the two-day announcement period (CAR=-0.917, t=-3.55) which are 
significantly different from zero at 1 % level. These results suggest that most of the 
combination offers studied had a higher proportion of shares in the offer. The 
negative effect of the share portion must have outweighed the positive effect of the 
cash portion of the offer.
9.2: Difference in the announcement period returns of bidders in the cash, share 
and combination offers
To ascertain whether there is any significant difference in the announcement day AR 
and the the two-day announcement CAR between the cash, shares and the 
combination bidders, the daily mean differences of abnormal returns were calculated 
for the eleven days surrounding the announcement. The results are presented in 
Tables 9.1 (A), (B) and (C) in the Appendix, and the summary of the differences in 
the abnormal returns and the cumulative abnormal returns are presented in Table 9.1 
below.
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9.2.1: Cash versus share offers
The Information Hypothesis makes two predictions with respect to bidder returns in 
cash and share offers. First, for the pre-announcement period the returns to bidders in 
share offers are relatively higher than returns to bidders in cash offers.
Evidence from Table 9.1 (A) in the Appendix indicates that the difference in the 
average abnormal returns between cash and share bidders in the pre-announcement 
period (day -5 to day -1) is not significant, and therefore not consistent with the 
Information Hypothesis. Second, if the information effects are present and assuming 
other things being equal, the returns to bidders in cash offers will be higher than in 
share offers at the two-day announcement period. Specifically, the following 
hypothesis is tested:
Hq: The returns to bidders in cash offers are higher than those in the share 
offers at the two-day announcement period.
Hj: The returns to bidders in cash offers are equal to or lower than those in 
the share offers at the two-day announcement period.
Table 9 shows that the returns to bidders in cash offers at two-day (day -1 and day 
0) announcement period are negative but not significantly different from zero. The 
two-day announcement period returns to bidders in the share offers are negative and 
significantly different from zero at 1 % level.
Table 9.1 shows that the difference in the two-day announcement period abnormal 
returns of cash and share bidders is positive and significant at 5 % level (CAR(- 
1,0)=0.999, t=2.01).
These findings suggest that, on average, the returns to bidders in cash offers are 
higher than those in share offers at the two-day announcement period, therefore the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The findings are also consistent with the 
Information Hypothesis which suggests that at the announcement, the returns to 
bidders in cash offers are higher than those in share offers.
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9.2.2: The combination offer versus the share offer and cash offer
The Information Hypothesis is silent with respect to bidders in the combination 
offers and no hypothesis is tested for bidders in this category. However, as a matter 
of interest, the differences in the two-day announcement abnormal returns for bidders 
in these categories were calculated. Table 9.1 shows that the difference in the two- 
day announcement abnormal returns for bidders in the ’cash versus combination’ is 
positive and for bidders in the ’share versus combination’ category is negative but 
both differences are not significantly different from zero.
The negative and significant two-day announcement abnormal returns for bidders in 
the combination category as shown in Table 9 implies that most of the combination 
offers studied had on average a higher proportion of shares in the offer. If this 
implication about the combination offers could be related to the ’cash versus 
combination’ and the ’share versus combination’ offers, it implies that for the former 
category the positive effect of the cash offers outweighed the negative effect of the 
share offers but the positive difference is not significantly different from zero.
For bidders in the ’share versus combination’ category the negative effect of the 
share offers outweighed the positive effect of cash offers but the negative difference 
is not significantly different from zero.
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Table 9.1
Summary of the differences in the AR and CAR on day -1 and day 0 for bidders 
in the cash, share and combination offers. The t -statistics are in parentheses.
Means of Payment
Event Cash Cash Shares
Day vs. Shares vs. Combination vs. Combination
-1 0.480 0.206 -0.272
(1.470) (0.871) (-1.30)
0 0.519 0.581 0.061
(1.970) (2.390)* (0.240)
CAR (-1,0) 0.999 0.787 -0.211
(2.01)* (1.93) (-0.312)
* Significantly different from zero at 5 % level
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Table 9 shows that the two-day announcement abnormal returns for bidders offering 
shares is negative and significantly different from zero at 1 % level (CAR(-1,0)=- 
1.256, t= -4.860). These findings are consistent with the findings of Dodd (1980), 
Asquith (1983), Dennis and MacConnel (1986) and Travlos (1987) on bidder returns 
in share offers in the US. Bidders in their studies experienced significant negative 
abnormal returns at the two-day announcement period. Other studies in the US 
which used monthly returns reported mixed results for their bidders in the share 
offers. For example, Mandelker (1974) reported insignificant positive abnormal 
returns, Asquith (1982) reported significant positive returns and Franks, Harris and 
Mayer (1988) reported significant negative abnormal returns. The inconsistent 
results reported in studies using monthly returns could be due to the confounding 
effect of exogenous events on the monthly returns. Fishman (1986) suggested that 
bidders in cash offers experience positive and significant abnormal returns in the 
post-announcement period. The abnormal returns for cash bidders in the post 
announcement period (day +1 to day +5) in this study (Table 9 (B)) are positive but 
only abnormal returns on day +1 are significantly different from zero, which is not 
consistent with Fishman’s suggestion.
9.3: Target returns
There is considerable documented evidence in the US that shareholders of target 
firms earn significant positive abnormal returns as a result of a bid, and that the 
shareholders of successfully acquired firms earn larger returns for a longer period of 
time than the shareholders of target firms which successfully defend themselves 
(Jensen and Ruback (1983)). There is also evidence that of successfully acquired 
targets, those that were subjected to cash offers earned higher abnormal returns than 
those subjected to share and combination offers at the announcement of the offer 
(Huang and Walking (1987)).
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This study intends to test the empirical validity of Huang and Walking’s( 1987) 
findings on the returns and the differences in the returns to targets subjected to cash 
and share offers at the announcement of the offer in the US on a sample of 
successfully acquired targets incorporated in the U.K. This study also intends to 
determine whether the returns to target firms in cash, shares and combination offers 
are significantly positive and if there is any significant difference in their returns at 
the announcement of the offer.
As in the US, cash and share offers in the U.K. have different tax implications 
because cash offers generate tax obligations for the target firms’ shareholders but 
allow the bidder to raise the writing-down allowance (depreciation charges) of the 
acquired assets to their fair (market) value through the application of acquisition 
accounting method (SSAP 14).
In cash offers, the application of acquisition accounting method requires the bidder 
to record the target firm’s assets and liabilities in the consolidated accounts on fair 
value basis (which is the market value at the effective date of the takeover). 
Consequently, this will increase the writing-down allowance, lower the taxable 
income and increase the cashflows.
In share offers, any capital gains realised by the target shareholders are deferred 
until the shares are sold and the application of merger accounting method does not 
require the bidder to adjust the values of the assets and liabilities acquired to their fair 
values in its own books or on consolidation. The only adjustments appropriate are 
those to achieve uniformity of accounting policies in the bidder and target firms.
In the US, Wang, Lane and Yang (1983) and Huang and Walking (1987) provided 
evidence that due to the capital gains tax liability of accepting target shareholders in 
cash offers, the bidding firm pays a higher acquisition price in cash offers to offset 
the liability.
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From the bidders point of view, the high acquisition price in cash offers relative to 
share offers in part reflects the additional tax credits captured by the bidding firm in 
terms of higher writing-down allowances (depreciation tax shield). However, it is 
difficult to ascertain whether the bidding firms benefit from the additional tax credit 
associated with cash offers once the higher acquisition price is considered, because it 
depends on the degree of competition in the market for corporate control, alternative 
tax shields, effective tax rate of the bidders and the profitability of the firm 
(Rappaport (1987)). For example, the more competitive the market for corporate 
control the higher the price offered for the target, and the additional tax credit from 
the increase in the writing-down allowances may not compensate the high price 
offered. Firms with other ways to shield taxable income such as investment tax 
credits and payments of additional interest tax shield on debts, will value tax shield 
from higher writing-down allowances less highly than those without alternative tax 
shields. Firms facing high marginal tax rate will recoup the greatest benefit from 
additional tax credit captured through higher depreciation charges.
Tax shield from higher depreciation charges will be worth more to profitable and 
relatively stable firms that are likely to have taxable income to shield than firms with 
accumulated tax losses or uncertain prospects.
However, in contrast to investors in the US, investors in the U.K. are allowed to 
deduct certain expenses from the gains on sale of shares such as selling and buying 
expenses and capital losses on sale of other shares during the same period and 
inflation allowances, after which if the gains exceed £5000 (1989/90) they will be 
taxed on the investor’s top slice tax rate. These tax deductible allowances are 
permitted by the present government in an effort to encourage the public to invest in 
shares especially through the Business Expansion Schemes and investments through 
the Unit Trusts, Investment Trusts, Pension Funds and Insurance Companies.
190
Institutional investors own about 70 % of the equity of all listed firms in the U.K. 
(Stock Exchange Quarterly, 1988), and some of these institutional investors such as 
the Unit Trusts and Investment Trusts are currently exempted from capital gains tax. 
Taking all these factors into consideration it is possible that target shareholders 
subjected to cash offers in the U.K. are not compensated for the capital gains tax 
liability and if this is true, assuming other things being equal, the differences in the 
abnormal returns to target shareholders in the cash offers and share offers should not 
be significantly different from zero.
Specifically, the following hypothesis is tested:
Hq: The target shareholders subjected to cash, shares and combination offers 
earn positive abnormal returns at the two-day announcement period.
H^: The target shareholders subjected to cash, shares and combination offers 
earn zero or negative abnormal returns at the two-day announcement period.
Tables 9.2 (A), (B) and (C) in the Appendix present the details of the abnormal 
returns and cumulative abnormal returns for cash, shares and combination targets for 
the eleven days surrounding the initial announcement. Table 9.2 below presents the 
summary of average abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns on day -1 
and day 0 (announcement day).
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Table 9.2
Summary of the AR and CAR for targets subjected to cash, share and 
combination offers, on day -1 and on the announcement day. The t-statistics are 
in parentheses.
Means of Payment
Event Day Cash Shares Combination
-1 1.6703 1.1700 1.1981
(9.148)** (6.408)** (6.562)**
0 2.2039 2.5010 1.7128
(12.066)** (13.693)** (9.381)**
CAR(-1,0) 3.874 3.671 2.911
(14.976)** (14.218)** (11.274)**
** Significantly different from zero at 1 % level
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9.3.1: Targets subjected to share offers
The results in Table 9.2 show that for share targets, the abnormal returns on day -1 
(AR=1.1700, t=6.408) and the announcement day (AR=2.5010, t=13.693) are 
positive and significantly different from zero at 1 % level. The two-day 
announcement cumulative abnormal return is 3.671, significant at 1 % level 
(t=14.218). These results indicate that on average target shareholders in share offers 
experience significant positive abnormal returns at the two- day announcement 
period.
9.3.2: Targets subjected to cash offers
For targets subjected to cash offers, Table 9.2 shows that the abnormal returns on 
day -1 (AR=1.6703, t=9.148) and the announcement day (AR=2.2039, t=12.066) 
are positive and significantly different from zero at 1 % level. The two-day 
announcement CAR is 3.874 which is also significant at 1 % level (t=14.976). These 
results indicate that target shareholders in cash offers experience significant positive 
abnormal returns at the two-day announcement period.
9.3.3: Targets subjected to combination offers
For targets subjected to a combination offers, the abnormal returns on day -1 
(AR=1.1981, t=6.562) and the announcement day (AR=1.7128, t=9.381) are positive 
and significantly different from zero at 1 % level. The two-day announcement CAR 
is 2.911 which is significantly different from zero at 1 % level (t=l 1.274). These 
results imply that target shareholders in combination offers earn significant positive 
abnormal returns at the two-day announcement period.
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These findings indicate that irrespective of the means of payment offered by bidders 
to their targets, the target shareholders earn significant positive abnormal returns at 
the two-day announcement period, consistent with the findings on target returns in 
the US. Based on these findings the null hypothesis of positive returns to target 
shareholders at the two-day announcement period in cash, shares and combination 
offers cannot be rejected at 1 % level. These positive abnormal returns might be due 
to the premiums offered by bidders to target shareholders at the announcement of the 
offer.
9.4: Differences in the announcement period returns to targets subjected to cash, 
share and combination offers.
The results in Table 9.2 show that the two-day CAR for cash targets is marginally 
higher than that of share targets and considerably higher than that of combination 
targets. To ascertain whether there is any significant difference in the two-day CAR 
of cash, shares and combination targets, the daily mean differences in abnormal 
returns were calculated. The results are presented in Tables 9.3 (A), (B) and (C) in 
the Appendix and the summary of these tables is presented in Table 9.3 below.
9.4.1: Cash versus share offers 
In view of the documented evidence of higher returns to target firms subjected to 
cash offers than that of share offers due to the immediate capital gains tax liability of 
target shareholders in cash offers in the US and the possibility that this evidence is 
not valid for target firms in the U.K. because of the more lenient capital gains tax 
system in the U.K., the following hypothesis is tested:
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Hq: Target shareholders subjected to cash offers earn 
equal or lower abnormal returns than those in share offers at 
the two-day announcement period.
H^: Target shareholders subjected to cash offers earn 
higher returns than those in share offers at the two-day 
announcement period.
Table 9.3 shows that the returns to targets in the ’cash versus share’ category on day 
-1 (AR=0.500, t=0.820) and day 0 (AR=-0.297, t=-1.52) are not significantly 
different from zero. The two-day CAR is 0.203 which is also not significantly 
different from zero (t=0.170). Based on these findings the null hypothesis of no 
difference in the returns to target shareholders subjected to cash and share offers at 
the announcement of the offer cannot be rejected.
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Table 9.3
Summary of the differences in the AR and the CAR for cash, share and 
combination targets on day -1 and on the announcement day. The t-statistics are 
in parentheses.
Means of Payment
Event Day Cash vs. Cash vs. Shares vs.
Shares Combination Combination
-1 0.500 0.472 -0.028
(0.820) (0.760) (-0.150)
0 -0.297 0.491 0.788
(-1.52) (0.890) (0.980)
CAR (-1,0) 0.203 0.963 0.760
(0.170) (0.850) (0.810)
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These findings are not consistent with the documented evidence of the difference in 
the two- day announcement CAR of successfully acquired cash and share targets in 
the US (Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983), Huang and Walking (1987), Travlos 
(1987)). These studies show that shareholders of cash targets always earn higher 
abnormal returns than those of share targets.
The findings of no difference in the abnormal returns to target shareholders in cash 
and share offers at the two-day announcement period in the U.K. may be explained 
by taxation factors. In the U.K., an investor does not pay capital gains tax on profits 
from sale of shares until those profits amount to £5000 (1989/90). The investor is 
allowed to make the following deductions from the capital gains on the sale of shares: 
the buying and selling expenses; inflation allowance and losses on sale of shares that 
the investor has sold in the same year. Investors are also able to practise ’bed and 
breakfast’ transactions which involve selling shares on one day and buying at the 
beginning of the next day to establish losses which are deductible from capital gains 
before tax. The capital gains tax is charged at the investor’s top slice of income tax. 
As for the institutional investors such as Investment Trusts and Unit Trusts who are 
major shareholders in most firms, they are exempted from paying capital gains tax on 
transactions made by the fund, as part of the government’s strategy to encourage the 
public to invest in shares. These exemptions however do not cover insurance firms. 
Financial institutions in the U.K. hold about 70% of the listed U.K. equities of large 
British firms (Stock Exchange Quarterly, 1988).
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Therefore, unlike in the US, there is no evidence of significant difference in 
abnormal returns of cash and share targets at the announcement of the offer in the 
U.K. These findings are consistent with the notion that bidders do not compensate 
the target shareholders for the capital gains tax liability in cash offers. This is 
probably due to target shareholders in cash offers in the U.K. are able to mitigate 
their capital gains tax liability themselves.
These findings are inconsistent with that of Franks, Harris and Mayer’s (1988) on 
cash and share target returns in the U.K. They found that the returns to target firms 
subjected to cash offers were higher than those in the share offers in the 
announcement month. This inconsistency could be due to two possible reasons: First, 
the studies related to different time periods. This study covers firms involved in 
takeovers from January 1985 to July 1988 whereas Frank et. al. study covers the 
period from January 1955 to June 1985.
Although Franks et. al. suggested that the difference in the cash and share target 
returns in their study cannot be completely explained by the capital gains tax factor 
because part of their sample covers the period earlier than 1965 (whereas the capital 
gains tax was first introduced in the U.K. in 1965), it is possible that investors 
incurring capital gains tax liability during the early years of the tax (i.e. April 1965 to 
April 1982) had a greater tax liability relative to investors in the later years (i.e. April 
1982 onwards).
The present government in its effort to encourage the public to invest in shares has 
over the years gradually lightened the incidence of capital gains tax liability on 
investors by introducing the following amendments to its capital gains tax system 
(Homer and Burrows, 1988):
The introduction of indexation allowance in April 1982. This allowance allowed the 
investor to deduct from the proceeds of sale of shares the increase in the retail price 
index since April 1982 to the month of disposal.
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The annual exemption threshold for capital gains tax (CGT) is £5000 (1988/1989). 
Unless it is a large investment, this allowance reduced the chances of most small 
investors to qualify for the CGT liability.
Since 1986 the government has introduced Personal Equity Plans (PEP’s) to 
encourage savings through purchase of shares which enable investors to invest up to 
£3000 a year and, provided this investment is held for a minimum of one or two 
years, any capital gains and reinvested dividends are entirely tax free and remain so 
as long as the investment is held.
Since 1987 investors are allowed to practice ’bed and breakfast’ transactions where 
shares are sold and bought back the next day to establish losses which are deductible 
from the gains. However, this practice is only allowed if both the purchase and sale 
are fully completed with consequent costs involved including the difference between 
the buying and selling price.
The introduction by the Finance Act 1988 of the right to have all gains and losses on 
assets acquired before 31st March 1982 calculated as if they had been acquired at 
their market value on that date. This effectively reduced the potential capital gains 
tax liability of shareholders who invested in shares before 31st March 1982 and were 
still holding their investment at that date.
Second, Frank et. al. study used monthly returns instead of daily returns and it is 
possible that the monthly returns are confounded by other events occurring in the 
same month as the offer.
9.4.2: Cash versus combination and share versus combination offers
As a matter of interest, the differences in the announcement period returns to target 
shareholders in the ’cash versus combination’ and ’share versus combination 
categories were also calculated, and the results are presented in Table 9.3. The 
differences in the two-day announcement abnormal returns in both categories are 
positive but not significantly different from zero.
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9.5: Total bidder and target returns
Previous studies on acquisitions in the U.K. by Newbould (1970), Singh (1971), 
Utton (1974), Franks, Broyles and Hecht (1977), Firth (1980), Barnes (1978, 1984) 
and Dodd and Quek (1985) concentrated on returns to bidders and targets in mergers 
rather than takeovers. This could have been due to the availability of data on mergers 
and/or the popularity of this technique at that time. These studies which used 
different methodologies on different samples of firms in different time periods 
concluded that mergers in general did not create any wealth for the bidder 
shareholders though the target shareholders always gained. At present takeovers are 
as popular as mergers in the U.K. and yet there is little published evidence on firms 
involved in takeovers.
Unlike mergers, the bidder in a takeover invites the target shareholders to sell their 
shares at a premium above the current market price. The bidder in a hostile takeover 
does not negotiate with the target management but only informs them of the attempt 
at a very short notice in compliance with the requirements of the Takeover Code. 
Because the target management is informed at a very short notice before the 
announcement, the surprise attack makes it more difficult for them to build up an 
effective defence and hence gives the bidder a better chance of success.
The surprise nature of the takeover also makes it difficult to compare the returns to 
bidders and targets in takeovers and mergers at the announcement of the offer.
In this section no attempt is made to compare the returns to all the bidders and 
targets in the sample of takeovers and mergers but the returns to bidders and targets 
in takeovers are presented and discussed below.
It is expected that at the announcement of the takeover the bidder will offer a price 
which is above the current market price but below the estimated value of the target 
firm to the bidder.
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If the bidder is successful in acquiring the target firm at this price, part of the 
potential gains from the takeover identified by the bidder should accrue to their 
shareholders, and bidder shareholders’ should therefore earn positive abnormal 
returns at the announcement of the offer. The shareholders of the target firm should 
also earn positive abnormal returns, as the result of the premiums typically offered by 
the bidder.
In the U.K., there is very little published evidence on returns to bidders and targets 
in takeovers. Frank, Harris and Mayer’s (1988) study provides evidence on returns to 
bidders and targets in takeovers classified according to the means of payments 
offered to their targets, but not on total returns on bidders and targets in takeovers. 
Evidence from the US on bidder returns in takeovers shows inconsistent results, in 
particular the two-day announcement abnormal returns for bidders is positive but 
statistically insignificant in Asquith (1983), negative and statistically significant in 
Dodd (1980) and Asquith and Kim (1982) and statistically significant positive returns 
in Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983) and Bradley (1980), and Jarrell and Poulsen 
(1989).
In general, most findings on daily and monthly announcement returns to bidders in 
takeovers tend to show that bidders suffer losses at the announcement of the offer 
(Jensen and Ruback (1983)). The results on announcement period targets returns in 
takeovers in all these studies are consistently positive.
Finance theory predicts that firms pursue new capital investments when the 
investments have positive effects on their market value. McConnell and Muscarella 
(1985) provide evidence in support of this view, reporting a significant positive share 
price reaction for a sample of industrial firms which announced an increase in 
planned capital expenditures.
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Acquisitions are also planned capital expenditures and if the acquisition has any 
wealth-creating effect for the bidder firm, the bidder returns at the announcement of 
the offer should be positive.
To ascertain the wealth effect of takeover announcements to bidders and targets 
involved in hostile bids in the U.K., the following hypotheses are tested:
(Bidder Returns)
Hq: Bidder shareholders in takeovers earn positive abnormal returns at the 
announcement of the offer.
H :^ Bidder shareholders in takeovers earn zero or negative abnormal returns 
at the announcement of the offer.
(Target Returns)
Hq: Target shareholders in takeovers earn positive abnormal returns at the 
announcement of the offer.
Hj: Target shareholders in takeovers earn zero or negative abnormal returns 
at the announcement of the offer.
This section presents the average abnormal returns and the cumulative abnormal 
returns for all the bidders and targets in takeovers for the eleven days surrounding the 
announcement. The details are presented in Tables 9.4 (A) and (B) respectively in 
the Appendix and the summary of the two-day announcement period returns from 
these tables are presented in Table 9.4 below.
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Table 9.4
Summary of the average abnormal returns (AR) and the cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) of all bidders and targets in takeovers at the two-day 
announcement period. The t-statistics are in parentheses
Event Day AR
-1 -0.1005
(-0.954)
Bidders
0 -0.8915
(-8.457)**
Bidder CAR (-1,0) -0.992
(-6.65)**
Targets
-1 1.4322
(7.844)**
0 2.0534
(11.250)**
Target CAR (-1,0) 3.486
(23.385)**
** Significantiy different from zero at 1 % level
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9.5.1: Bidder returns
Table 9.4 shows that for bidders, the abnormal return on day -1 is negative (AR= 
-0.1005) but not significantly different from zero (t=-0.954) at 1 % level, whereas the 
announcement day abnormal return is negative (AR=-0.8915) and significantly 
different from zero at 1 % level (t=-8.457). The two-day announcement CAR is 
negative (CAR= -0.992) and significantly different from zero at 1 % level (t=-6.65). 
These results indicate that bidders shareholders in takeovers suffer losses at the 
announcement of the offer and the null hypothesis of positive returns to bidders at the 
announcement of the offer is rejected at 1 percent level.
The findings of negative abnormal returns to bidder shareholders at the 
announcement of the offer are not consistent with the view that acquisitions are 
wealth creating investments. However, it is possible that the positive wealth effect 
of takeover announcements is dominated by the combined effects of other factors 
which are beyond the control of research design. For example, in the enthusiasm to 
takeover target resources, the bidder management may characteristically overstretch 
its financial and management resources. Some consequent losses of efficiency in its 
current business activities may be expected and reflected in the share price.
However, the overall negative returns to bidders at the announcement of the offer is 
consistent with the notion that bidders believe that the market has a consistently 
short-term horizon. The bidders have a long-term view of their investment and do 
not make their investment decisions based on the market’s perception of their 
investment. This suggest that, on average, bidders seems not to believe in market 
efficiency and therefore do not use market signals as a basis for their takeover 
decision.
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The short-selling of bidders’ shares around the announcement of the takeovers by 
arbitrageurs could have contributed to the significant negative abnormal returns at the 
two-day announcement period. This action on part of arbitraguers exerts a downward 
pressure on the bidders’ share price.
The market might have already anticipated the acquisition strategy of the bidding 
firms before the analysis period, thus mitigating any valuation effect at the time of 
the formal announcement.
The significant negative abnormal returns for all bidders at the two-day 
announcement period in this study are not comparable with that of Barnes (1978, 
1984) and Dodd and Quek’s (1985), Utton (1974), and Franks, Broyles and Hecht’s 
(1977) findings on returns to bidder firms, because they studied a sample of mergers 
rather than takeovers.
The findings are also not directly comparable to Franks, Harris and Mayer’s (1988) 
findings on bidder and target returns in takeovers because their sample of bidders and 
targets was classified according to means of payments, and they used monthly 
returns.
However, the negative announcement day returns for all bidders in this study are 
consistent with the evidence from the US. For example, Langetieg (1978), Asquith 
(1983), Eger (1983) and Malatesta (1983) used different samples for different time 
periods and concluded that bidder firms’ earned significantly negative abnormal 
returns at the announcement of the offer.
9.5.2: Target returns
For target firms, Table 9.4 shows that the abnormal return on day -1 (AR= 1.4322) 
and the announcement day (AR= 2.0534) is positive and significantly different 
from zero at 1 % level. The two-day announcement CAR is also positive (CAR— 
3.486) and significantly different from zero at 1 % level (t=23.385).
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These results indicate that the target shareholders earn significant positive abnormal 
returns at the announcement of the offer and the null hypothesis of positive abnormal 
returns to target shareholders at the announcement of the offer cannot be rejected.
The positive abnormal returns to target shareholders at the announcement of the 
offer could be due to the expected benefits of the takeover but can be attributed 
mainly to the large premiums offered by the bidders.
Two days prior to the official announcement, there is evidence of positive abnormal 
returns (AR=0.2658) which is significantly different from zero at 5 % level (t= 
2.521), which could be due to information leakage about the offer. However this 
seems to be a one sided leakage as there is no evidence of abnormal share price 
activity for bidders during the same period.
The positive and significant two-day announcement period abnormal returns for 
targets in takeovers in the U.K. are consistent with the findings of announcement 
period target returns in takeovers in the US as reported by Langetieg (1978), Bradley 
(1980), Dodd (1980), Asquith and Kim (1982), Asquith (1983), Bradley, Desai and 
Kim (1983), Eger (1983) and Malatesta (1983).
9.6: Combined gains
If bidder managers seek to maximise their shareholders’ wealth, their takeover 
activity can be justified only if there is some form of synergy present which will 
contribute towards the creation of such wealth. Synergy may manifest itself in the 
form of an increase in market power, possession of a new technology, research and 
development facilities, better distributional facilities, skilled management, production 
and sales economies of scale or any other form which will help towards the creation 
of more wealth. The presence and the potential of exploiting these expected 
synergies partially explain the rationale for bidders willing to offer large premiums 
for their targets.
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In ascertaining the presence of synergy in takeovers through abnormal returns 
analysis it is difficult to identify the particular type of synergy present, but the 
expected synergy can be assumed if the combined abnormal returns of bidders and 
targets are significandy positive at the announcement of the takeover offer. 
Specifically the following hypothesis will be tested:
Hq: The combined returns to bidders and targets are positive at the two-day 
announcement period.
H^: The combined returns to bidders and targets are zero or negative at the 
two-day announcement period.
To ascertain the presence of expected synergy in takeovers, the combined returns 
to bidders and targets at the two-day announcement period were calculated and the 
results are presented in Table 9.5 below.
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Table 9.5
Summary of the two-day announcement cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
and combined returns for all bidders and targets in takeovers and bidders and 
targets classified according to the means of payment. The t-statistics are in 
parentheses.
Total Cash Shares Combination
Sample
N=90 N=30 N=30 N=30
Bidders -0.992 -0.257 -1.256 -1.044
(-6.65)** (-0.995) (-4.86)** (-4.04)**
Targets 3.486 3.874 3.671 2.911
(23.385)** (14.976)** (14.211)** (11.266)**
Combined Gains 2.494 3.617 2.415 1.867
(4.67)** (3.42)** (2.71)* (2.03)*
** Significantly different from zero at 1 % level 
* Significantly different from zero at 5 % level
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9.6.1: Total sample
Table 9.5 shows that for the total sample of 90 bidders and 90 targets, shareholders 
of bidding firms earn significant negative abnormal returns whereas shareholders of 
target firms earn significant positive abnormal returns for the two - day 
announcement period. The gains to target shareholders more than compensate the 
losses to bidder shareholders and the combined gains are positive (AR=2.494) and 
significant at 1% level (t=4.67). Based on these findings the null hypothesis of 
positive combined returns to bidders and targets in takeovers at the two-day 
announcement period cannot be rejected.
These findings are consistent with the notion that the market recognises expected 
benefits from takeovers at the announcement of the offer, although a major portion of 
the benefits seem to accrue to the target shareholders. The distribution of expected 
benefits at the announcement of the offer could have been influenced by a 
combination of factors such as competition for the target, target management’s 
resistance, bidder’s lack of information about the target firm and its industry and 
consequently committing a negative valuation error.
It can be expected that when the bidder is successful in acquiring the target resources 
and able to implement a higher valued operating strategy to exploit the expected 
benefits from the takeover, it will be able to earn the expected return on its 
investment, which is reflected in the share price at the announcement of the offer. 
However, the positive effects of expected benefits could be overshadowed by the 
effects of other factors operating simultaneously such as competition, target 
resistance, valuation error and means of payment.
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The bidder s ability to realise the potential synergies in the post takeover period will 
depend on how well it is able to integrate the target resources into its own 
organisation. The market, however, gauges the bidder’s ability to realise the 
expected benefits of the takeover from its past experience, which is discounted in the 
bidder’s share price at the announcement of the offer.
In essence, the findings of positive combined returns in takeovers imply that the 
intense takeover activity in recent years is not without purpose, as wealth is created in 
the process which is socially and economically desirable. The positive combined 
returns also imply that takeovers are an effective means of employing resources to a 
higher value use and indirectly an effective tool to discipline complacent managers. 
9.6.2: Combined returns of bidders and targets in the cash, share and 
combination offers
Table 9.5 shows that the combined returns for bidders and targets in the cash, share 
and combination offers respectively are positive and significantly different from zero. 
However there was no significant difference in the combined gains of bidders and 
targets in the cash, share and combination offers. These results imply that, 
irrespective of the means of payments offered, takeovers are wealth creating 
investments.
9.7: Growth maximisation hypothesis
In recent years it is observed that takeovers are more frequent between firms in 
seemingly unrelated or loosely related businesses. Also, most acquired targets are 
left to operate as autonomous divisions run by the same management team that 
controlled it before the takeover. One possible reason for this is that there is a 
possibility that firms are responding towards the government s tough anti­
competitive rules on takeovers.
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When one firm takes over another in the same industry, the other firms in the 
industry may feel vulnerable and resort to defensive measures such as pursuing the 
takeover of other firms, even in unrelated or loosely related businesses. The reaction 
of the other firms is expected to restore some sort of equilibrium in the industry in 
terms of relative firm size.
There is an incentive to increase size because size makes it difficult and expensive 
for a potential bidder. The targets are usually left to manage their own business with 
minimum interference possibly due to the bidder’s lack of expertise in the target’s 
business and/or the difference in the bidder’s management style (i.e. Strategic control 
or Financial control type of management).
Robin Marris (1964), Mueller (1969) and Murphy (1985) suggest that bidder 
managers pursue growth rather than profit objective because size provides both 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits to the bidder managers. Wiedenbaum and 
Vogt (1987) argue that managers prefer to increase the size of their corporation 
because the ability of shareholders to monitor management decreases in larger and 
complex organisations.
If most bidder managers pursue takeovers basically for growth purposes at the 
expense of their shareholders’ interests, we can expect on average their combined 
gains to be either zero or negative.
The findings of positive and significant combined gains shown in Table 9.5 above 
are not consistent with the hypothesis that bidders pursue takeovers with the intention 
to increase firm size rather than shareholders’wealth. The findings are consistent with 
the activities of large conglomerates in the U.K., such as BTR and Hanson Trust. 
Their success is attributable to the strong management team which effectively 
employs a ’financial-control’ type of management style and pursues an effective 
rationalisation policy once it takes control of the target resources.
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BTR and Hanson Trust takeover firms in unrelated business, keep the most profitable 
part of the business and sell off the other parts which have very poor fit with its own 
business and are making losses. The proceeds from the sale help to recoup part of 
the purchase price.
The positive significant combined gains of bidders and targets in this research do 
not support Roll’s (1986) hubris hypothesis which postulates that takeovers are a 
zero-sum game, that is, gains to target shareholders are offset by the losses to bidder 
shareholders. In the U.K., there is no published evidence of combined gains of 
bidders and targets in hostile takeovers, though there is evidence of combined gains 
of merging firms in the industrial sector provided by Firth (1980) and in the brewing 
and distilling sector by Franks, Broyles and Hecth (1977). However, it is not 
appropriate to compare the findings of combined gains of firms involved in hostile 
bids in this study with those of F irth ’s or Frank’s et.al because mergers are 
technically different from hostile bids.
9.8: The presence of co-insurance effect
Lewellen (1971)) has suggested that when a bidder takes over a target whose 
cashflows are not perfectly correlated with its own, there would be a reduction in the 
default risk of the combined firm’s debt and an increase in the market value of the 
debt. Assuming the takeover has no synergistic wealth creating effects (i.e. the 
combined gains of bidder and target are zero), an increase in the market value of debt 
would be offset by an equal decrease in the value of the combined firm s equity. 
This implies a wealth transfer from shareholders to debtholders (i.e. bondholders or 
other forms of lenders). This phenomenon is termed as the co-insurance effect, and 
can also take the form of wealth transfer from debtholders to shareholders if the 
bidder management invest in risky projects with new debt.
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Higgins and Schall (1975) have suggested that one way to negate the transfer of 
wealth from shareholders to debtholders is for the bidder to increase its financial 
leverage before the takeover to a point that the post-takeover default risk of 
previously outstanding debt is sufficiently increased. This implies that if the co- 
insurance effect of wealth transfer from shareholders to debtholders is present, 
shareholders of low financial leveraged bidders will tend to suffer greater losses (or 
earn lower returns) than the shareholders of bidders with a higher degree of leverage. 
This implication is tested on a total sample of bidders in takeovers in this study, 
which were subdivided into categories of high, medium and low leverage firms.
The financial leverage was measured in terms of total loan capital divided by the 
total capital employed as per latest balance sheet before the announcement of the 
offer, which ranged from 0% to 29%. It was arbitrarily decided that those bidders 
that had leverage from zero to 9.99% will be classified as low leveraged bidders, 
those in the range of 10% to 19.99% as medium leveraged and those with higher than 
20% as highly leveraged. Financial leverage was measured in terms of total loan 
capital divided by total capital employed because it was easily available.
Specifically, the following hypothesis is tested:
Hq: Bidders in the high leverage category earn higher returns than those in the 
low leverage category at the two-day announcement period.
H :^ Bidders in the high leverage category earn an equal or lower returns than 
those in the low leverage category at the two-day announcement period.
The abnormal returns of bidders classified according to the degree of financial 
leverage, for the eleven days surrounding the announcement are presented in Table
9.8 (A) in the Appendix and the summary of the two-day announcement abnormal 
returns and cumulative abnormal returns are presented in Table 9.6 below.
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Table 9.6
Summary of the two-day announcement abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) for bidders in the low, medium and high financial 
leverage categories. The t-statistics are in parentheses.
Degree of Leverage
Low Medium High
(0-9.99%) (10-19.99%) (>20%) 
N=34 N=29 N=27
Difference 
in CAR of Low 
and High Group
Event Day AR AR AR
-1 -0.1059 -0.2471 0.0498
(-0.618) (-1.308) (0.259)
0 -0.7037 -0.9852 -0.490
(-4.103)** (-5.213)** (2.546)*
CAR(-1,0)-0.8096 -1.233 -0.440 -0.3696
(-3.34)** (-4.69)** (-1.62) (-1.72)
** Significantly different from zero at 1 % level 
* Significantly different from zero at 5 % level
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9.8.1. Comparison of returns to bidders in the ’high’ and ’low’ leverage 
category.
Table 9.6 shows that the two-day announcement cumulative abnormal return for 
bidders in the low leverage category is negative (CAR= -0.8096) and significantly 
different from zero at 1 % level (t=- 3.34). The two-day announcement CAR for 
bidders in the high leverage category is also negative (CAR= - 0.440 ) but not 
significantly different from zero (t= -1.62). The difference in the two-day 
announcement cumulative abnormal returns of bidders in the low leverage category 
and that of high leverage category is negative (-0.3696), but not significantly 
different from zero (t= -1.72). Based on these findings, the null hypothesis of higher 
returns to bidders in high leverage category than those in the low leverage category at 
the two- day announcement period cannot be accepted.
Though no direct test of wealth transfer was carried out due to the lack of 
appropriate sample, the findings of no difference in the returns to shareholders of 
bidders in the high and low leveraged categories at the announcement of the offer is 
not consistent with the implication that shareholders of low leveraged bidding firms 
earn lower returns than the shareholders in highly leveraged bidding firms.
9.8.2: Returns to bidders in the ’medium’ leverage group
Table 9.6 shows that the two-day announcement cumulative abnormal returns for 
bidders in the ’medium’ leverage group is negative (CAR= -1.233) and significantly 
different from zero at 1 % level, which is apparently lower than the returns to bidders 
in the Tow’ and ’high’ leverage groups. However, the difference in the two-day 
announcement CAR of bidders in the ’medium’, ’low’ and high leverage groups is 
not significantly different from zero.
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9.9. The presence of the day of the week effect on bidder and target returns in 
takeovers
It has been suggested in the literature that prices of shares in major stock exchanges 
are subjected to the day of the week effect, which implies that prices of shares tend to 
be persistently low on Mondays relative to other trading days of the week (Fama 
(1965), Cross (1973), French (1980) and Gibbon and Hess (1981)). For example, 
Fama (1965) reports that Monday’s variance of daily returns is about 20% higher 
than other days, Cross (1973), French (1980) and Gibbons and Hess (1981) also 
provide evidence of negative average returns for Mondays.
One explanation offered for this effect is that firms release bad news just before the 
market closes on Friday and the effect on the share price is reflected on Monday, 
although this explanation is inconsistent with efficient markets.
In this study, 25% of the takeover announcement fell on Mondays, so it is possible 
that the day of the week effect could have partially influenced the bidder and target 
returns at the announcement of the offer. To ascertain this possibility, dummy 
variable regressions were run for all the bidder and targets in which the dependent 
variable is the two-day announcement cumulative abnormal returns and the 
independent variable is given the value of one if the announcement falls on Monday 
and a value of zero if the announcement falls on other days.
The results of the regressions on bidders and targets are presented in Tables 9.7 and
9.8 respectively below:
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Table 9.7
Regression results for all the bidders in the takeover sample and for bidders 
classified according to the means of payment offered. Regressions A to D uses 
the two-day announcement abnormal returns as the dependent variable. The t- 
statistics are shown in the parenthesis.
Regressions Intercept Monday Effect N r2(%)
A (CASH) -0.198 -0.322
(-0.44)
30 7.0
B (SHARES) -1.380 0.327
(0.37)
30 5.0
C (COMBINATION)-0.508 -0.868
(-1.08)
30 4.0
D (TOTAL) -0.787 -0.107
(-0.24)
90 10.0
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Table 9.8
Regression results for all targets in the takeover sample and for targets 
classified according to the means of payment offered. Regressions E to H uses 
the two-day announcement abnormal returns as the dependent variable. The t- 
statistics are in the parenthesis.
Regressions Intercept Monday Effect N r2(%)
E (CASH) 0.394 0.695
(1.61)
30 8.5
F (SHARES) 2.360 -1.021
(-1.52)
30 3.5
G (COMBINATION) 0.933 0.536
(1.24)
30 5.2
H (TOTAL) 1.390 -0.127
(-0.33)
90 12.1
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The findings in Tables 9.7 and 9.8 show that the Monday effect has no significant 
influence on the two-day announcement abnormal returns of bidders and targets in 
the cash, shares, combination categories and for all bidders and targets in the 
takeover sample. The Monday effect is present but not significant enough to 
influence the findings. Probably the aggregation of the returns into portfolios could 
have nullified this effect.
9.10: Returns to bidders and targets in mergers
The previous sections discussed the announcement period abnormal returns for 
bidders and targets in takeovers. This section discusses the announcement period 
returns of bidders and targets in mergers. There is a technical difference between 
takeovers and mergers in the sense that a merger is a negotiated deal between the 
bidder and target management in which the negotiations can start months before the 
official announcement. A takeover is a surprise attack on the target management, and 
the bidder directly appeals to the target shareholders to sell their shares. In a 
takeover, the target management is usually notified of the offer at very short notice 
before the announcement, in compliance with the requirement of the Takeover Code. 
This makes it difficult for the target management to defend the bid effectively.
It is desirable to compare the announcement period returns of bidders and targets in 
mergers and takeovers as, to date, there is no published evidence of such comparison 
in the U.K. There are many studies conducted on the returns to bidders and targets 
in mergers per se in the U.K., such as that of Newbould (1970), Singh (1971), Utton 
(1974), Franks, Broyles and Hecth (1977), Firth (1980), Barnes (1978, 1984) and 
Dodd and Quek (1985).
219
These studies provide evidence that bidder shareholders suffer losses and target 
shareholders enjoy gains at the announcement of the offer and the combined gains 
are not significantly different from zero.
In the US, there are studies on bidder and target returns in mergers ( Dodd (1980), 
Eckbo (1983), Dennis and McConnel (1986) ) and takeovers ( Bradley (1980), 
Bradley and Kim (1985) and Travlos (1987)) which provide a inconclusive evidence 
on bidder returns but are conclusive on the positive returns to target shareholders at 
the announcement of the offer.
Based on the evidence of mixed findings for bidder returns in mergers and takeovers 
at the announcement of the offer, Guilkey, Harris and Stewart (1983) suggested that 
the inconsistency of bidder returns in the different type of acquisition is due to the 
different type of payments employed by the bidders, as mergers are usually 
consummated through a share exchange and takeovers through cash.
However, the inconclusive bidder returns in mergers and takeovers could also be 
due to the possibility of a difference in the degree of information leakage, the 
possibility of which is higher in mergers than in takeovers.
In mergers, negotiations may start months before the official announcement, during 
which period there is a possibility of a gradual leakage of information from the 
negotiations and appropriate adjustments of the bidders’ share price in response to 
such information. In takeovers, the target management are usually caught by 
surprise and due to the relatively short time period during which takeovers are 
planned and executed, the chances of any information leakage well before the 
official announcement are minimised.
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Due to the different ways mergers and takeovers are usually planned and executed 
it is not meaningful to compare the announcement period returns to bidders and 
targets in mergers and takeovers, unless one is able to trace back the share price 
activity of firms in mergers from the day the negotiations started. Due to the 
difficulty of tracing back the share price activity of bidder firm in mergers from the 
first day of negotiations, no comparison of returns to bidders and targets in mergers 
and takeovers at the announcement is attempted.
Previous studies on bidder and target returns in mergers in the U.K. were done on 
firms sampled in the late seventies and the attempt here is to revisit the subject in 
context of more recent evidence, especially when considerable regulatory and 
economic changes have taken place since the earlier studies were conducted. 
Specifically, the following hypotheses will be tested:
(Bidder Returns)
Hq: Bidders in mergers earn zero or negative abnormal returns at the two-day 
announcement period.
Hj: Bidders in mergers earn positive abnormal returns at the two-day
announcement period.
(Target Returns)
Hq: Targets in mergers earn positive abnormal returns at the two-day
announcement period.
Hj: Targets in mergers earn zero or negative abnormal returns at the two-
day announcement period.
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(Combined Returns)
Hq* ^he combined returns of bidders and targets in mergers is zero or 
negative at the two-day announcement period.
H The combined returns of bidders and targets in mergers is positive at the 
two-day announcement period.
The abnormal returns and the cumulative abnormal returns of merger bidders and 
targets for the eleven days surrounding the official announcement is presented in 
Tables 9.9 (A) and (B) respectively in the Appendix. The summary of the returns on 
the announcement day is presented in Table 9.9 below:
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Table 9.9
Summary of the abnormal returns (AR) and the two-day announcement 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of bidders and targets in mergers. The t- 
statistics are in parentheses.
Event Day Bidder Target
-1 0.2404 0.1704
(1.102) (0.781)
0 -0.4974 1.9756
(-2.279)* (9.053)**
CAR (-1,0) -0.257 2.146
(-0.471) (3.65)**
Combined Gains 1.889
(2.45)*
** Significantly different from zero at 1 % level 
* Significantly different from zero at 5 % level
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9.10.1: Bidder returns in mergers
The announcement day (day 0) abnormal return for bidders is negative (AR= 
-0.4974) and significantly different from zero at 5 % level (t=-2.279). This implies 
that even if there was information leakage during negotiations it was not complete as 
the merger announcement still had information for the market. The two-day 
announcement cumulative abnormal returns for bidders are not significantly different 
from zero (CAR= -0.257, t= -0.471). Unlike the returns to bidders in takeovers, the 
returns to merger bidders are expected to be spread over time as there is greater 
chances of information leakage in mergers which are negotiated long before the 
official announcement. Therefore, the two-day announcement returns are probably 
an underestimation of the total wealth effect of merger announcement. Since merger 
bidders had some form of ownership in the target ranging from 5% to 29%, any 
gains or losses expected from the information leaked must have been gradually 
captured by the bidder’s share price. Based on these findings, the null hypothesis of 
zero or negative abnormal returns to bidders in mergers at the two-day announcement 
period cannot be rejected.
The two-day cumulative abnormal returns for bidders in this study are consistent 
with Asquith’s (1983) and Eckbo’s (1983) findings and inconsistent with Dodd’s 
(1980) findings on bidder returns in mergers in the US. Asquith found insignificant 
performance (CAR=0.002, t=0.78) as did Eckbo (CAR=0.0007, t=0.12) for the two- 
day announcement period. Dodd found significant negative CAR for merger bidders 
in his sample (CAR=-0.0109, t=2.980).
In the U.K., Firth’s (1980) and Dodd and Quek’s (1985) findings on bidder returns 
in mergers at announcement cannot be directly compared with the findings of bidder 
returns in this study because they used monthly rather than daily returns.
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Nevertheless, the direction of bidder returns in mergers in this study is inconsistent 
with Firth’s (1980) findings and consistent with Dodd and Queks’s (1985) findings. 
Firth reported that merger bidders in his sample experienced significant negative 
monthly abnormal returns (AR=- 0.063, t=-5.971) in the announcement month. He 
interprets these results as an indication of the merger being too expensive as costs of 
administrating the merger (i.e. premiums paid and the uncertainty involved in the 
merger at the announcement) more than outweigh the expected benefits (i.e. synergy 
and improvement of profitability).
Dodd and Quek (1985) found that bidders in their sample earned negative monthly 
abnormal returns (AR=-0.0002) in the announcement month, which were not 
statistically significant (t=-0.0002).
9.10.2: Target returns in mergers
The abnormal return to targets on the announcement day is positive (AR= 1.9756) 
and significantly different from zero at 1 % level (t=9.053). The two-day 
announcement period cumulative abnormal return is also positive (CAR= 2.146) and 
significantly different from zero at 1 % level (t= 3.650).
Based on these findings, the null hypothesis of positive abnormal returns to targets 
in mergers at the two-day announcement period cannot be rejected at 1 percent level. 
These findings are consistent with the findings of Asquith (1983), Eckbo (1983) and 
Dodd (1980) on returns to merger targets at the two-day announcement period in the 
US. The findings on target returns in mergers in the U.K. by Firth (1980) are not 
directly comparable because he used monthly returns instead of daily returns. 
However, the direction of his findings is consistent with the findings of this study, 
that target shareholders earn positive abnormal returns in the announcement month.
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9.10.3: Combined returns in mergers
The two-day announcement period abnormal returns to target shareholders (CAR= 
2.146) more than compensate the two-day announcement returns to bidder 
shareholders (CAR= -0.257) and the combined return is positive (1.889) and 
significantly different from zero at 5 % level (t=2.45).
This implies that announcement of mergers do have positive wealth effects on the 
shareholders of the combined firm and the null hypothesis of zero or negative 
combined returns of bidder and targets at the two-day announcement period is 
rejected at 5 percent level of significance.
These findings of positive and significant combined returns at the two -day 
announcement period implies that mergers do create wealth for the shareholders of 
the combined firm except that at the announcement of the offer most of this potential 
wealth apparently accrues to the target shareholders.
Overall, the bidder shareholders in mergers do not lose at the announcement as their 
returns are not significantly different from zero. However, the combined returns to 
bidders and targets are significantly positive, implying that mergers do create wealth 
for the shareholders of the combined firm.
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Chapter 10
Conclusions, limitations and suggestions for future research 
10.1: Conclusions
The following conclusions are implied by the findings of this research:
Shareholders of share and combination bidders earned significant negative abnormal 
returns at the two-day announcement period, whereas shareholders of cash bidders 
did not suffer losses. These findings support the ’information hypothesis’ suggested 
by Myers and Majluf (1984). For potential investors, the chance to design a 
profitable trading strategy based on the knowledge of the findings is constrained by 
the speed of adjustment and by transaction costs.
The two-day announcement cumulative abnormal returns of all bidders in the 
takeover sample are significantly negative, which could have been due to one or 
more of the following factors: expected loss of efficiency in the bidder’s current 
business operations due to management time and effort spent on pursuing the 
takeover; the takeover’s lack of commercial or industrial logic as perceived by the 
market. Large premiums offered to target at announcement, probably due to the 
expected resistance from the target, competition from other potential bidders and lack 
of information about the target’s business and its industry, could also have 
contributed towards the negative returns. These negative abnormal returns to bidders 
are, however, insufficient evidence that bidder management are not acting in the best 
interest of their shareholders, because the findings do not account for the total effect 
of the takeover but just the two-day announcement returns. There is also no evidence 
to indicate that the loss to shareholders benefits the management. It is naive to 
assume that bidder managers are consistently making irrational investment decisions, 
because this would jeopardise their own position as they would become the target of
other bidders.
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The majority of the bidders may be pursuing targets merely as a long term strategy 
to gain a competitive advantage in their respective markets or industries. This view 
is supported by the fact that the combined gains of bidders and targets are 
significantly positive implying that the takeovers do create wealth for the 
shareholders of the combined firm.
It is also possible that bidders’ do not make investment decisions based on the 
market signals because they do not believe in market efficiency. The bidders’ make 
investment decisions based on long-term view and believe that the market views 
investments on short-term basis.
The findings on bidder returns in takeovers in this research and those documented by 
other studies in the US, imply that in takeover situations bidder shareholders require 
some form of protection against management ambition. However, intervention is 
likely to be undesirable because shareholders are free to make their own choice as 
they have the legal right to vote against the management and to reinvest their capital 
in other firms of their choice. Legislation for investors’ protection is not designed to 
secure investors against losses resulting from their own decisions but to ensure that 
the investors are treated fairly by accepted standards.
Shareholders of target firms earned significant positive abnormal returns for the 
two-day announcement period irrespective of the form of payment (cash, shares, and 
combination) and the type of acquisition (mergers or takeovers). In takeovers, there 
was no significant difference in the two-day announcement period returns of cash and 
share targets. This implies that cash targets are not compensated for the capital gains 
tax liability, probably because U.K. investors are provided with the opportunity to 
minimise the liability themselves. TheU X  C a p i t a l  Gains Tax system is designed to 
encourage large and small investors to invest in shares.
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There is no evidence of a difference in announcement period returns to shareholders 
of low leveraged bidding firms and those in the high leverage bidding firms. It is 
possible that the difference in the degree of leverage between the ’high’ and ’low’ 
leverage bidders was too small to detect any implication of difference in shareholder 
returns.
This research was based on the assumption that the capital market is at least semi­
strong efficient. Since the analysis covered only eleven days surrounding the official 
announcement, it is not possible to infer that the findings of this study support this 
assumption. However, the significant positive combined gains of bidders and targets 
in both takeovers and mergers at the two- day announcement period imply that the 
securities market is strong form inefficient in the sense that financial markets were 
unable to anticipate all the information contained in the bid announcement.
For the sample of mergers, the two-day announcement period returns were positive 
for the targets, consistent with the findings of the earlier studies on merger targets in 
the U.K. and the US. The returns to bidders for the same period was not significantly 
different from zero.
The combined gains at the two-day announcement period were significantly positive 
implying that the announcements of mergers does have a positive wealth effect on the
share price of the combined firm.
The findings of positive and significant combined returns of merger bidders and 
targets in this research are not directly comparable with the findings of earlier studies 
on mergers in the U.K., because the earlier studies based their findings on monthly 
rather than daily returns. However, the findings of earlier studies suggest that the 
combined gains in mergers are not significantly different from zero (Firth (1979)).
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10.2: Limitations of study
The findings of this research are subjected to the following limitations:
(a) The sample size is relatively small as it was difficult to establish a large sample 
which satisfied all the sampling requirements.
(b) The study is based on a sample of successful bids. The exclusion of unsuccessful 
bids from the sample introduces a bias, assuming the distribution of failures is 
different across financing methods. The literature provides evidence that share offers 
have a higher probability of failures than cash offers (Jensen and Ruback (1983)).
The negative returns to bidders offering shares in this study could be due to the 
possibility of failure and information effects, which are difficult to distinguish 
without an analysis of the returns to bidders and targets in a sample of unsuccessful 
bids.
(c) To the extent that takeover and merger announcements are partially anticipated, 
the measured abnormal returns will understate the effect at announcement. The 
findings of this study did not indicate any anticipation of acquisition in the five days 
prior to the official announcement.
However, any such anticipation could have occurred prior to day -5 and 
consequently the abnormal returns on the announcement day will not reflect the 
complete effect of the information in the announcement.
(d) To eliminate the confounding effects of other events on the returns to bidders 
and targets during the analysis period, the firms sampled in this research were 
screened for such events. Nevertheless, there could have been other factors 
influencing the results which were not identified.
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(e) The market model used to generate the expected returns in this study allows only 
the influence of the market factor to be removed from the returns. The residual 
(abnormal return) represents the influence of the takeover or merger announcement 
plus the influence of the statistical bias such as measurement errors and model 
mispecifications and the influence of omitted (unidentified) variables.
Ideally, to measure the impact of the merger and takeover accurately, it is desirable to 
remove the influences of these other variables from the expected returns. In reality, it 
is not possible to completely eliminate the effect of these other factors on the residual 
term, and any such effects are assumed to be minimal.
10.3: Suggestions for future research
There are many areas of takeovers and mergers which can be researched assuming 
that data are available. The issues addressed by this study could be extended to cover 
the following aspects:
(a) To ascertain whether the announcement period returns to bidders and targets in 
unsuccessful takeovers subjected to the different form of payments, behave in the 
same manner as the findings of this study. This might illuminate the extent to which 
the announcement period returns to bidders and targets in takeovers are influenced by 
the probability of success or failure of the bid. An analysis of target returns in 
unsuccessful takeovers might also help to explain whether the positive revaluation of 
target shares at the announcement of the offer is due to the information content in the 
announcement or it is due to the expectation that target resources would be put to a 
better use by the bidder through a transfer of control of the target s resources to the
bidder.
231
(b) Due to lack of an appropriate sample, this study could not test the magnitude and 
direction of wealth transfers between shareholders and debtholders. To address the 
possibility of a co- insurance effect requires a study of the announcement period 
returns of shareholders and bondholders of a sample of bidder firms involved in 
takeovers but whose combined gains at the announcement of the offer are not 
significantly different from zero. With such a sample, if there is any evidence of 
transfer of wealth, than the magnitude and the direction of the wealth transfer can be 
determined.
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APPENDIX 
TABLE 9 (A)
Daily average abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for 
the sample of thirty bidders offering shares to their target shareholders, for the 
eleven days surrounding the initial announcement.
Years 1985 through 1988
Event Day AR t-Value CAR
-5 -0.0521 -0.285 -0.0521
-4 0.2651 1.452 0.2130
-3 0.1872 1.025 0.4002
-2 -0.0154 -0.084 0.3848
-1 -0.3662 -2.006 0.0186
0 -0.8898 -4.874** -0.8266
1 -0.4753 -2.603* -1.3020
2 -0.1309 -0.717 -1.4329
3 0.0663 0.363 -1.3666
4 0.2056 1.126 -1.1610
5 0.1384 0.758 -1.0226
**
*
Significantly different from zero at 1% level 
Significantly different from zero at 5% level
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TABLE 9 (B)
Daily average abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns for the 
sample of thirty bidders offering cash to their target shareholders, for the eleven 
days surrounding the initial announcement.
Years 1985 through 1988
Event Day AR t-Value CAR
-5 0.0694 0.380 0.0694
-4 0.3681 2.018 0.4373
-3 0.1003 0.549 0.5377
-2 0.3568 1.964 0.8963
-1 0.1129 0.618 1.0092
0 -0.3699 -2.026 0.6458
1 0.4264 2.336* 1.0722
2 0.0720 0.395 1.1442
3 0.2531 1.386 1.3973
4 0.0584 0.319 1.4557
5 0.1593 0.873 1.6150
* Significantly different from zero at 5% level
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TABLE 9 (C)
Daily average abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for a
sample of thirty bidders offering a combination of shares and cash to their target
shareholders, for the eleven days surrounding the initial announcement.
Years 1985 through 1988
Event Day AR t-Value CAR
-5 0.2735 1.498 0.2735
-4 -0.1160 -0.635 0.1575
-3 0.0503 0.276 0.2078
-2 0.0951 0.521 0.3029
-1 -0.0296 -0.162 0.2733
0 -0.8871 -4.858** -0.6138
1 -0.0920 -0.504 -0.7058
2 -0.1385 -0.759 -0.8443
3 -0.2001 -1.096 -1.0444
4 -0.1655 -0.906 -1.2099
5 -0.0503 -0.276 -1.2602
** Significantly different from zero at 1% level
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TABLE 9.1(A)
Differences in average abnormal returns (AR) between cash and share bidders, 
for the eleven days surrounding the initial announcement.
Event Day Differences in AR t-Value
-5 0.121 0.600
-4 0.105 0.360
-3 -0.087 -0.480
-2 0.380 1.260
-1 0.480 1.470
0 0.519 1.970
1 0.910 3.170**
2 0.203 1.010
3 0.184 0.770
4 -0.146 -0.560
5 0.021 0.110
** Significantly different from zero at 1% level
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TABLE 9.1(B)
Differences in the average abnormal returns (AR) between cash and combination 
bidders, for the eleven days surrounding the initial announcement.
Event Day Differences in AR t-Value
-5 -0.205 -0.870
-4 0.486 1.740
-3 0.050 0.210
-2 0.265 0.990
-1 0.206 0.871
0 0.581 2.390*
1 0.520 1.970
2 0.210 1.260
3 0.450 1.080
4 0.225 0.900
5 0.209 1.180
* Significantly different from zero at 5% level
237
TABLE 9.1(C)
D ifferences in the average abnormal returns (AR) between share and
combination bidders, for the eleven days surrounding the initial announcement.
Event Day Differences in AR t-Value
-5 -0.326 -1.600
-4 0.381 1.690
-3 0.137 0.590
-2 -0.115 -0.440
-1 -0.272 -1.301
0 0.061 0.240
1 -0.390 -1.362
2 0.007 0.040
3 0.266 1.481
4 0.371 1.720
5 0.188 1.050
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TABLE 9.2 (A)
Average abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns for a sample of 
thirty targets subjected to shares offer, for the eleven days surrounding the initial 
announcement.
Years 1985 through 1988
Event Day AR t-Value CAR
-5 -0.0091 -0.049 -0.0091
-4 0.0788 0.432 0.0697
-3 0.2209 1.209 0.2787
-2 0.2533 1.387 0.5320
-1 1.1700 6.408** 1.7020
0 2.5010 13.693** 4.2030
1 0.1205 0.660 4.3235
2 -0.0960 -0.526 4.2275
3 0.0060 0.330 4.2335
4 0.0633 0.347 4.2968
5 0.0138 0.076 4.3106
** Significantly different from zero at 1%
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TABLE 9.2 (B)
Average abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for a
sample of thirty targets subjected to cash offers, for the eleven days surrounding 
the initial announcement.
Years 1985 through 1988
Event Day AR t-Value CAR
-5 0.0176 0.096 0.0176
-4 -0.0183 -0.100 -0.0007
-3 0.0665 0.365 0.0658
-2 0.0957 0.524 0.1615
-1 1.6703 9.148** 1.8318
0 2.2039 12.066** 4.0357
1 0.0589 0.323 4.0946
2 -0.0218 -0.119 4.0728
3 -0.0097 -0.054 4.0631
4 -0.0038 -0.021 4.0593
5 0.0264 0.145 4.0858
** Significandy different from zero at 1% level
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TABLE 9.2 (C)
Average abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for a 
sample of thirty targets subjected to a combination of cash and share offer, for the 
eleven days surrounding the initial announcement.
Years 1985 through 1988
Event Day AR t-Value CAR
-5 -0.0809 -0.443 -0.0809
-4 0.0633 0.347 -0.1176
-3 0.0668 0.366 0.0492
-2 0.3821 2.093* 0.4313
-1 1.1981 6.562** 1.6294
0 1.7128 9.381** 3.3422
1 -0.0564 -0.309 3.2858
2 0.0814 0.446 3.3672
3 -0.0127 -0.069 3.3545
4 0.0729 0.399 3.4274
5 -0.0079 -0.043 3.4195
** Significantly different from zero at 1% level 
* Significantly different from zero at 5% level
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TABLE 9.3 (A)
Differences in the average abnormal returns between cash and share
the eleven days surrounding the initial announcement.
rent Day Differences in AR t-Value
-5 0.027 0.430
-4 -0.097 -1.180
-3 -0.154 -1.100
-2 -0.157 -1.180
-1 0.500 0.820
0 -0.297 -1.520
1 -0.062 -0.510
2 0.074 1.201
3 -0.016 -0.160
4 -0.067 -1.250
5 0.012 0.200
targets for
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TABLE 9.3(B)
Differences in the average abnormal returns between share and combination targets
for the eleven days surrounding the initial announcement.
Event Day Differences in AR t-Value
-5 0.072 1.250
-4 0.016 0.140
-3 0.154 1.010
-2 -0.127 -0.540
-1 0.472 0.760
0 0.491 0.890
1 0.177 1.180
2 0.077 1.261
3 0.019 0.190
4 -0.637 -0.850
5 0.022 0.370
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TABLE 9.3 (C)
Differences in the abnormal returns between cash and combination 
the eleven days surrounding the initial announcement.
Event Day Differences in AR t-Value
-5 0.099 1.390
-4 -0.081 -0.920
-3 0.000 0.000
-2 -0.284 -1.340
-1 -0.028 -0.150
0 0.788 0.980
1 0.115 0.880
2 -0.103 -1.060
3 0.003 0.004
4 -0.704 -0.940
5 0.034 0.620
targets for
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TABLE 9.4 (A)
Average abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of all 
n,_ne y. ! .e!'f. ". e e. ! en days surroun<*ing the initial announcement
Years 1985 through 1988
Event Day AR t-Value CAR
-5 0.1017 0.965 0.1017
-4 0.1729 1.641 0.2746
-3 0.1394 1.323 0.4140
-2 0.1789 1.697 0.5929
-1 -0.1005 -0.954 0.4924
0 -0.8915 -8.457** -0.1801
1 -0.0367 -0.348 -0.2167
2 -0.0743 -0.706 -0.2911
3 0.0365 0.346 -0.2546
4 0.0323 0.306 -0.2223
5 0.0823 0.782 -0.1400
** Significantly different from zero at
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TABLE 9.4 (B)
Average abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of all 
ninety target firms for the eleven days surrounding the initial announcement.
Years 1985 through 1988
Event Day AR t-Value CAR
-5 -0.0226 -0.215 -0.0226
-4 0.0400 0.380 0.0174
-3 0.1139 1.081 0.1313
-2 0.2658 2.521* 0.3971
-1 1.4322 7.844** 1.8293
0 2.0534 11.250** 3.8827
1 0.0377 0.358 3.9204
2 -0.0087 -0.082 3.9117
3 -0.0094 -0.090 3.9023
4 0.0250 0.237 3.9273
5 0.0080 0.076 3.9353
** Significantly different from zero at 1% level 
* Significantly different from zero at 5% level
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TABLE 9.8 (A)
Degree of Leverage
Low Medium High
(0-9.99%) (10-19.99%) (>20%)
N=34 N=29 N=27
Event Day AR t-Value AR t-Value AR t-Value
-5 -0.0071 -0.041 0.0424 0.225 0.1602 0.832
-4 0.0324 0.189 0.3533 1.869 0.2667 1.386
-3 0.0617 0.360 0.0013 0.007 0.1178 0.612
-2 -0.0608 -0.355 -0.0562 -0.298 0.4830 2.507*
-1 -0.1059 -0.618 -0.2417 -1.308 0.0498 0.259
0 -0.7037 -4.103**-0.9852 -5.213**-0.4901 -2.546*
1 -0.0811 -0.473 -0.1372 -0.726 -0.1215 -0.631
2 -0.2322 -1.748 0.0893 0.519 0.0515 0.268
3 -0.2998 -1.768 0.0794 0.473 0.0968 0.503
4 0.0037 0.0215 0.3341 1.767 0.1052 0.547
5 0.3182 1.856 0.0841 0.445 -0.0238 -0.123
** Significantly different from zero at 1% level 
* Significantly different from zero at 5% level
Total Loan Capital 
Degree of Leverage = ^ e d "
247
TABLE 9.11(A)
Daily average abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR)
of merger bidders for the eleven days surrounding the announement of the offer.
Years 1985 through 1988
Event Day AR t-Value CAR
-5 0.0402 0.184 0.0402
-4 0.0158 0.070 0.0560
-3 0.1436 0.658 0.1996
-2 0.1813 0.830 0.3809
-1 0.2404 1.102 0.6213
0 -0.4974 -2.279* 0.1239
1 -0.3161 -1.449 -0.1922
2 -0.3325 -1.524 -0.5247
3 -0.0086 -0.039 -0.5333
4 -0.0338 -0.155 -0.5671
5 -0.1158 -0.530 -0.6829
* Significantly different from zero at 5% level
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TABLE 9.11(B)
Daily average abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of 
merger targets for the eleven days surrounding the announcement of the merger.
Years 1985 through 1988
Event Day AR t-Value CAR
-5 -0.0674 -0.309 -0.0674
-4 0.0057 0.026 -0.0617
-3 0.2999 1.374 0.2382
-2 0.1687 0.773 0.4069
-1 0.1704 0.781 0.5773
0 1.9756 9.053** 2.5529
1 -0.1068 -0.489 2.4461
2 0.0548 0.267 2.5009
3 -0.0435 -0.199 2.4574
4 0.1514 0.694 2.6088
5 -0.1481 -0.678 2.4607
** Significantly different from zero at 1% level
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List of Firms in Takeovers 
Cash Offers
Bidders Beta Targets Beta
Bank of Scotland 0.66 Bank of Wales -0.39
Unigate 1.54 Oldace -0.89
Hillsdown Hold 1.08 Bluebird Confectionary 0.22
Meyer International 0.89 Brown Lee 1.23
Davy Corporation 1.29 Monk A -0.02
British Commonwealth Shippingl.43 Stell Brothers Holdings -0.01
Imperial Chemical Industries -0.01 Scottish Agri. Ind. -0.72
Allied Textiles Co. 0.29 Blumer & Lumb Holdings 0.44
Tarmac 1.14 Feb International 0.64
General Electric Co. 0.47 Micro Scope -0.81
Ratners 0.83 Jones Ernest 0.95
TSB 0.79 Hill Samuel -0.10
Sears 1.10 Freemans 0.04
Dixons 0.85 Wigfalls 0.34
Wool worth Holdings 1.57 Tip Top Drugs 0.12
RMC 0.81 Wettern Brothers -0.10
H Samuel 1.48 James Walker 0.11
Charterhall 0.98 Allebone -0.15
William Holdings 1.03 Spencer Clark -0.07
BM Group 1.37 Benford Concrete 0.04
Gallacher 1.33 NSS Newsagents 0.67
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United Parcels 0.17
Citicorp 0.69
Bardon Hill Group 0.33
Enterprise Oil 0.19
M K Electric 0.91
Tilbury Group 1.15
Unilever 0.09
Hep worth Ceramic Holdings 1.14 
Trusthouse Forte -0.03
York Trailer Holdings 0.12
Seccombe Marshall&Campion 0.86 
Vectis Stone -0.05
Saxon Oil -0.01
Friedland Doggart -1.67
West Group International -0.13
Brooke Bond -0.01
Henderson Group -0.19
Kennedy Brookes 0.25
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Share Offers
Bidders Beta Targets Beta
Trafalgar House 1.55 Brown John 1.00
F H Tomkins 0.97 Pegler Hattersley 0.78
Bet 1.54 Shorrock 0.05
Priest Marians 0.68 Linkroft Kilgour 0.39
Evode Group 0.23 Supra 0.24
UEI 0.03 Miles 33 0.04
Boots -0.08 Clement Clarke Hold. 1.00
King & Shaxson 0.43 Smith St. Aubyn 0.64
London & Edinburg Trust 0.81 1928 Investments 0.03
Hollis 1.48 Exco 0.73
Wardwhite 0.04 Grosvenor Group 0.60
Tootal 1.02 LCP Holdings 0.49
BSG International 0.01 Sandhurst Marketing 0.68
Coloroll 0.37 Restonor -0.24
Williams Holdings 0.78 Forgaty 0.22
Goldsmith Group 0.75 London& Midland Ind. -0.04
BTP -0.65 Prince of Wales -0.34
Peek Holdings 2.12 Owens 1.04
Rank Hovis McDougall 0.27 Barrow Hepburn 0.35
Evered Holdings 1.40 Sarasota Technology 0.94
Newman Tonks -0.03 Avana 0.93
Tesco 1.05 London & Northern 0.57
Granada Group 0.90 Peerless 1.81
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Harrisons & Crossfields 1.17 Hilliards 0.86
Meggit Holdings 0.30 WSL Holdings -0.13
Bestwood 0.74 Paul Michaels 0.23
Freemans -0.15 Bestobell 0.98
Dowding & Mills 1.30 Barrie Invest.& Fin. -0.16
British Syphoon 0.50 Warehouse Group 0.51
Bunzl 0.64 Bootham Engineering -0.05
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Cash and Share Offers
Bidders Beta Targets Beta
Bunzl 0.46 Moss Roberts 0.12
Ratners 0.70 H Samuel 0.13
McKechnie Brothers 0.71 PSM International 0.32
Turner & Bull 0.88 AE 0.25
Sketchly 1.79 Equipu 0.23
Emess Lighting 0.63 Tenby Industries 0.97
Ferguson Industrial Holdings 0.28 Berisfords Group -1.67
Marley 0.56 Nottingham Brick 0.53
Granada 0.36 Electronic Rental Gp. -0.59
Ibstock Johnson 1.37 Eucalptus Pulp Mill 1.27
British Commonwealth Holdings 0.86 Abaco Investments 0.90
John Mowlem 1.59 Glasgow Stock. Trust 0.04
G M Firth 1.41 Porter Chadbum 1.21
Yule Catto 0.86 Reabrook Holdings 0.87
Crest Nicholson 0.76 Pearce CH & Sons 0.23
C H Beazer 0.15 French Kier 0.50
Scottish Heritable Trust 0.39 Robert Kitchen Taylor 1.04
Hambros 0.59 Bairstow Eves -0.35
Guinness 0.49 Distillers 0.25
Hanson Trust 0.88 Imperial Group 0.25
John Crowther 1.94 Sunbeam Wolsely -0.56
Bet 0.15 Initial 0.87
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Associated Book Publishers 0.74 Routledge Kegan& Paul -0.03
Burton Group 0.44 Debenhams -0.02
Dalgety 0.98 Gill & Duffus 1.11
Rugby Portland Cement 0.44 John Carr 1.99
Newman Tonks -0.30
•
Cartwright R 1.13
Scapa Group 0.17 United Wire 0.14
Mathew Hall 0.35 IDC Group 0.08
BSG International 1.37 Adams & Gibbons -0.02
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List of Firms in Mergers
Bidders Beta Targets Beta
Dawson International 1.12 Coats Paton -0.13
C & W Walker 0.14 Greenbank Group 0.52
Wingate 1.39 Property Holdings 0.01
Allied Plantation Group -0.04 George Dew -0.23
Property & Reversionary 0.01 Lynton Industries 0.37
Dudson & Pearce 0.46 Counter Production -0.05
Merivale Moore 0.22 Municipal Properties 0.32
Pittard Group 0.08 Gamer Booth 0.72
Atlantic Co. 0.49 Comcap 0.23
Godfrey 0.74 Sunlight -0.24
First Securities 0.28 Howtal 0.72
Ferranti 1.57 International Signal 0.89
Kennedy Smale 0.43 McLeod Russel 0.14
United Spring 1.02 Ratchiffe 0.99
Casket S 1.14 Kingley & Forest 1.29
New Tonks 0.04 Henderson 0.01
Stafford Holdings 0.83 Skiers International 0.17
Wagon Industries -0.06 Banro Industries -0.18
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Porter Chadbum 
Carless
S undell Perkins
0.19 LDH Group 0.27
0.21 Ryan International 0.30
0.62 Travos & Arnold 0.27
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